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Abstract
This thesis explores the impact of scale on the costs of HIV prevention interventions
and the contractual relationships between governments and NGOs in two Southern
Indian states. Evidence on the resources required and organisational structures for
scaling up health interventions efficiently in low income countries is scarce. The
Indian National AIDS Control Programme (NACP) is tackling the largest HIV
epidemic in the world. Between 1998 and 2004 the NACP, through state level AIDS
programmes, scaled up contracting with NGOs delivering priority targeted HIV
prevention projects for high risk populations by increasing the number of NGO
projects. Standardised data on production costs and qualitative data on transaction
costs were collected and analysed from a sample of these NGO projects in two
Indian states. Two data sets are used to explore the impact of increasing coverage
on costs: economic cost data from 17 case study interventions; and expenditure data
from 82 interventions contracted by one of the state programmes. An econometric
cost function examines the influence of coverage on costs. Factors affecting the
transaction costs of HIV prevention programmes supporting large numbers of
contracts with NGOs are identified from document review and semi-structured
interviews. Across the interventions there are variations in coverage, and total and
average costs (median cost per person reached is US$ 19.21 (range: US$ 10-51 )).
Coverage explains over 50% of the variation in total costs. The cost function
estimates confirm a non-linear relationship between average cost and coverage. The
two states use different contracting models: direct contracting; and contracting a
management agency for NGO recruitment, monitoring and evaluation and technical
support. The management agency reduces opportunity costs of leakage and poor
quality and copes better with large scale contracting than direct contracting. More
efficient scaling up could be achieved by increasing the number of interventions
delivered by an NGO rather than recruiting new NGOs. Through better
understanding costs and transaction costs, the thesis demonstrates that the
economies of scale vary with coverage and that governance must adapt with
increasing scale of operation.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1. Scaling up the response to the global HIVIAIDS
epidemic
Close to 40 million people are estimated to be living with HIV/AIDS, with forty-five
million new infections expected to occur between 2002 and 2010 (UNAIDS, 2005).
Over 60% of these new infections could be averted with a comprehensive prevention
package yet the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) estimates
that, in 2005, only one in five people needing basic HIV prevention had access to these
services (UNAIDS, 2005). With an estimated 5.7 million people living with HIV/AIDS,
India currently bears approximately 15% of the global HIV/AIDS burden and 78% of the
HIV prevalence in the region of South and South-East Asia (UNAIDS, 2006). It has the
dubious distinction of being the country with, in absolute numbers, the largest HIV
epidemic in the world. There is also a large gap in HIV prevention services. Even in
the states where prevention services have been well established, the coverage of
population groups with high risk behaviours was estimated not to exceed 25% of this
high risk population (National AIDS Control Organisation, Voluntary Health Services et
al.,2002).
Coverage of a broad range of HIV/AIDS prevention, care and treatment programmes
needs to be increased to ensure meeting the United Nations Millennium Development
Goals (USAID, UNAIDS et al., 2004; UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs,
2005). UNAIDS has highlighted the urgent need for scaling up prevention programmes
(Piot, 2004; UNAIDS, 2004b). Scaling up in this context implies increasing the output
of existing HIV prevention services as well as introducing new services in previously
uncovered areas. This requires increased resources as well as overcoming demand
and supply-side bottlenecks within the existing service delivery systems (Commission
on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001). In low income countries, an increasingly
important method used to overcome these bottlenecks, increase coverage and
increase the efficiency of services has been the contracting out of service delivery to
the not-for-profit sector (Liu, Hotchkiss et al., 2004; Loevinsohn and Harding, 2004;
Loevinsohn and Harding, 2005). In the case of HIV prevention, as well as addressing
the inability of publicly provided services to meet coverage targets, this approach takes
advantage of the non-governmental organisations' (NGOs) greater experience and
ability to reach marginalised, high-risk populations (Solomon, Chakraborty et al., 2004).
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1.2. The economics of scaling up HIV prevention services
Resources required to fill the global gap in services are estimated to be US$ 8.4 billion
in 2006 rising to US$ 11.4 billion in 2008 (UNAIDS, 2004b). However, the evidence-
base underlying these estimates is far from strong and the nature of costs of HIV/AIDS
activities in low-income countries is still poorly understood (Kumaranayake and Watts,
2000c; Kumaranayake and Watts, 2000d; Creese, Floyd et al., 2002; Marseille,
Hofmann et al., 2002; Scotland, Van Teijlingen et al., 2003; Walker, 2003; Guinness,
Levine et al., 2004). The estimates are based on existing service delivery structures,
assume constant average costs across the ranges of coverage analysed and rely on
limited data (Attaran and Sachs, 2001; Commission on Macroeconomics and Health,
2001; Schwartlander, Stover et al., 2001; UNAIDS, 2004b). Improved estimates of
resource requirements need: a greater understanding of the most appropriate methods
to overcome bottlenecks in service delivery; to take into account economic theories of
cost and production in which economies or diseconomies of scale can result in
variations in the average cost with output; and a broader range of empirical evidence
on the costs of HIV prevention services and causes of their variation. Without these
foundations, estimates of resource requirements and financing gaps may be subject to
large errors.
Economic theory predicts that a number of factors are likely to influence average costs.
The relationship between costs and output is driven by the production function. In
increasing the scale of production output behaves in different ways according to the
production relationship. Depending on the relationship between fixed and variable
inputs to production, this can result in economies or diseconomies of scale or constant
returns to scale. The nature of the relationship can be identified by comparing the
average cost (AC) with the marginal cost (MC) at different levels of output. If
MC/AC>1, then there are diseconomies of scale and average costs rise with increases
in output; if MC/AC<1, there are economies of scale and average costs are found to fall
with increases in output; and, if AC=MC then there are constant returns to scale and
the production process is said to be cost-minimising. In addition to the influence of
outputs, average costs have been found to be influenced by the production technology
applied (the mix of inputs used in service delivery), the scope (e.g. the range of
services provided), input prices, levels of efficiency including technical inefficiencies,
the context and length of time the service has been provided (Robertson, Castro et al.,
1991; Gilson, 1992; Robertson, Hall et al., 1992; Barnum and Kutzin, 1993a; Creese
and Parker, 1994; Bitran, 1995; McPake, Kumaranayake et al., 2002; Johns, Baltussen
et al., 2003; Hutton, Fox-Rushby et al., 2004; Johns and Tan-Torres, 2005).
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The most rigorous way of determining the cost-output relationship is through the
application of econometric techniques to estimate a cost function and the marginal
costs of service provision (Over, 1986; Barnum and Kutzin, 1993a; Johns and Tan-
Torres,2005). Accounting cost studies that use smaller sample sizes and explore cost
profiles to generate hypotheses about the extent and causes of cost variation can also
be used to inform on the nature of the cost-output relationship (Barnum and Kutzin,
1993a). However, standardised datasets of production costs and outputs over different
coverage ranges and contexts for existing HIV/AIDS interventions that would enable
these types of analysis are lacking, leaving a gap in knowledge associated with the
causes of variation in the costs of HIV prevention services. Added to this, the impact of
different service delivery structures on costs is also unknown.
The literature review for this thesis (see chapter 2) found that there is little evidence on
the ability of contracting out to improve coverage and efficiency, with even less
information regarding this approach in the field of HIV/AIDS programmes (Marek, Diallo
et al., 1999; Palmer, 2000; Barnett, Connor et al., 2001; Slack and Savedoff, 2001;
Oliveira-Cruz, Hanson et al., 2003; Liu, Hotchkiss et al., 2004; Peters, Mirchandani et
al., 2004; Palmer and Mills, 2005). Loevinsohn and Harding (2004 and 2005) suggest
that contracts with larger coverage may be less expensive per capita than those with
smaller coverage but this analysis does not include the transaction costs of contracting
(the costs of friction in the contracting process) (Loevinsohn and Harding, 2004;
Loevinsohn and Harding, 2005). Although key to understanding whether
improvements in efficiency have been made, transaction costs and their ability to
outweigh potential cost savings and other benefits in service delivery accruing from
contracting out are still poorly understood (Broomberg, 1994; Liu, Hotchkiss et al.,
2004).
1.3. Aims of the thesis
In order to address the information gap regarding the impact of the level of output on
costs, this thesis aims to examine costs of the delivery of HIV prevention services as
activities are scaled up in India. The thesis focus is on the supply-side. It examines
provider costs, excluding the costs of users of HIV prevention services and the
subsequent effect on demand. The thesis' objectives are to:
1. Develop a sampling frame for the costing of HIV prevention projects in Southern
India by describing the response to the epidemic and carrying out a census of
NGO HIV prevention activities in two states.
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2. Describe how costs change with coverage level by calculating the total and
average costs of HIV prevention projects targeted at high risk populations for
NGO interventions in two states in India
3. Use econometric techniques to:
• Identify economies of scale of HIV prevention projects targeted at high risk
populations for different levels of coverage by estimating marginal costs;
and
• Assess the impact of key factors, other than scale, on total and average
costs of HIV prevention
4. Identify and analyse the transaction costs of different governance arrangements
for scaling up targeted HIV prevention projects by contracting with NGOs in
three Government of India supported programmes in Southern India.
5. Integrate these analyses to identify how scale of activity affects cost and the
transaction cost characteristics of specific governance arrangements in order to
inform policy debates on expanding HIV prevention services in low income
countries.
1.4. Background to HIVIAIDS in India
India is a low-income country with GDP per capita of 2,670 International Dollars and a
ranking of 127 in the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2004). Although overall HIV
prevalence rates are low (between 0.5 and 1.5% of the adult population (UNAIDS,
2004a)) and there have been reports of the epidemic stabilising (National AIDS Control
Organisation and UNAIDS, 2001; Kumar, Jha et al., 2006), the number of people
estimated to be living with HIV/AIDS has risen from 3.9 million in 2001 to 5.7 million in
2006 (National AIDS Control Organisation, 2004a; National AIDS Control Organisation,
2005a; UNAIDS, 2006). Due to the expanding number of HIV sentinel sites (increasing
from 55 in 1994 to 659 in 2004 (National AIDS Control Organisation, 2004a; National
AIDS Control Organisation, 2005a)) and changing methodologies in the calculation of
HIV estimates, it is difficult to describe trends in prevalence. The national sentinel
surveillance surveys show that the epidemic is concentrated in 6 states - Andhra
Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Manipur, Nagaland and Tamil Nadu - where HIV
prevalence has exceeded 1% in the antenatal population and 5% among high risk
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groups 1, as shown in Figure 1.1 (National AIDS Control Organisation, 2001 b; National
AIDS Control Organisation, 2004a).
Figure 1.1: Map of high, medium and low adult HIV prevalence states in India
> 1% Antenatal Women
> 5% High Risk Group
< 5% High Risk Group
.f, .
MClmlna j~
•
Note: For the purposes of HIV sentinel surveillance, high-risk population groups include people attending
STD (sexually transmitted disease) clinics, MSM clinics and drug de-addiction centres; HIV prevalence is
defined as high if it is greater than 1% in the antenatal population, medium if it is greater than 5% in high
risk groups and low if if it is less than 5% in high risk groups.
Source: (National AIDS Control Organisation, 2004a)
With the exception of the North-eastern states (Manipur and Nagaland), the HIV
epidemic in India is largely driven by transmission through unsafe heterosexual sex
(Pais, 1996; National AIDS Control Organisation, 2000b; National AIDS Control
Organisation, 2004a; Solomon, Chakraborty et al., 2004). Sexual transmission is the
cause of 87.5% of all infections (National AIDS Control Organisation, 2004a). In 2004,
forty percent of infections were estimated to be among women (National AIDS Control
1 .
1 High risk groups are defined as people attending STD clinics, MSM clinics and drug de-addiction centres
National AIDS Control Organisation (2004a). Annual Report 2002-20031 2003-2004 (up to 31 July 2004).
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India ..
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Organisation,2005a). Increasing incidence of HIV infection in married monogamous
women (Gangakhedkar, Bentley et al., 1997; UNAIDS, 2004c) is an indication that the
epidemic is moving into the general population. However, HIV infection is still
concentrated in the most vulnerable populations, such as sex workers and their clients,
injecting drug users and migrant populations (Pais, 1996; Bryan, Fisher et al., 2000;
National AIDS Control Organisation, 2001 b; UNAIDS, 2001). HIV prevalence rates
among sex workers are known to have reached double figures in the cities of Mumbai
(60% and 52% in 1997 and 2001 respectively), Madurai (24.2% in 1990), Pune (40%
1994), Goa (29% and 51% in 1993 and 2001, respectively), Vellore (35% in 1993) and
Kakinada (42% in 2000) (Bhuyan, Dallabetta et al., 2001; National AIDS Control
Organisation, 2001 b; Wilson and Shiv Kumar, 2001; UNAIDS, 2004a). Mobile workers
such as truck drivers, a large proportion of who have sexual intercourse with non-
regular partners including sex workers, are also considered to be at risk. HIV
prevalence rates among this group of highly mobile men in Tamil Nadu was 9.4% in
1997 (AIDS Prevention and Control (APAC) Project, 1999). In addition, injecting drug
user populations are particularly vulnerable. This pattern of behaviour is linked mainly
with the North-East of India where estimates of HIV prevalence rates in these
populations range from 5% to 80% (Panda, Chatterjee et al., 1998; National AIDS
Control Organisation, 2001 b; Solomon, Chakraborty et al., 2004; UNAIDS, 2004a).
The high-risk behaviour practised by commercial sex workers and their clients and
other high risk groups has been identified as a key factor in the spread of HIV (World
Bank, 1997; World Bank Health Nutrition and Population Sector Unit. South Asia
Region, 1999; Bryan, Fisher et al., 2000; National AIDS Control Organisation, 2000b;
National AIDS Control Organisation, 2004a). Unsafe practices such as low condom
use and multiple sexual partners are common in India. For example, the national
behavioural surveillance survey (2001) showed 6.6% of the sample had a non-regular
sexual partner in the most recent year and only 32% of these consistently use
condoms (National AIDS Control Organisation, 2001 b). Another study revealed 87% of
6,000 truck drivers having had sex with a commercial sex worker while only 11% were
using condoms during commercial sex (Rao, Pilli et al., 1999). The 2002 behavioural
surveillance in Tamil Nadu showed that 27% of truckers and their helpers interviewed
had sex with non-regular partners in the previous year, although this is a decrease from
48% in 1996 (AIDS Prevention and Control Project (APAC), 2002; Solomon,
Chakraborty et al., 2004). A high prevalence of sexually transmitted infections (STI)
also indicates both unsafe sexual practices and increased risk of infection and high
rates of HIV infection observed in STI clinic patients bear this out (Thappa, Singh et al.,
1999; National AIDS Control Organisation, 2002). In addition, STI prevalence surveys
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have found overall STI prevalence rates of 15.8% in the general population in Tamil
Nadu (AIDS Prevention and Control (APAC) Project, 1998) and 42.4% among female
sex workers in Eastern Andhra Pradesh (Bhuyan, Shobarani et al., 2001)
HIV/AIDS in India adds another burden to a health system already struggling to meet
the demands placed upon it (National Commission on Macroeconomics and Health,
2005a). The Indian health system is a complex mix of central, state and local
responsibility and public, private and "not for profit" delivery mechanisms. Aside from
the centrally organised vertical programmes, decision-making in the public sector takes
place at the state level where centrally provided budgets are allocated to health
services. Although there is a large network of public health care providers, public
spending is at 1% of GOP, putting India in the bottom 20% of countries' public
expenditures on health (Peters, 2003). Household expenditure comprises over 70% of
all health expenditures, the majority of which are out-of-pocket (National Commission
on Macroeconomics and Health, 2005b; Peters, Yazbeck et al. 2002). In spite of
efforts over the last 50 years to improve access to free primary care, it is still easier and
cheaper for villagers to seek care from the local quack (National Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health, 2005b). Over 79% of outpatient care for the poor is in
the private sector which is made up of both trained and untrained providers as well as
those who practice Indian systems of medicine (Peters, Yazbeck et al. 2002). Since
the introduction of the National Health Policy of 1983, an increasingly important part of
health system development has been the creation of public-private partnerships and
the strengthening of the regulatory framework (Peters, 2003). With the successes of
the National Blindness Control and National Leprosy Programmes, there is also a
growing recognition of the need to include the not-far-profit sector as an effective
means of achieving improved access in an equitable manner and quality services
(National Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2005c).
With the assistance of the World Bank and a number of other donors, the country has
been expanding its National AIDS Control Programme (NACP) by increasing the range
and coverage of HIV prevention services. The NACP is a vertical programme located
in central government that releases funds to their implementing partners in the states.
To facilitate the expansion of activity and to expedite the release of funds, AIDS-
specific organisational structures and government arrangements have been
established. The vertical HIV/AIDS programme is being decentralised with the
establishing of autonomous state AIDS control societies (SACS). These SACS are
responsible for implementing HIV prevention and AIDS treatment and care within their
states with a budget provided by the NACP. The SACS work with a number of partner
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organisations for different activities including medical training colleges for capacity
development and public hospitals in the provision of counselling and education at
specialised STI clinics.
In the case of outreach activities for higher risk groups an innovative approach has
been taken. The SACS contract with local not-for-profit non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) to provide best practice HIV prevention projects. The model for
these projects is provided by the NACP and is based on experience from all over India.
The prevention projects comprise a combination of peer education, promotion of safer
sex behaviour, referral for treatment of STDS and provision or sales of condoms. At
the outset, the national programme planned to fund 600 NGO projects in this way
within the 5-year programme (National AIDS Control Organisation, 2000b).
Budgeting for the NGO HIV prevention projects for high risk groups is based on a
restricted set of financial analyses assuming constant average costs for all scales of
activity and organisational arrangements (National AIDS Control Organisation and
UNAIDS, 2001). The opportunity costs of these projects have yet to be calculated. In
practice, the organisational structure and new governance arrangements and the
increase in coverage have likely led to changes in the cost structure and non-linear
variation in the average costs. In such circumstances, the new organisational
structures and different levels of activity imply variations in efficiency. There have been
no analyses at the national or international level addressing the implications of this
variation in efficiency on the identification of appropriate organisational forms, optimum
levels of project coverage or resource requirement estimation.
1.5. Overview of the methods used in the thesis
To ensure a complete analysis of the provider costs of service delivery both production
and transaction costs need to be considered. The research undertaken for this thesis
therefore includes the collection and analysis of a combination of qualitative and
quantitative data on the production and transaction costs of HIV prevention services in
India. To gather the information required for the study, the research comprises four
major components with the following specific aims:
1. A mapping survey of NGO HIV prevention projects to establish a sampling
frame and assess the feasibility of the study.
2. The collection and in-depth analysis of production cost data from a set of case
study HIV prevention projects for vulnerable groups delivered by NGOs to
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identify and explain the causes of average cost variations with a particular focus
on project scale.
3. The econometric modeling of a cost function for HIV prevention services in
order to estimate the marginal costs of service delivery, identify the existence of
economies of scale at different levels of coverage and assess the impact of
other key contextual factors on total and average costs
4. The collection of qualitative data from case study funding agencies and NGO
service providers to identify and analyze the transaction costs of different
governance arrangements for scaling up HIV prevention services by contracting
out to NGOs.
1.6. Structure of the thesis
Chapter 2 lays out the rationale for the analysis based on a review of current
knowledge of the costs of scaling up HIV prevention and health services. Based on the
literature review a framework for analysis is developed. Chapter 3 then provides a
general overview of the methodology followed to study the economics of scaling up HIV
prevention interventions in Southern India. This includes the methods followed to carry
out a mapping of HIV prevention services in the region under study. Chapter 4
describes the results of the mapping analysis and provides a background for the
analysis of transaction and production costs. The subsequent three chapters present
the results of the costs of HIV prevention services in Southern India. Each chapter
provides a brief background to the analysis in the form of a supplemental literature
review, an overview of the data collection methods and the methodological approach, a
detailed description of the analytical methods applied and the results of the analyses.
Chapters 5 and 6 examine the production costs of scaling up. Chapter 5 uses a set of
case studies to explore the total and average costs and cost profiles of HIV prevention
services. Chapter 6 estimates a cost function for these services. The last of the
results chapters, Chapter 7, analyses the institutional environment and transaction
costs of large scale programmes for HIV prevention. Finally, chapter 8 presents the
discussion in the form of research and policy implications resulting from the analysis
and a summary of the results and conclusions.
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Chapter 2.
scaling up
Literature review of the economics of
2. 1. Introduction
As stated in Chapter 1, the aim of the thesis is to examine the provider costs of HIV
prevention services as activities are scaled up in India. The thesis uses the tools of the
economics of organisation to explore how state governments are scaling up HIV
prevention services and the production cost implications of their actions. This chapter
introduces the topic with a summary of the current knowledge of the supply side in the
economics of scaling up HIV prevention interventions. The chapter starts with an
overview of the methods used for the literature review. Next, in order to construct a
definition of "scaling up" the review examines interpretations of the term in the
international health policy literature. It then goes on to describe the range of HIV
prevention services provided in low income countries. Strategies used for scaling up
and knowledge regarding their constraints and costs are then identified with, given the
nature of the Indian National AIDS Control Programme (NACP), a particular focus on
the contracting out of health services to increase service coverage. Subsequently, the
literature review explores both theoretical and empirical work on how scale affects
costs and considers issues regarding the measurement of both production and
transaction costs of health services as well as the measurement of scale. The final
section summarises the existing evidence identified in the literature on the economics
of scaling up health services and highlights questions that have not been previously
addressed.
2.2. Methodology
Relevant literature to the topic of the economics of scaling up in HIV prevention
services was identified through examining five key topics:
• International health policy on the scaling up of health and HIV/AIDS services
• Economic theories of contracting with a focus on transaction cost economics
• Theories of cost and production
• Evidence on the governance of HIV prevention services in low income countries
• Evidence on cost-output relationships in HIV prevention and other health services
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In searching for literature on these topics, a combination of strategies was followed:
1. Formal citation database searches (including Econlit, Pubmed and lSI Web of
Science) of titles and key words/MESH terms combined with manual reviewing
of the search results to identify relevant literature.
2. Consultation of key internet sources on economics and management of health
services in low and middle income countries (e.g. Partnerships for Health
Reform Plus - www.phrplus.org, Institute for Health Sector Development -
www.ihsd.org, the World Bank, the Indian National AIDS Control Organisation
(NACO) - www.nacoonline.org , UNAIDS - www.unaids.org , the World Health
Organisation - www.who.int and the Commission on Macroeconomics and
Health - www.cmhealth.org).
3. Consultation with experts in the individual areas covered by the research.
4. Review of the bibliographies in the papers generated from the previous search
strategies.
5. Consultation of Economics and Econometrics text books.
2.3. What is scaling up
In 2001 the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health findings highlighted that the
major burden of avoidable mortality in developing countries arises from a small number
of health conditions. The Commission went on to recommend the "scaling up" of
interventions to prevent or treat these priority conditions or that:
"access to priority health services be dramatically expanded so that they are
universally available" cited in (Hanson, Ranson et al., 2003) p. 3
The provision of universally available health services is further defined by Victora et al.:
"a policy that builds on one or more interventions with known effectiveness and
combines them into a programme delivery strategy designed to reach high, sustained
and equitable coverage at adequate levels of quality, in all who need the interventions"
(Victora, Hanson et al., 2004) pg 1541.
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The emphasis in these population or system level definitions of scaling up is expanding
access of services for all. However, scaling up can take on a number of different
dimensions. Uvin describes 4 such perspectives with respect to NGOs: expanding
coverage or expanding size; increasing activities; broadening the indirect impact i.e.
increase the activities that seek to affect the behaviour of other actors; and enhancing
organisational sustainability (Uvin, Jain et al., 2000). Similarly, De Jong examines the
question from the perspective of inputs (e.g. expanding organisational size, integrating
other activities into the interventions) and outputs (e.g. reaching more people,
expanding geographical coverage or increasing service intensity or volume) (De Jong,
2001 ).
Table 2.1 summarises the different dimensions of scaling up and classifies them
according to whether scaling up relates to how services are delivered (input-based) or
the service achievements (output-based). These dimensions are closely related. In
order to explore the implications of increasing output, the focus of analysis does not
pre-empt the importance of the other input focussed dimensions of scaling up. As well
as looking at marginal changes in coverage at the service delivery level (output
orientation), it is important to understand what is required to achieve this scaling up
including any re-organisation on the input side. Where there are large gaps in service
coverage, this input side re-organisation can imply significant change in the way
service delivery is organised and governed, such as the contracting out of health
services as used by the Indian National AIDS Control Programme to ensure coverage
of vulnerable groups. Acquiring an understanding of both the organisational changes
required to scale up and the marginal changes in coverage within these provides
important inputs into project design by helping identify appropriate scaling up
technology and avoiding the replication of inefficiencies across service delivery units.
Table 2.1: Various Definitions of Scale
• Expanding organizational size
• Increasing the scale of activity engaged •
in
• Increasing the number of service •
delivery units
• Integrating other activities ('horizontally' - •
addressing unrelated activities;
'vertically' - addressing different levels •
of related problems) in order to reach
more eo Ie
•
In ut-based Out ut-based
• Achieving universal coverage
Reaching more people
Expanding geographic areas reached
Reaching other target groups
Increasing the volume of outputs
Increasing the intensity of impact within
a given geographic areal social group
Increasing the sphere of influence of the
organization
•
• Source: (Kumaranayake, 2000; Uvin, Jain et al., 2000; De Jong, 2001; Hanson, Ranson et al., 2003)
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As the report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health notes, achieving
these ends is dependent on understanding the gap in coverage, the increase in inputs
to fill this gap and the best methods with which to achieve these ends i.e. it also
requires consideration of how these are combined and delivered (Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health, 2001).
In the 2005 progress report on the Millennium Development Goals, no low income
region was on track to meet the HIV/AIDS component of Goal 6 to stop and reverse the
spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other major diseases including tuberculosis (UN
Department for Economic and Social Affairs, 2005). Funding gaps have been well
documented as a problem faced in scaling up health interventions to achieve
internationally set targets (Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001;
Schwartlander, Stover et al., 2001; World Health Organisation, 2002a; Global HIV
Prevention Working Group, 2003; Hanson, Ranson et al., 2003; Global HIV Prevention
Working Group, 2004; UNAIDS, 2004b). Understanding the level of funding required
requires context specific cost information (the marginal cost of service delivery), the
delivery strategies chosen for scaling up (the technology) and the political environment
within which scaling up takes place (Devarajan, Miller et al., 2002; Hanson, Ranson et
al.,2003). The following sections therefore explore the service delivery methods and
organisational forms used to scale up health services in low income countries and the
evidence base regarding the effectiveness and cost of these strategies with a particular
focus on expanding HIV/AIDS services for all in need.
2.4. HIV prevention services in low income countries
HIV prevention services include a wide range of activities, largely differentiated by the
client-base that they serve. In estimating global resource requirements, UNAIDS uses
a list of 15 different interventions that are seen as core components of a national HIV
prevention strategy (UNAIDS, 2004b). Table 2.2 provides a description of the different
types of interventions that UNAIDS includes in this analysis. Of these, the provision of
education and condoms, strengthening treatment services for sexually transmitted
infections, prevention of mother-ta-child transmission, voluntary counselling and
testing, ensuring the safe blood supplies, universal precautions and interventions
targeted at specific populations with a high risk of infection are the core activities in any
national HIV prevention programme (Kumaranayake and Watts, 2001; UNAIDS,
2004b).
Priority-setting exercises both at the international and national level have shown that
the maximum impact on the epidemic will be achieved by different combinations of
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these interventions implemented at different stages of an epidemic (World Bank, 1997;
Kumaranayake and Watts, 2001). If HIV infected individuals infect more than one other
individual HIV prevalence will not only be sustained but increase. As a result the focus
of early intervention efforts has been high risk groups "characterised by a high number
and change of partners and with multiple, overlapping or concurrent sexual
relationships" (Kumaranayake and Watts, 2001) p. 458. These targeted interventions
not only focus efforts in areas where the highest incidence is generated if left
unchecked but have also been found to be one of the most cost-effective approaches
to preventing an HIV epidemic, particularly in the early stages (World Bank, 1997;
World Bank Health Nutrition and Population Sector Unit, 1999; Kumaranayake and
Watts, 2001; Creese, Floyd et al., 2002). As an epidemic spreads to the general
population, the targeted interventions require complementary services for broader
population groups (Kumaranayake and Watts, 2001).
In spite of increasing availability of resources for AIDS programmes the coverage of
HIV prevention programmes is still limited in countries both with early and later stage
epidemics (see Table 2.2) (USAID, UNAIDS et al., 2004). Condom programmes are
reported to cover only 20% of risky sex acts world wide and only 16% of the priority
group of commercial sex workers have been reached by prevention efforts (USAID,
UNAIDS et al., 2004). This gap in coverage is mirrored in India where the coverage of
population groups with high risk behaviours has been estimated not to exceed 25% of
this high risk population (National AIDS Control Organisation, Voluntary Health
Services et al., 2002). Coverage of a broad range of HIV/AIDS prevention
interventions therefore still needs to be increased to meet the United Nations
Millennium Development Goal of halting and reversing the HIV/AIDS epidemic by 2015
(USAID, UNAIDS et al., 2004; UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs, 2005).
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Table 2.2: The range and coverage of HIV prevention programmes that form part of a
national HIV AIDS programme
Intervention/ activity Definition % coverage (aI/ reporting
countries),2003
Mass media campaigns Education programmes for the n/a
general population implemented
through the mass media e.g. TV,
radio, posters or newspapers
Voluntary counselling and HIV testing and provision of both 0.2% of adult population in 2003
testing counselling and education for
individuals who come forward
voluntarily
Condom social marketing Sales of subsidised condoms n/a
promoted using mainstream
advertising and marketing techniques
Public sector condom Free distribution of condoms and 21% of risky sexual contacts
promotion and distribution promotion to the general and targeted (defined as all sexual contacts
population between commercial sex workers
and clients, men having sex with
men, casual sex contacts and
contacts between spouses when
at least one partner has outside
partners)
School-based AIDS Education for children in school 64% of children enrolled in
education primary and 86% in secondary
education
Peer education for out-of- Education for children out of school 20% of street children
school youth carried out by trained members of
their peer qroups
Targeted prevention
programmes
• Outreach programmes 16% of commercial sex workers
for sex workers and their
clients
11% of men who have sex with• Outreach programmes A varying combination of education,
for men who have sex condom distribution, counselling and men
• with men treatment of sexually transmitted
• Harm-reduction infections for specific high-risk 4.3% of injecting drug users
programmes for populations
injecting drug users
• Prevention programmes
for special populations
53% of male prisoners(prisoners, migrants,
truck drivers, etcl
Treatment of sexually Ensuring access to services for n/a
transmitted infections treatment of sexually transmitted
infections through strengthening of
existing services, provision of
additional services and education to
increase uptake of these services
Prevention programmes for Education targeted specifically at n/a
_people livinq with HIV people livinq with HIV/AIDS
Workplace prevention A varying combination of education, n/a
programmes condom distribution, counselling and
treatment of sexually transmitted
infections for people in the workplace
Prevention of mother-to-child Minimising the risk of mother to child 8% of pregnant women offered
transmission transmission through provision of services
ARVs, promotion of appropriate
feeding (exclusive breast or bottle
feeding) and delivery through
caesarean section.
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Table 2.2 (cont): The range and coverage of HIV prevention programmes that form part
of a national HIV AIDSp_rogramme
Intervention/ activity Definition % coverage (aI/ reporting
countries), 2003
Post-exposure prophylaxis Provision of ARVs to individuals
exposed to the virus
n/a
Safe medical injections Ensuring clean needles and syringes n/a
when injecting
Universal precautions Ensuring clean medical equipment
and use of protective clothing in
medical facilities
n/a
Blood safety Screening of blood to ensure blood
supplies are free of HIV
n/a
Adapted from: (UNAIDS, 2004b) and (USAID, UNAIDS et al., 2004); n/a - not available
2.5. Strategies and constraints in scaling up HIV/AIDS services
in low income countries
Aside from the analysis of the Working Group 5 of the Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health the literature on strategies for scaling up of health
services is limited. The Commission recognised that scaling up could only be achieved
by overcoming bottlenecks in the system and the methods selected for scaling up
should depend on the nature of existing constraints (Commission on Macroeconomics
and Health, 2001). These can occur at different levels: at the community/ household
level; the health service delivery level; the health sector policy and strategic
management level; across other public sectors; and at the level of the institutional
environment or country context. These types of constraint apply equally to HIV
prevention programmes. However, HIV/AIDS programmes face additional problems.
Firstly, the relatively new phenomenon of HIV and AIDS require "scaling up"
prevention, care and treatment activities from a baseline of no output. Second,
prevention activities can be provided through a broad array of channels from the
workplace to the health clinic to the mass media, increasing the importance and
difficulty of coordination. And, third, the stigma associated with the disease creates
barriers both to the uptake of services and to the sensitisation of health service
professionals (see Table 2.3).
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Oliveira-Cruz et al.. (2003) review the various methods applied to overcoming health
system constraints and these are also summarised in Table 2.3. They note that these
are generally not well documented and that it is difficult to draw conclusions about
successes and failures (Oliveira-Cruz, Hanson et al., 2003). Corresponding
investments in HIV programming are also listed in Table 2.3 and equally, there is very
little evidence to support the success of the approaches used in terms of increasing
access and utilisation of services. Social marketing has been shown to have an
important impact on the uptake of contraceptive services over time (Eloundou-
Enyegue, Meekers et al., 2005; Terris-Prestholt, Kumaranayake et al., 2005b).
Research trials in East Africa have also shown how strengthening STI services can
increase their uptake, albeit in the context of a trial where patient recruitment is a
primary goal of the activity (Kinsman J, 2002). Barnett et al. document the important
role of contracting out service provision to NGOs and Civil Service Organisations to fill
service coverage gaps (Barnett, Connor et al., 2001). Indeed, as in the historical
development of sexual health services, NGOs have played a critical role in developing
the market for HIV prevention services throughout the developing world (Ambegaokar
and Lush, 2004; UNAIDS, 2004b).
NGOs have been addressing the gap in HIV prevention service coverage from the start
of the HIV crisis (Solomon, Chakraborty et al., 2004). As funding has become available
to low income countries, governments have recognised this role and have increasingly
involved civil society and NGOs in the delivery of HIV/AIDS programmes through
contracting out these services to these non-state providers. In South Asia and Brazil,
government contracts with NGOs have been a core component of the National AIDS
programmes (World Bank Health Nutrition and Population Sector Unit. South Asia
Region, 1999; World Bank Health Nutrition and Population Sector Unit. South Asia
Region, 2000; Barnett, Connor et al., 2001; World Bank Health Nutrition and Population
Sector Unit. South Asia Region, 2003). Little is known about how successful these and
other government-NGO partnerships have been in expanding HIV/AIDS services. Only
in Brazil have the factors affecting the success of contracting been documented
(Barnett, Connor et al., 2001). Given the important role of NGOs in the delivery of
health services, the use of NGO-government partnerships to address HIV prevention
service gaps and the lack of evidence on the effectiveness of these partnerships in
increasing service coverage, the next section draws on the literature of contracting out
in more general health service expansion in order to identify key problems that these
partnerships might face and factors that facilitate success.
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2.6. Contracting out to increase service coverage
Contracts are explicit or implicit exchange relationships between agents. Contracting
out by the public sector implies that rather than deliver services directly, the
government purchases those services from an alternate provider on behalf of the
population. One of the key rationales for introducing contracting out of health services
in low income countries has been to increase coverage, in particular for vulnerable or
hard to reach populations (Nieves, La Forgia et al., 2000; Slack and Savedoff, 2001;
Vladescu and Radulescu, 2002; Harding and Preker, 2003; Liu, Hotchkiss et al., 2004;
Loevinsohn and Harding, 2004; Peters, Mirchandani et al., 2004; Loevinsohn and
Harding, 2005). Largely driven by donor funding and their programmes, contracting out
is reputed to be able to also address the problems of quality, equity and efficiency
inherent in many public services in low income countries (Liu, Hotchkiss et al., 2004).
Evidence suggests that it has also been introduced to tackle issues of accountability,
coordination, civil service employee regulations and lack of political will (Barnett,
Connor et al., 2001).
In theory, contracting out helps overcome public service delivery bottlenecks through
increasing allocative efficiency so that services are produced at minimum cost and
resources allocated to maximise quality and ensure a distribution in line with social
value (McPake, Kumaranayake et al., 2002). Two major schools of economic thought
drive this hypothesis. First, property rights theory suggests that the main source of
inefficiency in the public sector is the weakening of property rights (Milgrom and
Roberts, 1992; Hart, 1995). The private sector (including the not for profit sector)
therefore faces greater incentives to use resources efficiently and to deliver services
productively. Second, public choice theory states that politicians and bureaucrats are
likely to act in their own interests or those of powerful interest groups rather than in the
public interest (Frant, 1996). Contracting out is hypothesised to address this with the
use of objective evaluation tools that enable more systematic performance based
monitoring and encourage a more productive use of resources that falls closer in line
with public interest (Liu, Hotchkiss et al., 2004).
In assessing the success of contracting out in achieving these potential efficiency
gains, conventional forms of economic analysis can provide us with insights into the
costs and efficiency of HIV prevention services by using the cost function to examine
how inputs are related to outputs and prices. This neoclassical model assumes that
transactions are costless (Gravelle and Rees, 1981). However, the nature of
organisation through the governance of contracts also affects the cost of service
delivery. By further examining the costs of friction in the transaction, transaction cost
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economics explores the impact on governance arrangements, in the form of
organisational structures and strategies (Williamson, 1983). Although a departure from
the neoclassical analysis of costs and efficiency, transaction cost economics uses the
same analytical perspective of the utility maximising objectives of parties to a
transaction. The resultant framework predicts that institutional factors alongside
behavioural and service characteristics including scale of activity, lead to different
organisational forms in an attempt to minimise transaction costs.
For contracting with the private sector to succeed in increasing coverage at lower cost
than direct public provision a number of conditions are required: enough potential
providers to create competition; adequate capacity to enter into and manage the
contractual relationships; provider competition to enhance efficiency; and benefits
outweighing the transaction costs (Broomberg, 1994; Palmer, 2000; Harding and
Preker,2003). These conditions are not necessarily in place. Many low income
countries have poorly developed markets for health service provision characterised by
lack of competition (Mills, 1998; Palmer, 2000; Oliveira-Cruz, Hanson et al., 2003).
The problems of limited government capacity for contracting in low income countries
have also been highlighted (Bennett and Mills, 1998; Mills, 1998; Oliveira-Cruz,
Hanson et al., 2003; Peters, Mirchandani et al., 2004). Evidence from developed
countries suggests that increasing competition is unlikely to achieve great efficiency
(Broomberg, 1994). It is also hypothesised that high transaction costs are a major
obstacle to scaling up health services efficiently when contracting with the private
sector, further reducing any likely gains in efficiency (Broomberg, 1994; Oliveira-Cruz,
Hanson et al., 2003; Liu, Hotchkiss et al., 2004).
In practice little is known regarding the ability of contracting to address the constraints
of access, quality, equity and efficiency (Marek, Diallo et al., 1999; Palmer, 2000; Slack
and Savedoff, 2001; Oliveira-Cruz, Hanson et al., 2003; Liu, Hotchkiss et al., 2004;
Peters, Mirchandani et al., 2004; Palmer and Mills, 2005). Evaluations of contracting
out initiatives in Cambodia, Bangladesh and Central America have shown some
positive results in terms of improved quality, equity, efficiency and transparency
(Abramson, 2000; Abramson, 2001; Bhushan, Keller et al., 2002; Jack, 2003; Soeters
and Griffiths, 2003). There is also evidence to indicate that contracting out has been
successful in filling service gaps through increased coverage (Nieves, La Forgia et al.,
2000; Slack and Savedoff, 2001; Chowdhury, 2002; Soeters and Griffiths, 2003;
Loevinsohn and Harding, 2004; Loevinsohn and Harding, 2005). Whether these gains
can be sustained in the long term is not known (Liu, Hotchkiss et al., 2004). To
demonstrate improvements in efficiency as services are expanded, the analysis of
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costs is required. By comparing different contracting studies Loevinsohn et al. (2004
and 2005) suggest that contracts with larger coverage may be less expensive per
capita than those with smaller coverage (Loevinsohn and Harding, 2004; Loevinsohn
and Harding, 2005). However, the evidence on these gains in efficiency is not strong.
The literature review for this thesis identified only two studies comparing costs of
contracting out with direct public service delivery in developing countries, that
attempted to measure the full costs of contracting including transaction costs (Mills,
Hongoro et al., 1997; Loevinsohn and Harding, 2004) (see Section 2.7.2.2 below)).
Cost analysis provides insights into efficiency and can therefore help ensure the most
productive use of resources in the process of scaling up. An understanding of both
production costs and transaction costs is required to assess gains or losses in
efficiency associated with a particular strategy. Although key to understanding whether
improvements in efficiency have been achieved, the role of transaction costs and their
potential to outweigh benefits accruing from contracting out are still poorly understood,
in particular in low income countries (Broomberg, 1994; Liu, Hotchkiss et al., 2004).
Indeed, there is still a significant research gap pertaining to both the production and
transaction costs of scaling up health services through contracting out. If existing
evidence on costs is based on inefficient programmes, resource requirement estimates
merely reflect the replication of inefficiencies in a system. In addition, it is important to
know how costs change as output is increased and at what level of output costs are
minimised. In light of this gap in knowledge, the following section draws on the
economic theories and existing evidence on production and transaction costs to identify
their predictions for the efficiency of scaling up HIV prevention services through NGO
contracting. For both the production and transaction aspects of costs, the review first
examines the general theory, followed by applied research in health services and
HIV/AIDS. Next, it focuses on relevant research in the area of HIV/AIDS in India where
the evidence permits. Each sub-section then explores the methods used to measure
the respective costs. Finally, methods for measuring scale in the context of HIV
prevention services are reviewed.
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2.7. The costs of scaling up
2.7.1. Production costs of scaling up HIV/AIDS interventions
2.7.1.1. Economic theory of production, costs and scale
Production
The standard short run production function serves as the starting point for
understanding the cost structure of the HIV prevention interventions and the
relationship between costs and scale. A production function describes the relationship
between the inputs and outputs of the production processes and identifies the level of
output that can be produced for a given set of inputs. The short run is defined as the
period over which only variable inputs, those that are dependent of the level of
production, increase or decrease and there is fixity of capital i.e. there are fixed inputs
"that are held constant and independent of the level of production" (Gold, Siegel et al.,
1996).
The mathematical representation of this relationship is presented as follows:
where Q is the output of any production process and Xi
(for i = 1, 2 ... n) represents the quantities of n different inputs.
The production function is described as the locus of technically efficient points of
production i.e. the minimum level of inputs required to achieve different levels of output.
In increasing the scale of production (raising output by increasing the inputs to
production), output behaves in different ways according to the production relationship.
Classically, theory assumes that there are diminishing returns to the variable factor. If
increasing a single input leads to the same proportional change in output, this would be
defined as constant returns to the variable factor and where output increases at a
greater than proportional change to the increase in the input, there are increasing
returns to the variable factor.
Scaling up production (increasing outputs) in the long run allows for all inputs to
production (fixed and variable) to be scaled up. If all inputs are increased by the same
Constant factor, the most natural outcome is constant returns to scale (Varian, 1987),
Where output increases at the same rate as inputs:
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where T is a constant factor and Xi (for i = 1, 2 ...
n) represents the quantities of n different inputs.
Scaling up can also lead to increasing and/or decreasing returns to scale. Similarly,
there exist the phenomena of returns to scope and short run product-specific returns to
the variable factor. In the long run, returns to scope imply that it is technically more
efficient to produce selected outputs together than to produce them in different
production units. The short-run product-specific returns to the variable factor describe
the effect on output of the ith product of increasing inputs while all other outputs remain
constant (Barnum and Kutzin, 1993a).
By exploring the relationship between inputs and outputs in production we can explore
how marginal product changes at different levels of output and the impact of
increasing/decreasing one input on all other inputs while keeping output constant. The
most technically efficient provider and the most technically efficient scale of production
can be identified by comparing marginal productivities of the different providers.
Costs
The cost function has a dual relationship with the production function. This implies that,
with constant prices, the production technology can be derived entirely from the cost
function and vice versa. The cost function traces the locus of economically efficient
points (where economic efficiency is measured as the ratio of costs to outputs). It
describes the relationship between outputs and total costs in the production of a good
or service and is defined as the minimum cost of producing a given output with given
factor prices, so that:
where C is total cost, a is level of output and Wi is input price for
input i (for i = 1, 2 ... n)
The total cost function is described in Figure 2.1 as the combination of the total variable
cost and total fixed cost, where fixed and variable retain the same definitions as in the
analysis of production. The straight horizontal line of the total fixed cost curve reflects
the fixity of capital in the short run. The slope of the total cost curve is known as the
marginal cost (MC) Le. the change in cost associated with increasing or decreasing
output by one unit. The total cost of production associated with each unit is known as
the average cost, defined as C/O. The average cost curve is derived by plotting the
slope of the rays from the origin to the total cost curve.
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Figure 2.1: The total cost function
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Taking a long run perspective, there is an important relationship between the average
and marginal cost that allows us to identify if average costs are falling or rising at
different levels output (see Figure 2.2). The cost curve is said to exhibit economies of
scale if MC/AC<1. This implies that AC is falling with increased output. Conversely,
the cost curve is said to exhibit diseconomies of scale if MC/AC>1. Where the long run
average cost curve remains constant, MC/AC=1, and we observe constant economies
of scale. This concept mirrors the long run production characteristics of returns to
scale and should occur at the corresponding levels of output, assuming cost
minimisation.
Figure 2.2: The relationship between the marginal and average cost curves
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In the short run average and marginal cost curves must be constructed separately for
fixed and variable costs as each varies differently with output (Over, 1986). Short run
variable returns to the factor and product specific returns to the factor can also be
translated into cost theory by exploring the impact on cost of changes in production
technology or outputs, respectively.
In summary, the cost function describes the relationship between total costs and output
and, where production is technically efficient, can be derived from the production
function. Through the derivation of the marginal and average costs at different levels of
output, the cost function can also describe whether there are economies or
diseconomies of scale. To identify economies of scale and their nature, it is therefore
important to understand the relationship between inputs, their prices and outputs as
well as the cost structure of a production process i.e. the relative contribution of fixed
and variable inputs.
2.7.1.2. Analysing the cost-scale relationship
In an analysis of the relationship between cost and scale, the economist is concerned
with efficiency: what is the efficient output level at which production should take place
and how might efficiency change as the changes in output(s) occur. The types of
questions that might be addressed in analysing the cost-scale relationship for scaling
up health services are shown in Table 2.4 along with the types of analyses that are
required to explore these questions. The methods used in these analyses depend on
the data available and the research question to be addressed (Johns and Tan-Torres,
2005). Accounting cost studies that explore cost profiles and make informed
assumptions about or model how the costs of different inputs change with output level
can be used to examine the impact of scaling up on total and average costs (Barnum
and Kutzin, 1993a; Johns and Tan-Torres, 2005). The best and most rigorous way of
assessing the cost-scale relationship, however, is time-series econometrics analysis
(Over, 1986; Barnum and Kutzin, 1993a; Johns and Tan-Torres, 2005). Econometric
cost function estimation can also be applied to cross-sectional data to explore factors
that influence average costs at different coverage levels (Kumaranayake and Watts,
2000d; Johns and Tan-Torres, 2005). Data limitations, particularly in low income
settings, do not always allow these latter types of statistical analysis and therefore they
have not been frequently applied (Barnum and Kutzin, 1993a; Johns and Tan-Torres,
2005).
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Table 2.4: Questions addressed by the theoretical cost-scale relationship and
corresponding analyses
Questions Data anaJx§es
What are
requirements
levels of
_Qrojections?
the resource
at the scaled up
production cost
Fixed versus variable costs at different levels of coverage;
Average and incremental/ marginal costs at different
levels of coverage
How do costs vary with scale of
production?
What is the efficient scale of
.Qroduction?
Average and incremental/ marginal costs
Marginal and/or incremental costs
What other factors influence
total, fixed and variable costs
and are important in the cost-
scale relationship?
Cost profiles (input & activity); average costs; for different
geographical locations, levels of infrastructure, human
resource capacity, level of fixed costs, extent of
manC!9_ementto cope with scali'!9_ u_Q*
'Source (Johns and Tan-Torres. 2005)
The following sections examine accounting and econometric methods used in exploring
the impact of scale on the costs of production in health services, then more specifically
HIV prevention services in low income countries and HIV prevention services in India in
more detail.
2.7.1.3. Accounting cost studies and the costs of scaling up
Accounting cost studies calculate total and average costs to determine performance
and estimations of relative efficiency, to compare cost-effectiveness ratios, or to
calculate the level of provider reimbursements (Creese, Sriyabbaya et al., 1982;
Barnum and Kutzin, 1993a). In spite of their limitations in terms of ability to capture
variations in, for example, quality of services, accounting cost studies can analyse
performance by comparing average or unit costs and cost profiles across a sample of
similar health services providers.
Methodological approaches to an accounting cost study
To assess the accounting costs, it is standard practice to use an ingredients approach
in which all inputs to production are identified and a price attached to each of these
inputs (Gold, Siegel et al., 1996; Drummond, Stoddart et al., 1997; UNAIDS, 2000a).
Which inputs are included in the cost analysis will depend on the research question
being addressed. Choices around which costs to include generally take the forms of:
total or incremental; financial or economic; societal, provider or patient (Drummond,
Stoddart et al., 1997; Kumaranayake, Pepperall et al., 2000). Choices also surround
the indicator of output of services. Again this depends on the research question. To
define output it is imperative to consider the objective of the service provided
(Drummond, Stoddart et al., 1997) and the production process itself. This might
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include multiple outputs, in which case all aspects of the scope of production should be
included in output measurement to avoid underestimation of the outputs of the
programme (Mansley, Dunet et al., 2002). In addition, the respective sizes of the
production units/ firms and any correlated variables should be measured in order to
control for their influence on average costs and efficiency (Long, Ament et al., 1985).
Whereas cost-effectiveness evaluations attempt to capture the impact of the health
service intervention by using measures of health outcomes, studies assessing
technical or scale efficiency typically use measures of the volume of services provided
e.g. number of patients treated or number of condoms distributed (Kumaranayake and
Watts, 2000a; De Jong, 2001). The choice of indicator will depend on the question
being addressed. In particular, definitions of scale might include the number of HIV
infections averted, the number of people accessing prevention services or the number
of HIV prevention education sessions held.
Empirical evidence
The effect of scale and scope on costs is best explored using statistical cost analyses
and the estimation of marginal cost. However, a few studies have used an accounting
approach, some supplemented with simple regression analysis or modelling, on the
premise that a better understanding of the cost structure, most notably the degree to
which costs are fixed, can provide insights as to how costs might change with scale.
Table 2.5 lists the costing studies identified that use accounting approaches and have
explicitly looked at the issue of how average costs change with output in health
services in low income countries. The studies use a combination of primary data,
interviews with experts and logic to examine this question. By measuring average
costs over different ranges of coverage they are able to suggest whether economies of
scale exist. However, without measuring the marginal cost they are unable to measure
economies of scale. The interventions covered by these studies include primary health
care, immunisation programmes, maternal and child health and family planning,
nutrition and HIV prevention. In all cases, the studies have found falling average costs,
sUggesting that in these settings, there is room to expand coverage with the existing
set of resources (Creese, Sriyabbaya et al., 1982; Robertson, Davis et al., 1984; Over,
1986; Berman, Brotowasisto et al., 1989; Robertson, Hall et al., 1992; Broomberg and
Rees, 1993a; Soucat, Levy-Bruhl et al., 1997; Jian, Jing-Jin et al., 1998; Ensor, Ali at
al., 2003; Johns and Baltussan, 2004; Routh, Thwin at al., 2004; Tarris-Prastholt,
Kumaranayake et al., 2005a). In their review of immunisation costs, Brenzel and
Claquin (1994) support this view, concluding that scale, measured as the number of
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fully immunised children. is the single most important factor in influencing costs and
cost-effectiveness of immunisation programmes (Brenzel and Claquin. 1994).
Variations in average costs across sites are not only attributable to scale. The variation
can be caused by a range of factors which need to be accounted for in any analysis of
cost variation. These factors include production technology (the mix of inputs used for
service delivery), scope (or range of activities), input prices, inefficiencies, the
geographical location and the timeframe of analysis.
Production technology: Even for similar health services. the production technology can
vary (Barnum and Kutzin. 1993a; Grieve. Dundas et al., 2001; Johns. Baltussen et al.,
2003). Some of the factors that might contribute to this are staff mix. such as the ratio
of doctors to nurse or more expensive to less expensive staff. referral mechanisms.
policy on length of hospital stay and training intensity (Gilson, 1992; Barnum and
Kutzin. 1993a; Grieve. Dundas et al., 2001; Johns. Baltussen et al., 2003; Hutton. Fox-
Rushby et al., 2004).
Scope: Accounting cost studies have in general not examined the issue of economies
of scope. Only three studies were identified that analysed this issue specifically. When
routine immunisation services were complemented by mass campaigns in Ecuador the
cost per fully immunised child increased, indicating diseconomies of scope associated
with adding on a new activity (Shepard. Robertson et al., 1989). Conversely. two
studies have found average costs lower in those primary health care facilities with a
wider range of services, interpreting that this is as a result of economies of scope
(Soucat, 1995) cited in (Soucat. Levy-Bruhl et al., 1997) and (Robertson. Castro et al..
1991 ).
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Input prices: The prices of resources differ across health service sites and will also
have an impact on economic efficiency (Bitran, 1995). Grieve et al. (2001) noted a
fifteen fold difference between the highest (Portugal) and lowest (Latvia) cost per hour
of European mid grade doctors (Grieve, Dundas et al., 2001), even after adjusting for
purchasing power. Variation in input prices may arise for a number of reasons
including regional price differences, for example differences between urban and rural
areas, and the ability to bulk purchase and bargain prices down.
Technical inefficiencies: Where practice and input prices are similar, it is also possible
to find cost variations as a result of inefficiency or different levels of productivity
(Gilson, 1992; Barnum and Kutzin, 1993a; Creese and Parker, 1994; Fiedler and Day,
1997; Hutton, Fox-Rushby et al., 2004). Causes of inefficiencies include staff
productivity, prescribing practices, wastage and inappropriate technology. Likewise,
the objectives of the organisation should be analysed. It might not be the objective of
the provider to be efficient or cost-minimising. Mansley (2002) highlights that this issue
is likely to be a feature in public health interventions: "the function we estimated was
an observational rather than a minimum average cost function [the assumption of
cost minimization] may not hold for public health programmes that have no competitive
incentive to minimise cost" (Mansley, Dunet et al., 2002). One example is the intention
to maintain some level of excess capacity or inbuilt technical inefficiency in order to
meet peaks or anomalous increases in demand and ensure accessibility to services
(Gold, Siegel et al., 1996).
Context: Geographical location will influence the nature, size of the target or patient
population and epidemiology of disease will also affect the average costs (McPake,
Kumaranayake et al., 2002; Johns, Baltussen et al., 2003). It will also have a bearing
on the existing infrastructure from which a programme can be expanded (Johns and
Tan-TorreS,2005). Finally, due to differences in topography, some locations will have
higher transportation costs than others (Jian, Jing-Jin et al., 1998; Johns and Tan-
Torres, 2005).
Timeframe: A further consideration in understanding cost variation is the length of time
a health service has been operating. Four studies identified found average costs falling
over time (Robertson, Hall et al., 1992; Soucat, Levy-Bruhl et al., 1997; Stallworthy and
Meekers, 1998; Terris-Prestholt, Kumaranayake et al., 2005a). This increase in
efficiency can be attributed to learning and programme maturity (Over, 1986;
Stallworthy and Meekers, 1998). On the other hand, increased uptake of services and
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economies of scale may be responsible (Robertson, Hall et al., 1992; Soucat, Levy-
Bruhl et al., 1997; Terris-Prestholt, Kumaranayake et al., 2005a).
Accounting cost studies of HIV/AIDS programmes
Only three of the studies identified in Table 2.5 analyse HIV/AIDS programmes. Each
of these suggests potential economies of scale when increasing service delivery
output. These are rare examples of accounting cost studies in HIV/AIDS programmes.
Reviews of the economic costs and cost-effectiveness of HIV/AIDS programmes have
consistently identified lack of information as well as insufficient detail and transparency
in the ways in which cost analyses have been presented, with a tendency to focus on
the overall cost and cost-effectiveness ratio (Kumaranayake and Watts, 2000c; Creese,
Floyd et al., 2002; Scotland, Van Teijlingen et al., 2003; Walker, 2003).
The evidence on the costs of HIV prevention in India is further limited. A review of the
published and grey literature found only 4 cost analyses based on empirical data
collection (see Table 2.6) and one cost-effectiveness analysis using a modelling
approach and cost data from the international literature (Gonzales, Grosskurth et al.,
1999; Wilson, 1999; World Bank Health Nutrition and Population Sector Unit. South
Asia Region, 1999; National AIDS Control Organisation and UNAIDS, 2001; Dandona,
Sisodia et al., 2005b). Only one of these explored the issue of how costs change with
scale of activity (Dandona, Sisodia et al., 2005b).
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Table 2.6: Costs of HIV prevention in India: summary of the evidence.
(National
Control
Organisation and
UNAIDS, 2001)
AIDS Development of budgetary
guidelines using financial
analysis of interventions for sex
workers, migrants, transport
workers and street children
Economic cost analysis of Cost per client receiving full services (USD)
voluntary counselling and testing - 2.92 - 17.14
in Andhra Pradesh
Method Unit cost (USD)Author
(Dandona, Sisodia
et al., 2005b)
(Wilson, 1999) Final evaluation of truckers'
projects in North (N) and South
(S) India.
Unit costs (USD):
per BCC··· activity - 6.68 (S) 13.63 (N)
per Condom distributed -O.16(S)/ 0.12(N)
per STI referred-14.51(S)/4.67(N)
per STI treated - 18.75 (S)/ 37.15 (N)
Variations between & within reoions.
(Gonzales,
Grosskurth et al.,
1999)
Economic
Sonagachi
intervention
perspective
cost analysis of
sex worker
from provider
Unit costs (USD ):
Per year - 268,720
Per member of target population - 24.01
Per STI treated - 10.62
Per BCC'" contact -0.64,
Per condom distributed - 0.22
Financial cost per person per year (USD):
Sex workers/IDU..I/MSM~ - 28
Migrants - 6
Transport workers - 2.2
Street children - 15.8
United States Dollar
::.Sexually Transmitted Infection
Behaviour Change Communication
Department for International Development
M National AIDS Control Organisation
..I Injecting Drug User
\\ Men who have Sex with Men
The need for a greater transparency in HIV prevention castings to permit the
interpretation of costs, the assessment of technical and economic efficiency and the
consideration of how costs change with programme replication or expansion is evident.
The World Health Organisation and UNAIDS have made some inroads into improving
the understanding of resource requirement estimation for both prevention and
treatment using methods summarised in Table 2.5 (Adam, Evans et al., 2003; Johns,
Baltussen et al., 2003; Gutierrez, Johns et al., 2004). However, in the absence of
improved evidence, resource requirement estimates at the international level continue
to use cost data with minimal understanding of programme efficiency and assume
constant average costs (World Bank and UNAIDS, 2000; Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health, 2001; Schwartlander, Stover et al., 2001; Opuni, Bertozzi
et al., 2002; UNAIDS, 2004b).
2.7.1.4. Econometric estimation of the cost function
Econometric methods estimate cost functions using multivariate analysis to explain
how costs vary with level of output. In relating total costs to different output variables,
the regression parameters are used to estimate the average and marginal cost, so
describing how costs vary with scale of activity (Berndt, 1990). This is the only
technique that enables the direct estimation of marginal costs. Ideally resource
estimation should be based on a cost function estimated using these techniques (Over,
1986; Barnum and Kutzin, 1993b; Johns and Tan-Tortes, 2005). The advantages of
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this econometric approach are: changes in marginal cost in response to input prices
and quantities are considered; the model can incorporate multiple outputs facilitating
the exploration of economies of scope; and the impact of contextual factors can be
tested with the use of exogenous explanatory variables (Barnum and Kutzin, 1993b).
Constructing cost functions in health services
The literature on the estimation of cost functions in health services has concentrated on
hospital costs and comprises two main approaches to estimating cost functions: those
that are ad hoc; and those that build on the theory of the firm (Vita, 1990; Scott and
Parkin, 1995; Li and Rosenman, 2001; Smet, 2002; Adam, Evans et al., 2003). Ad hoc
cost functions tend to use an additive linear specification to explain variations in the
cost per unit of output and include all variables for which a relationship to cost is
hypothesised (Vita, 1990; Scott and Parkin, 1995; Smet, 2002). However, the
coefficients in such a regression do not have obvious economic interpretations (Breyer,
1987). In addition, as average cost is used as the dependent variable there is a
problem associated with including output on both sides of the equation which can lead
to an exaggeration of the extent and importance of economies of scale (Goldman and
Grossman, 1983; Barnum and Kutzin, 1993b). The alternative "production theoretic"
methods are constructed using specifications based on knowledge of the production
units and neoclassical cost theory (Vita, 1990).
Identifying a clear model of provider behaviour to relate cost to output has been
problematic for those studies requiring theoretical consistency. Using the neoclassical
profit maximisation model of the firm to explain incentives is unlikely to reflect the true
behaviour of health care providers ruled by such factors as the Hippocratic oath or
maximising health gain. Instead a number of different behavioural objectives have
been modelled in the literature including maximising output, minimising costs,
maximising a combination of profit and output, maximising prestige and even satisficing
models of behaviour (Barnum and Kutzin, 1993b). Cowing et al. (1983) conclude that
the neoclassical cost function in which costs are minimised is the most useful
theoretical framework for analysing hospital costs. This is both a more general
assumption than profit maximisation and consistent with a variety of institutional and
behavioural features of the hospital sector and health services as a whole (Cowing,
Holtman et al., 1983; Vitaliano, 1987).
A standard cost function based on economic theory takes the following form (see, for
example (Scott and Parkin, 1995)):
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C = f(Q,W),
Ware input prices.
where C is the total cost of production, Q is output, and
Cost functions based on the economic theory of production and costs use the duality
property of cost and production. The function must therefore meet the regularity
conditions: C is non-negative, real valued, non-decreasing, positive for non-zero Q and
linearly homogenous in input prices (Caves, Christensen et al., 1980). To determine
economies of scale requires the estimation of a long run cost function. However, for
cross-sectional data the assumption of a long run cost function is unrealistic (Cowing,
Holtman et al., 1983; Scott and Parkin, 1995). A preferred approach in this instance is
to assume cost-minimisation with respect to the variable inputs such that:
C' = C(Q,W \ •K) , where C" is total variable cost, W \' the price of variable inputs,
and K are fixed inputs.
The relationship between short and long run cost functions can also be derived if
information is available on the price of capital inputs (Scott and Parkin, 1995).
Estimates of "economies of scale" in the absence of such information can only predict
what will happen to variable costs when outputs are increased for a given organisation
size (Barnum and Kutzin, 1993b; Scott and Parkin, 1995; Smet, 2002). Smet's (2002)
review of hospital cost functions finds that most studies estimate short run variable cost
functions and an emerging consensus that few hospitals are operating in long run
equilibrium (Smet, 2002). The short run cost function assumes that facilities are
operating at technically efficient points in the production possibility set. This is
unrealistic and particularly the case for health facilities in low income countries
(Barnum and Kutzin, 1993b; Mansley, Dunet et al., 2002). Allowances for those non-
technically efficient observations can be made using an index of efficiency based on
the production function, similar to the approach used by Wouters in her analysis of
health facility costs in Nigeria (Wouters, 1993).
A major strength of econometric estimation is that it allows for the inclusion of multiple
outputs in the cost function (.cowing, Holtman et al., 1983; Breyer, 1987; Barnum and
Kutzin, 1993b). Therefore there is no limiting restriction of a single measure of scale
but output can be measured by using a set of indicators that reflect different aspects of
scale of activity or volume of services (Kumaranayake and Watts, 2000b). Wouters
takes advantage of this to estimate a bi-product cost function (Wouters, 1993). The
hospital cost literature uses this property to explore the impact of case mix on costs
(Cowing, Holtman et al., 1983; Breyer, 1987; Barnum and Kutzin, 1993b; Scott and
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Parkin, 1995). However, by using measures of output rather than outcome (e.g.
number of patient days rather than number of inpatients with successful treatment)
there are problems in controlling for quality. This can be overcome in the ad hoc
approach by using some measure of quality as an output or independent variable in the
model if data are available. Another drawback to econometric estimation and the multi-
product cost function is the requirement of large standardised datasets (Barnum and
Kutzin, 1993b). Without such datasets it is difficult to obtain statistically significant
results. This has resulted in their limited use, particularly in low-income countries.
In the estimation of hospital cost functions based on economic theory, a variety of
functional forms have been used. Although able to provide a useful test for constant
returns to scale, functions taking the form of the Cobb-Douglas and Constant Elasticity
of Substitution constrain the elasticities of substitution between inputs to a constant
value and, in the former case, unity (Berndt, 1990). More flexible functional forms,
notably the translog, have therefore become more popular in exploring issues of
economies of scale and scope (Cowing, Holtman et al., 1983; Goldman and Grossman,
1983; Vita. 1990; Scott and Parkin. 1995; Li and Rosenman. 2001). These are able to
represent any arbitrary structure of production, lifting the constraint of constant
elasticities of substitution between inputs and allowing for second- and third-order
terms on outputs as well as the interaction of output terms (Grannemann. Brown et al.,
1986; Vita. 1990; Scott and Parkin. 1995). Although the preferred model in hospital
cost analysis, there are limitations to its application. The increased flexibility is gained
at a cost of an increased number of parameters to be estimated (Caves, Christensen et
al.. 1980; Vita. 1990). As a result. this reduces the number of explanatory variables
that can be used in the model to ensure significant results and therefore is of particular
concern where sample sizes are small (Breyer. 1987; Scott and Parkin, 1995).
However. of the three possible flexible functional forms (the generalized Leontief. the
quadratic and the translog). the translog is "the most parsimonious in parameters"
(Caves, Christensen et al., 1980).
In the case of the multi-product hospital with its diverse technologies. these structural
cost models can still be considered na'ive (Grannemann. Brown et al., 1986). For this
reason, Grannemann et al. (1986) developed a "hybrid" functional form that maintains
the theoretical consistency of linear homogeneity in factor prices but includes other
explanatory variables that might have a causal relationship with costs (Grannemann.
Brown et al., 1986; Vita. 1990; Smet, 2002; Weaver and Deolalikar. 2004). In this way.
the model is able to derive valid estimates of marginal costs (Grannemann. Brown et
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al., 1986). The advantages and disadvantages of the different functional forms used
for estimating cost functions are summarised in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Advantages and disadvantages of different functional forms for the estimation
of a cost function in health services*
Functional Advantages Disadvantages
form
Ad hoc Permits inclusion of any No theoretical basis; concern with
variable likely to influence including output on both sides of the
total and average costs equation
includiQg__guality
Cobb- Provides simple test for Elasticity of substitution between inputs
Douglas economies of scale; Satisfies constrained to unity
conditions for duality of cost
and production
CES Satisfies conditions for duality Constrained to constant elasticity of
of cost and _Qroduction substitution between inputs
r Generalised Linearly homogenous in input Constrained to constant elasticity of
Leontieff prices substitution between inputs;
Generalizing to permit flexibility in scale
(J)
economies requires large no. of
E parameters.....
Quadratic Not linearly homogenous in input prices.£
(ij Translog Linearly homogenous in input Does not allow zero output values duec:
0 prices to log specification+::o Generalised Linearly homogenous in inputc:
:J Translog prices; uses Box-Cox-(]) transformation to allow for_Q·x non-zero outputs(])~ Hybrid Linearly homogenous in input Does not allow zero output values dueu,
prices; incorporates other to log specification; The other
causal variables than output explanatory variables only explain
quantities and input prices deviations from predicted cost not\.
changes in the cost-output relationship.
Sources: (Caves, Christensen et al., 1980; Berndt, 1990, Sme!, 2002)
Two further important issues to address in estimating a cost function are whether the
assumption that outputs are not endogenous is met and the method in which input
prices enter into the model (Smet, 2002). If the producer of services can choose the
level of output the regression coefficients will be biased (Smet, 2002). In the case of
hospital services characterised by third party payment, the relationship between prices
and quantity demanded is weak and therefore output decisions are unlikely to be
dominated by cost of production (Grannemann, Brown et al., 1986; Smet, 2002). This
issue needs to be explored for the specific service and institutional set up under
analysis. Where outputs are found to be endogenous, unbiased estimates of the
regression coefficients can be obtained by constructing and estimating a system of
equations (Smet, 2002).
Due to difficulties in obtaining reliable data or to limit the parameters being estimated,
input prices are sometimes not interacted with output levels or even excluded from the
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cost function estimation (Smet, 2002). In the case of the former, this implies that prices
do not affect the relationship between total cost and output, but rather act as cost-
shifters (Grannemann, Brown et al., 1986; Smet, 2002). If input prices are excluded,
this implies that there are no input substitution possibilities or the assumption that
prices are equal across all observations (Cowing, Holtman et al., 1983; Aletras, 1997;
Smet,2002). However, where one input price is constant across the production units,
this price can be treated as the implicit price numeraire and excluded from the
regression. In this case, because of the homogeneity condition, all input price
parameters are then still identified in the model (Cowing, Holtman et al., 1983; Smet,
2002).
Estimation of marginal costs and economies of scale using the cost
function approach
The cost function can be used to calculate average and marginal cost and identify
returns to the variable factor and returns to scale. Table 2.8 summarises the
calculations required to predict these measures of interest as reported by Barnum and
Kutzin (1993) (Barnum and Kutzin, 1993b).
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Table 2.8: Measures of economic efficiency based on the cost function
Measure Equation Definition
Marginal Cost MC, =~/~, The marginal cost of producing
lMCl an additional unit of output i.
Average AIC, = [C - C(Q,,_I )]IQ; The average added cost of
Incremental Cost producing the ith output (OJ)as
(AIC) compared with producing all
outputs except OJ.
Short run returns SRVF =C1'LMC;Q; Index showing the effect on costs
to the variable of a general increase in output
factor (SPRVF) when scale and output mix
remain fixed.
If SRVF > 1, the level of output is
below optimum efficiency; if
SRVF < 1, the level of output is
above optimum efficiency
Short run product SPRVF; = AIC, I MC; Index showing effect on costs of
specific returns a proportional increase in all
to the variable inputs on the output of the ith
factor (SPRVFj) product (all other outputs fixed)
SPRVF >1 -+ product-specific
returns to variable factor exist
Economies of rC(Q,) + C(QII_') - C(Q) Index showing whether it is
scope (SCOPE) SCOPE = cheaper to produce selected
C(Q) outputs jointly rather than
separately
If SCOPE> 0, economies of
scope exist
Economies of
EOS=(I-ac,k)/'Lac,fJ, ' Index showing the effect on costsscale (EOS) of a general increase in output
where a I indicates elasticity of a with when the output mix remains
III
unchanged and all inputs arerespect to b; and k is capital stock
allowed to vary.
If EOS> 1, economies of scale
exist; if EOS< 1 diseconomies of
scale exist
Note. n = number of observations; I refers to the tth output where outputs are the same, s refers to the sth
output where outputs are different (in the context of economies of scope).
Source: (Barnum and Kutzin, 1993a)
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Empirical evidence
Econometric applications in the estimation of cost functions for health care services
have been well described in terms of how they look at issues of efficiency, scale and
scope in both high and low income country settings e.g.(Cowing, Holtman et al., 1983;
Barnum and Kutzin, 1993a; Aletras, 1997; Weaver and Deolalikar, 2004). Barnum and
Kutzin (1993) review the existing econometric hospital cost function studies for low
income countries at the time of their study (Barnum and Kutzin, 1993b). They find that
the five studies identified follow the chronological technical development of hospital
functions in developed countries, moving from ad hoc analyses of hospital costs in
Kenya (Anderson, 1980) to the production theoretic estimation with flexible function
forms for hospitals in Ethiopia, Colombia and China (Bitran-Dicowsky and Dunlop,
1989; Barnum and Kutzin, 1993b). More recently, Weaver et al used a generalised
translog cost function for hospitals in Vietnam and found that economies of scale and
scope depend on the category of hospital as well as output (Weaver and Deolalikar,
2004). Due to the limited availability of large standardised datasets, studies from low
income countries are limited in number. This lack of studies, combined with the
application of different methods across them, makes it difficult to make generalisations
from the results (Barnum and Kutzin, 1993b). Similarly, yet in spite of a large number
of studies, results from hospital cost functions for developed countries are inconclusive
regarding economies of scale and scope (Cowing, Holtman et al., 1983; Barnum and
Kutzin, 1993b; Aletras, 1997; Smet, 2002).
Few econometric studies of health service costs exist outside the hospital cost arena.
These include community and home health care services, blood collection costs and
cancer detection in the US (Jacobs and Rawson, 1978; Goldman and Grossman, 1983;
Kass, 1987; Mansley, Dunet et al., 2002), cochlear implantation costs in UK (Barton,
Bloor et al., 2004) and health care services in Nigeria (Wouters, 1993). Of these
studies only Wouters (1993) and Kass (1987) use production theoretic approaches to
estimating economies of scale (Kass, 1987; Wouters, 1993). Both Wouters (1993) and
Goldman and Grossman (1983) also estimate production functions to assess returns to
the variable factor and returns to scale (Goldman and Grossman, 1983; Wouters,
1993). Not surprisingly, as a result of the mix of services and methods, the results
regarding economies of scale are mixed. The average cost functions for cochlear
implants and cancer detection programmes find economies of scale (Mansley, Dunet et
al., 2002; Barton, Bloor et al., 2004). The home health studies indicate limited
economies of scale in both cases (Goldman and Grossman, 1983; Kass, 1987).
Wouters (1993) finds increasing returns to scale with respect to admissions, nearly
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constant returns to scale for outpatient visits, and the ray specific economies of scale
show constant returns to scale (Wouters, 1993). Finally, the average cost function for
donor recruitment and blood donation services indicates diseconomies of scale
associated with increased recruitment (Jacobs and Rawson, 1978).
In the area of HIV, econometric estimation has been exploited to look at the impact of
scale on costs using data from a range of intervention types across countries in sub-
Saharan Africa (Kumaranayake and Watts, 2000d) and across different continents
(Marseille, Dandona et al., 2004) and in voluntary counselling and testing services
(Kumaranayake, 2004; Dandona, Sisodia et al., 2005b) as well as the impact of
advertising on the cost of national level condom promotion programmes over time
(Terris-Prestholt, Kumaranayake et al., 2005b). More recently Dandona et al. have
published a study examining the costs of HIV prevention programmes of female sex
workers in Andhra Pradesh (Dandona, Sisodia et al., 2005a). This study finds 88% of
the variability in total economic cost explained by the number of behaviour change
communication contacts, condoms distributed, contacts related to STls and contacts
related to enhancing the enabling environment (Dandona, Sisodia et al., 2005a).
However, the still limited range of studies means that there is no clear understanding of
the shape of the cost function and marginal costs of individual HIV prevention
intervention types.
2.7.1.5. Empirical methods applied in measuring costs
The most commonly used technique for measuring costs of public health interventions
in developing countries is the accounting approach. In valuing costs of implementation,
standardised methods are used for identifying inputs into production and valuing these
inputs (Creese and Parker, 1994; Gold, Siegel et al., 1996; Drummond, Stoddart et al.,
1997; UNAIDS, 2000a). It is normal practice to estimate the economic cost by
identifying all the inputs, calculating the net present value of capital investments and
valuing all inputs using current market prices converted to constant currency. In this
way both financial and economic costs of a particular service can be calculated. The
former captures actual expenditures, whereas an economic analysis considers the
opportunity cost of implementation.
Cost analyses using the accounting cost approach not only ignore the possibility of
changing unit costs with increased level of output but also do not differentiate between
the short and long run. Where the impact of economies of scale is being analysed this
distinction has important repercussions in the interpretation of results. Using a
classification system that distinguishes between fixed and variable costs enables the
identification of those factors that remain fixed in the short term (UNAIDS, 2000a).
Supplementing cost data collection with background information about the history of
the project and what investments would be required to expand current levels of activity
can help in determining how costs are likely to change over short and long run
timeframes (eg (Robertson, Davis et al., 1984; Over, 1986)). Furthermore, this can help
identify key major influences on costs such as budgetary guidelines, funding gaps,
geographical location of the project and socia-economic and cultural characteristics of
the target population.
2.7.2. Transaction costs in scaling up HIV/AIDS
interventions
2.7.2.1. Transaction cost economics - the theory
Formally, transaction costs are defined as the costs of friction in the process of
exchange (Williamson, 1983). The nature of the transaction costs will influence how
the production of the good or service is organised and governed. Transaction costs
and the resulting forms of organisation are a function of certain properties underlying
the transaction(s) and the institutional environmenf in which production or service
provision takes place (Milgram and Roberts, 1992; Shelanski and Klein, 1995).
Different organisational structures are established to minimise the transaction costs
(Williamson, 1983). Where transactions are costless we would expect to see
governance by the market and discrete spot contracts (as assumed in the neoclassical
model).
Transaction costs are shaped by the presence or not and interaction of bounded
rationality, opportunism and asset specificity (see Table 2.9). Bounded rationality
refers to the ability of individuals to obtain and process all the information, in this case,
to comprehend all the eventualities that might arise from the transaction and is
exacerbated under situations of uncertainty (Williamson, 1987). Opportunism is
defined as behaviour of parties to act in their own self interest at the expense of others
or lying and cheating (Williamson, 1987). The presence of bounded rationality can thus
permit or even facilitate opportunistic behaviour.
1.
2 The institutional environment is the broader set of institutions within which people and organisations
develop and implement institutional arrangements.
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Table 2.9: The governance implications of the interaction between transaction cost
generating behavioural characteristics and asset specltlcltye
Behavioural Assumption
Bounded rationality Opportunism
Asset specificity Governance
implications
le ./ Comprehensive
contracting
Relational contracting
Spot contracts
Bureaucracy
" Adapted from (Williamson, 1987). le = not present; ./ = present
The role of asset specificity is key (Williamson, 1983; Hart, 1995; Flood, 2000). If one
party to the transaction is required to make an investment specific to the transaction of
concern, it may find itself in a "hold up" situation, whereby it incurs considerable losses
if the transaction fails (Milgram and Roberts, 1992). As a result, as the cost of
transactions rises, incentives to remove the transactions from the market are created.
Eliminating a difference in interests by merging two contracting parties may be the
most effective way to prevent the risk of rent expropriation associated with asset
specific investments (Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Hart, 1996; Flood, 2000). With this
move towards the internal organisation of transactions or hierarchical governance, the
role of the price mechanism in resource allocation is reduced and the organisation itself
becomes the locus of control (Cease, 1937; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). At the
extreme the centralisation of organisation results in bureaucracy.
In addition to the three basic tenets above, frequency of the transaction and the
institutional environment serve to further influence the transaction costs (Williamson,
1983; Williamson, 1996; Ashton, 1998; Palmer, 2000; Allen, 2002). Transactions that
recur frequently are associated with higher transaction costs as the number of
transactions is necessarily higher. This can lead to the creation of specialised
procedures to avoid recurrent transaction costs (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). The
institutional environment can be defined as a combination of the degree to which
competition is present (Williamson, 1983; Palmer and Mills, 2000), the nature of the
regulatory framework (Williamson, 2000) as well as the presence of cultural norms,
codes and conventions (North, 1990) that shape behaviour. Trust" is also key to
1.
3 Various definitions to trust exist from an individual's expectation of a desirable action being performed by
the trustee to the assessment of goodwill in a transaction with uncertain outcome (Nielsen, 2001).
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limiting the degree to which transaction costs can escalate (McMaster and Sawkins,
1996). The factors influencing transaction costs are summarised in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Factors influencing the nature of transaction costs
Institutional environment
Regulations/ norms/ traditions/ trust
Organisation characteristics
Behaviour/ capacity/ bounded rational/ competitive
environment
Transaction Costs
Service characteristics
Uncertain outcome/ asset specificity
Transaction characteristics
Contract design/ frequency of contract
2.7.2.2. Application of the transaction cost economics
framework in the public sector
Transaction cost economics and New Institutional Economics, the sub-discipline in
which it sits, have focussed for the most part on the organisation of industry and firms
but increasingly insights from this work are being absorbed into the public sector in an
exploration of economic development and reform processes (Ashton, 1998) (Grindle
and Hilderbrand, 1995; Frant, 1996; Ashton, 1998; Goddard and Mannion, 1998; Isham
and Kahkonen, 1999; Jan, 2000; Mills, Bennett et al., 2000; Palmer, 2000; Palmer and
Mills, 2000; Allen, 2002; Azfar, 2002). Few transaction cost economics evaluations of
public sector services have attempted to measure transaction costs. This is because
the transaction cost minimising institutional arrangement takes into account the ex ante
costs of negotiating, establishing and safeguarding a contractual arrangement. As a
result some transaction costs are non-explicit or not realised rendering it impossible to
capture their full extent in quantifiable form (Masten, Meehan et al., 1991).
Where transaction costs have been quantified, a narrow definition has been used, for
example: the costs of negotiating, monitoring and enforcing a contractual agreement;
or the price of the contract over and above the production costs of a particular service
(Mills, Hongoro et al., 1997; Loevinsohn and Harding, 2004). The limited research in
this area suggests that even these quantifiable transaction costs represent a significant
share of overall costs in health services. Empirical evidence has shown that
transaction costs were 30% of premium revenue in the regulated insurance market in
Chile and about one third of total cost savings envisaged by the Hospital Rate Setting
Commission of New Jersey (Hsiao, 1995; Liss, 1995) cited in (Kumaranayake, 1998).
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Mills et al. (1997) found that the cost of contracts for hospital service provision was
between 20 and 25% higher than the costs of direct provision with any cost-savings
accruing to the provider rather than purchaser of services (Mills, Hongoro et al., 1997).
Similarly, Posnett et al.'s (1998) evaluation of the total purchasing pilot projects in the
UK found that per capita transaction costs were equal to the per capita direct costs of
management (Posnett, Goodwin et al., 1998). Finally, in comparing contracting models
of service delivery the direct government service delivery in Cambodia, the difference
in per capita provider costs appear to be largely attributable to measurable transaction
costs (Loevinsohn and Harding, 2004).
Rather than measuring transaction costs, a major focus of transaction cost economics
analysis has been in the identification of the degree to which transaction costs are
perceived to be present, their impact on the likely contractual outcome and their order
of magnitude. In the health sector, these frameworks have been used to help
understand how costs and cost structures change as a result of health sector reform
e.g. (Ashton, 1998; Palmer and Mills, 2000; Allen, 2002) and the use of economic
analysis in health sector decision-making (Jan, 2000).
Alien uses this framework to analyse the introduction of contracts in the NHS and
shows how it would have been identified a priori that comprehensive contracting was
not feasible due to asymmetries of information, a lack of trust between payers and
providers and the asset specificity of resources associated with health service delivery
(Allen, 2002). A better prior understanding of the transactions might have led to
improved and more appropriate contracting or governance arrangements. A similar
analysis in New Zealand shows that transaction costs are not homogenous across all
health services but vary according to the type of service provided (Ashton, 1998). The
implication is that the methods used for governing transactions should also vary across
these services i.e. one size does not fit all. Finally, Palmer (2003) documents how
regional governments' dependence on private primary care providers in areas of poor
health care is a form of asset specificity that has led to relational contracting in South
Africa in spite of incomplete contracts and evidence of opportunism (Palmer and Mills,
2003).
The few qualitative studies that have examined the transaction costs in-depth thus
show that the predictions of transaction cost economics are largely correct. Bounded
rationality, asset specificity and scope for opportunism in health services imply serious
contractual difficulties. As a result comprehensive contracts are deemed inappropriate
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(Allen, 2002), relational contracts have evolved (Palmer and Mills, 2000; Palmer and
Mills, 2003) and the extent of these difficulties varies across services (Ashton, 1998).
2.7.2.3. The transaction costs of scaling up
Scaling up adds another dimension to the understanding of contracting out for health
services. Qualitative work on health service contracting has largely concentrated on
how managed market reforms have impacted on efficiency of service delivery and the
implications for governance rather than how different levels of coverage may impact on
transaction costs (Ashton, 1998; Allen, 2002; Palmer and Mills, 2003). As stated
above, contracts with the private sector have been used successfully to scale up health
services (Nieves, La Forgia et al., 2000; Slack and Savedoff, 2001; Chowdhury, 2002;
Soeters and Griffiths, 2003; Loevinsohn and Harding, 2004; Loevinsohn and Harding,
2005) and it is suggested that there are likely to be economies of scale with higher
levels of coverage within a single contract (Loevinsohn and Harding, 2004). Although,
none of the existing presentations of transaction cost economics address this directly,
theoretically, the prediction of decreasing average costs over increasing output is
consistent with transaction cost economics. However, contracting with a single
provider is more likely to lead to reduced competition and a "hold-up" situation with the
purchaser or provider at risk of losing asset specific investments (Milgram and Roberts,
1992). In addition, due to geographical, socia-economic or cultural conditions, a
contract with a single provider may not be sufficient to cover the entire population
targeted. As scale increases, more contracts are likely to be required, requiring more
inputs at all stages of the contracting process. With these greater numbers monitoring
can also become more complex, exacerbating problems of bounded rationality and
opportunistic behaviour. There is no evidence available in the health services or
international development literature that assesses the transaction cost implications of
scaling up services.
2.7.2.4. Empirical methods used in measuring transaction
costs
In examining transaction costs, empirical techniques have included both quantitative
and qualitative analysis. Mills et al identified transaction costs as the price of the
contract plus the costs of negotiating and managing the agreement minus the direct
costs of services (Mills, Hongoro et al., 1997) and used detailed cost analysis along
with a review of the contractual process and agreement to identify these costs. In an
evaluation of the total purchasing pilot projects in the NHS transaction costs were
estimated as the value of resources devoted to undertaking the additional functions
related to total purchasing (Posnett, Goodwin et al., 1998). Analyses such as these fail
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to capture the complete problem of transaction costs which take into account the ex
ante costs of contracting that might not be realised if one organisational form evolves
as opposed to another. As a result of this, transaction costs are not necessarily
quantifiable and therefore transaction cost economics research has concentrated on
the collection of qualitative information through case studies (Masten, Meehan et al.,
1991). Although questionnaire surveys help explain some phenomena, an in-depth
understanding is better achieved through interviews of parties to the contracting
process (Azfar, 2002). Semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and
surveys of documents based on case studies are the most frequently used methods for
assessing transaction costs in health services (Ashton, 1998; Palmer and Mills, 2000;
Allen, 2002; Palmer and Mills, 2003). These types of qualitative methods are standard
techniques used to explain phenomena that are difficult to quantify (Britten, 1995).
They are particularly useful techniques for building the body of knowledge in this field.
By providing in-depth insight, they can test the realisation of theory in practice and can
lead to the generation of hypotheses for further study (Coast, 1999; Mays and Pope,
2000; Thorne, 2000).
Studies using these qualitative approaches have identified the transaction costs in
contractual relationships and attempted to explain their presence using the transaction
costs characteristics as described by Williamson (Williamson, 1983). The costs of
negotiating, establishing, safeguarding and enforcing the contracts are identified
through a process of document review and semi-structured interviews to pinpoint the
actions taken towards each of these ends. Explaining the influence of the institutional
environment and the nature of the transacting parties is also important in explaining the
transaction cost problem. This requires an understanding of the role of key
stakeholders, the historical background, the regulatory framework, cultural norms and
how these might shape the contracts with NGOs for the delivery of HIV prevention
services and the implementation of services themselves (Ashton, 1998; Williamson,
2000; Allen, 2002). Of particular importance is the ability of each contracting party to
rely on the regulatory framework to enforce the contractual agreement. A combination
of document review and interviews with stakeholders can be used to acquire this
information (Ashton, 1998; Allen, 2002).
2.7.3. Measuring scale
In measuring scale the choice of indicator depends on the nature of the research
question (Drummond, Stoddart et al., 1997) and should be comparable across the units
of analysis. Typically these can be categorised into three different groups for indicators
- impact, outcome and output (Grassly, Garnett et al., 2002; Marseille, Dandona et al.,
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2004). Where the research question is looking at efficiency, the most appropriate
indicators are impact and outcome indicators that capture some aspect of quality and
the degree to which a service is reaching its goal. Outcome indicators enable
comparison across services with different activities but similar goals e.g. different
methods for reducing risky behaviours. Impact indicators refer to the final goal of a
service e.g. HIV infections averted and can be used to make comparisons across the
range of HIV prevention services. For research looking at service delivery scale, using
an output based perspective, the indicator needs to capture the different activities
involved and the intensity of their implementation. Depending on the service and the
unit of analysis, this might include number of outpatient consultations, number of
vaccinations or number of condoms distributed. These more routinely collected output
or process indicators are adequate to capture the scale or volume of activity, using an
output-based definition (Kumaranayake and Watts, 2000a).
Applying these to the case of HIV prevention, the unit of analysis might be an NGO
orolect. The project might be designed to increase condom usage, increase access to
quality care for management of sexually transmitted infections (STls) and provide
access to information designed to foster behaviour change towards these goals. The
projsct activities could comprise outreach through peer education and distribution of
materials, referral of the target group for STI treatment. the development of sources of
condom supplies and supporting activities gain the communities' trust. An analysis of
efficiency would require outcome indicators such as HIV infections averted or years of
life saved. Measures of output would reflect the core activities and could therefore
include number of contacts made, number of STls treated (or referred for treatment),
number of condoms outlets, number of awareness campaigns, number of people
covered by the project and number of people exposed to programme messages (De
Jong, 2001; Lamptey, Zeitz et al., 2001).
In using output indicators, the generalisation of the results of an analysis of scale must
be made with caution. There is no consideration of the link between output and the
achievements in terms of behaviour change or impact on health or other community
development goals that a service might be designed to achieve. Information regarding
the outcome and impact of that service can help when attempting to generalise the
results in budgeting for project replication. However, data on the impact of HIV
prevention services are rarely available as they require expensive epidemiological trials
or mathematical modelling (Merson, Dayton et al., 2000; Grassly, Garnett et al., 2002).
Similarly behavioural change and successful STI treatment are rarely included as part
of routine monitoring and when they are the quality of the data is not always reliable.
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Without reliable data on these achievements, an indication of outcome and impact can
be ascertained using health services monitoring documentation such as routine
behavioural surveys as well as qualitative data from interviews or focus group
discussions with health service staff, the target population and project partners (e.g.
funders and training organisations).
Further care must be taken when making comparisons across units of analysis with
output based indicators if there is a suspicion that production technology varies across
these units. The degree of comparability of the routinely collected data that underpin
these indicators can only be ascertained through detailed knowledge of the production
process at each unit and the context and environment in which activities take place.
The production process can vary even across seemingly similar services. For
example, one HIV prevention project for commercial sex workers (CSWs) may
comprise education, condom distribution and STI treatment whereas the next may
include education, condom distribution and the development of a network of health
care providers to whom potential STI patients are referred. Comparison of the number
of people reached across these different projects is unlikely to be valid as the services
provided to recipients from the different projects differ.
Finally, given the multiple activities of health service delivery units it is likely that there
will be a range of output indicators to use or to choose from when measuring scale.
Again, the choice of measure depends on the research question being addressed.
Expanding HIV prevention services from the national or state level perspective might
include goals such as increasing the number of people covered by prevention
programmes, increasing the number of HIV prevention projects in operation or
increasing the number of people working on HIV prevention issues. On the other hand,
at the service delivery or project level expanding services might include increasing the
number of people covered by the service or a range of volume based indicators such
as number of STls treated, number of condoms distributed or number of contacts made
with the target community.
2.8. Conclusions and unanswered questions
The review presented here describes the different terminology and methods used for
scaling up in the health services literature, and reveals the weakness in the evidence
base regarding the role of contracting out and costs in the scaling up of HIV prevention
services. The review found a range of definitions used for the term "scaling up",
highlighting the importance of clarity in terminology when defining a research question.
The review also found that evidence regarding the effectiveness of an array of methods
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used for scaling up health services is still limited, in particular with regards to filling
HIV/AIDS service gaps by contracting out. The evidence base on the costs and
efficiency of contracting out is even weaker.
Contracting out health services has been found to increase coverage but the
understanding of the transaction and production costs of contracting out is limited. In
particular, there is limited evidence on the nature of the costs of HIV/AIDS
interventions. To obtain a full understanding of the efficiency gains of contracting out to
scale up services, any reduction in costs of production needs to be weighed against the
transaction costs resulting from the contract.
Production cost data provide information on how to scale up efficiently. Accounting
cost studies can provide a measure of average cost and an indication of whether costs
are falling or rising with increases in output. By calculating the marginal cost, it is
possible to identify the optimal scale of operation and make more accurate estimates of
resource requirements for HIV prevention programmes. This can be obtained from
econometric estimation. With econometric estimation of a cost function, using the
appropriate functional form, it is also possible to explore the impact of exogenous
variables on total and average costs.
Transaction cost economics aims to explain the underlying properties of transaction
costs and the extent to which they impact on efficiency. The transaction cost
framework enables a better understanding of the costs and efficiency of different
organisational structures for service delivery, although empirical testing of these
concepts is limited due to the practical and conceptual difficulty of measurement.
Research into the transaction costs can provide a better understanding of how
transaction costs associated with scaling up through contracting out affect the
implementation of HIV prevention services and generate hypotheses for future
empirical work.
Although the theory of scale economies implies that production costs will vary for
different levels of activity, there is limited evidence on scale economies or production
costs in HIV prevention services. Furthermore, transaction cost economics predicts
that transaction costs are likely to vary with scale of activity and with increasing output
they are likely to rise. However, the evidence base is also weak in this area. The
transaction cost economics framework has been little applied in the field of health and
more specifically HIV/AIDS services.
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Major gaps in knowledge exist in the understanding of economies of scale of HIV
prevention programmes as well as their transaction costs. Planning for scaling up
requires an understanding of the implications of organisational structure, optimal levels
of efficiency and resource requirements. Through building the evidence on transaction
costs and production costs this can be achieved. The next chapter embarks on
addressing this information gap by developing a framework for analysis and identifying
the appropriate methodologies to examine these issues.
71
Chapter 3. Methodology
3. 1. Introduction
This chapter describes the analytical framework and methods used for sampling and
data collection in carrying out the research into the production and transaction costs of
HIV prevention services in Southern India. Building on the literature review in Chapter
2, this chapter starts by identifying the framework for analysis and stating the objectives
of the thesis. The techniques used for developing a sampling frame and the sampling
methodology for the thesis are then described. Following from this, methods used for
data collection and the potential limitations arising from the data collection are
presented. Specific analytical methods applied in each analysis are described in the
specific chapters.
The research for this thesis was funded by the Wellcome Trust under a fellowship
awarded to the author. The author was responsible for the design of the analytical
framework, data collection and analysis. She was also responsible for the
management of the data collection which was carried out by herself with the assistance
of her collaborators in India.
3.2. Analytical framework
Based on the theoretical framework laid out in the previous chapters, an analytical
framework for exploring the costs of scaling up should incorporate the influence of both
the production process and transaction costs. The production process is influenced by
the technology, context, prices, timeframe and system inefficiencies, while transaction
costs are shaped by the institutional environment, organisation, service and transaction
characteristics. The analytical framework for the thesis was developed by the author
based on this premise and is shown in detail in Figure 3.1. The framework
hypothesises that a combination of the production technology, nature and level of
outputs and transaction costs affect the marginal cost. Each of these three factors is,
in turn, shaped by the context within which the intervention is implemented. Changes
in the output level also depend on existing coverage levels, ease of access to the
services and the characteristics of the target population. Governance arrangements
influence costs but in turn are influenced by transaction costs which are shaped by the
institutional environment, service and organisation characteristics.
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Figure 3.1: Analytical framework for analysing how costs change with scaling up
Technical
Institutional Inefficiencies
environment
Organisation Production
characteristics technology
Service
Contextcharacteristics
Factor prices
Transaction
characteristics Timeframe
3.3. Methodological framework
As a result of the methodological issues highlighted in chapter 2, the thesis uses both
qualitative and quantitative methods to explore the transaction and production costs of
scaling up. Production costs are defined as the provider costs of the implementation
of HIV prevention services. Transaction costs are defined as the costs of friction in a
contractual relationship (Williamson, 1983). Scaling up is defined as the expansion of
services to increase output and is examined at two levels. First, production costs are
analysed at the level of the service delivery unit. In this analysis the service delivery
unit is the NGO HIV prevention project i.e. the set of HIV prevention activities provided
by the NGO to the high risk group and financed by a separate funding agency e.g. the
State AIDS Control Society. Quantitative cost and output data are used to establish
Whether production costs vary with marginal changes in output defined by the various
project activities and the number of people reached by the project. Second, at the level
of the State programme or funding agency, the transaction cost analysis explores the
change in organisational form associated with ensuring increased services i.e. the
contracting out of services to NGOs. Qualitative data derived from case study HIV
prevention projects and their funding agencies are used to establish the transaction
costs of increased numbers of NGO contracts held and managed by the funding
agency.
To gather the information required for both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of
the study, the research comprised four major components with the following specific
aims:
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1. A mapping survey of NGO HIV prevention projects to establish a sampling
frame and assess the feasibility of the study by
• describing the epidemiology of HIV and national response to the HIV
epidemic in India
• describing the state level response to the HIV epidemic in the context of
the epidemiology of 2 high prevalence states
carrying out a census of NGO delivered targeted HIV prevention
projects in 2 states in India and establishing the availability of economic
cost data at a representative sample of projects
•
2. The in-depth analysis of production costs of HIV prevention services using
accounting cost methods, with the specific aims of:
• Estimating the total costs, average costs and cost profiles for a set of case
study HIV prevention projects with a range of scale, experience,
governance and location characteristics.
Identifying and explaining the causes of average cost variations with
particular focus on project scale using quantitative and qualitative analysis
•
3. The econometric modelling of a cost function for HIV prevention services in
order to:
• Estimate the marginal costs and investigate the existence of economies of
scale of targeted HIV prevention projects at different levels of coverage
• Identify whether some point of minimum efficient scale exists in the
implementation of targeted HIV prevention projects, if economies of scale
are found to exist
• Assess the impact of other key contextual factors on total and average
costs
4. The analysis and comparison of transaction costs of different governance
arrangements for contracting out HIV prevention services to NGOs in India
based on information collected from:
• different state level HIV prevention funding agencies identified in
component 1; and
• a set of case study HIV prevention projects funded by these agencies
The sampling and data requirements for each of these components are laid out in
Table 3.1. The author's first step in the research process was to establish the sampling
frame. The following section describes the methods used to establish the sampling
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frame, select the required case studies for the transaction cost and in-depth production
cost analysis and the larger sample of HIV prevention projects for the econometric
modeling. It is followed by the methods used for the data collection related to
transaction costs and then the methods used to collect production costs.
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3.4. Sample
3.4.1. Developing the sampling frame
Between January and March 2002, a mapping analysis was carried out by the author to
identify two states in India for the research, to identify an appropriate HIV prevention
service for analysis and to assess the availability and quality of data on costs and
outputs of the selected service type. The research commenced with a sampling frame
of NGO targeted HIV prevention projects in India, based on the importance of these
projects to the national programme and the significant role of NGOs in the expansion of
HIV prevention services in low income countries. To ensure comparability of outputs
across the projects one service type was chosen for analysis, rather than a range of
HIV prevention services. The criteria for selecting the service included that it was a
priority for the National AIDS Control Programme, that there were a sufficient number
of projects implementing this service to fulfil the sampling requirements, and there was
sufficient variation in institutional arrangements for the implementation of these
services to facilitate comparisons. The criteria are summarised in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Criteria for selection of the states and service type for the research
• Single service type to enable
comparison of outputs in model;
• 2 states to facilitate comparison and test
generalisability of model
Criteria for selection of the service t e Criteria for the selection of the states
• Priority in epidemic control; • HIV prevalence among high-risk
• Sufficient number of projects to popu lations;
meet sampling requirements; • Diversity in scale and history to generate
• Diversity of institutional relevant data;
arrangements. • A sufficient number of NGOs to meet
sampling requirements; and
• Diversity of governance arrangements
As a priority component of the national and state level programmes, targeted projects
(HIV prevention projects for high risk groups) were selected as the service for analysis
(see Chapter 4). To ensure comparability within these, production technology,
epidemiology of disease and context of the project were controlled for as far as
Possible by selecting services targeted at a single vulnerable group as the primary
focus of analysis.
As a result of the different demographics, socio-economic characteristics, epidemiology
and organisational set up in each state, the thesis uses the state rather than the
country as the starting point of analysis. To enable a comparison of different
governance arrangements and to examine the influence of contextual factors on costs,
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two states were chosen for the study. The selection criteria for the states required
them to have an HIV epidemic of concern at the time of the mapping survey (Le. HIV
prevalence rates at antenatal clinics in excess of 1% and epidemics in high risk
populations) and sufficient level of activity in the NGO sector. Thus selection criteria
included the HIV prevalence rates among antenatal clinic attendants and high-risk
populations, an adequate history to generate data, a sufficient number of NGOs
working with the state AIDS control programme to meet the econometric sampling
requirements and a diversity of governance arrangements (see Table 3.2).
The four Indian states with antenatal clinic HIV prevalence in excess of 1% and
epidemics driven by sexual transmission were considered for the study (Andhra
Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu). The four states are characterised
in Table 3.3 and described in more detail in Chapter 4. The organisational structures
for the implementation of the targeted projects vary across and within these states (see
Table 3.3). At the time of the mapping phase of the research, of these four states,
Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra were found to fit the research site
selection criteria as the state governments were supporting over 40 NGO HIV
prevention projects each. Karnataka had recruited 18 NGOs to the targeted
intervention programme and was still working in an inception phase. The AIDS control
programmes, including both state government and bi-Iaterally supported programmes,
in each of these states were visited. The programme directors were interviewed,
programme documents reviewed and key informants (Kls) interviewed to obtain
background on the functioning of the programmes, their interest in the research project
and feasibility of conducting the costing survey (see Appendix 1 for a list of people
interviewed) .
Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu were finally selected for the study for a number of
reasons: first, the programmes in Maharashtra were in flux due to the inception phase
of a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) supported HIV
prevention programme; second, access to data in Maharashtra proved extremely slow
and difficult; and finally, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu were supported by different
bi-Iateral donors resulting in institutional differences worthy of comparison.
The final sampling frame therefore included all NGO HIV prevention projects targeted
at CSWs and supported by government or other donors in the states of Andhra
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. Once this had been established, a more detailed mapping
survey of NGO HIV prevention projects in each of the states was carried out in order to
identify all NGOs working on HIV prevention for high risk groups.
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Table 3.3: Demographics, health status and characterisation of the epidemiology and the
State AIDS Programmes in the 4 Southern States considered for the Analysis
Maharashtra Andhra Pradesh Karnataka Tamil Nadu India
Total Population 96,752,247 75,727,541 52,733,958 62,110,839 1,027,015,247
% rural' 57.6% 72.9% 66.0% 56.1% 72.2%
Per capita consumption 697.4 550.5 638.8 681.4 591.0
expenditure, INR
1999/20002
Literacy rates 76.9% 60.5% 66.6% 73.5% 64.8%
infant mortality rate, 1999 48 66 58 52 70
Public spending on health 0.61 1.01 1.61 1.35 n/a
as % of GOP, 1998/92
Reported AIDS cases 13,402 11,819 2,478 52,036 109,349
HIV prevalence, 2004 (%) by type of surveillance site
STDlI 10.4 16.4 12 8.4
ANC 1.25 2.25 1.25 0.5
IOU 28 (Mumbai) nla 0 39.9
MSM 9.6 (Mumbai) nla nla 6.8
FSW 44.7 (Mumbai) 48.56 - 54f
People reporting sex with 11.1 13.3 4.2 3.3 6.6
non-regular partner in last
12 months"
Consistent condom use 60 25 16.5 29.1 32.4
with all non-regular
..2_artners8
Agencies responsible for MSACS' APSACS- with KSACS-- TNSACSL'1
contracting with NGOs MDACS" technical and CAPACSM
Avert managerial APACML'1
assistance from
Technical
Resource Unit
Si-lateral donor USAID* DFID** CIDA*** USAID
Stage of response at MSACS and Merging of well Inception TN SACS
outset of study MDACS established phase of bi- programme
established DFID supported lateral established prior
prior to and APSACS programme to NACP2';
NACP2#; programmes in CAPACS in start
Inception 2001 up phase; APAC
phase for new at end of phase
USAID 1 & moving into
programme expansion
Number of Targeted
(Avert) ..2_hase;
MDACS-16, 101 18 TNSACS-65,
Interventions (Tis) MSACS-30 CAPACS-7,
APAC-31
Of which sex worker MDACS-6, 18 13 TNSACS-21
projects: MSACS-9 CAPACS-2
APAC-6
Ce • J ..( nsus of India, 2001), (Government of India, 2002), (Government of Maharashtra, 2002), (National AIDS
Co~trol Organisation, 2005b); 5 (National AIDS Control Organisation, 2004c); 6 (Bhuyan, Shobarani et al., 2001); 7
(~llson and Shiv Kumar, 2001); 8 (National AIDS Control Organisation, 2002);lISTD = Clinics for sexually transmitted
diseases; ANC = antenatal clinics; IOU = injecting drug users; MSM = men who have sex with men; FSW = female~::xworkers. *United States Agency for International Development; **Department of International Development (UK);
Canadian International Development Agency; 'Maharashtra State AIDS Control Society; MMumbai District AIDS
Control Society; #National AIDS Control Programme 2; -Andhra Pradesh State AIDS Control Society; +-Karnataka
State AIDS Control Society L'1TamilNadu State AIDS Control Society; MChennai Corporation AIDS Prevention and
Control Society; MA USAID funded AIDS Prevention and Control project.
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3.4.2. Sample selection
3.4.2.1. Mapping of HIV prevention projects in Tamil Nadu
NGOs implementing targeted HIV prevention projects and their funding agencies were
identified by key informant interviews and document review carried out by the author
with the support of a research assistant. Key informants were selected again through
document review and snowballing. A list of people interviewed is contained in
Appendix 1. These processes were also used to understand the number of NGOs
funded, overall programme expenditures, methods used for planning, monitoring and
evaluation of the NGO programme and coverage achieved for each identified funding
agency. Second, a structured questionnaire was designed by the author to gather
information with respect to HIV and non-HIV related services and activities,
geographical location, population coverage of HIV activities, type of provider, size,
budget and funding sources, age of organisation and availability of monitoring and
evaluation data, from each NGO identified (see Appendix 2). The questionnaire also
sought an agreement to participate in the cost analysis if their project was selected.
This was posted or emailed to all the NGOs identified. The questionnaire was pilot
tested at 3 NGOs within Chennai in November 2001 and was subsequently revised.
The questionnaire was sent to all NGOs identified in Tamil Nadu in January 2002.
An MS Access™ database was developed for data entry. One research team member
was trained in MS Access and structure of the database itself. Data were entered as
the completed questionnaires were received.
3.4.2.2. Mapping of HIV prevention projects in Andhra Pradesh
In Andhra Pradesh, it was found that a census of NGO HIVIAIDS activities had already
been carried out before this study's mapping survey commenced (Lepra India, 2002).
Beyond the Andhra Pradesh State AIDS Control Society (APSACS) programme, no
other targeted NGO projects were identified from this survey (Lepra India, 2002). To
avoid duplication and to avoid repeating the low response rate in Tamil Nadu (see
Chapter 4), the postal survey used in Tamil Nadu was sent only to those projects
working with commercial sex workers in AP (the type of project finally selected for the
analysis, see Section 3.4.2.4). Information on the number of NGOs funded, overall
programme expenditures, methods used for planning, monitoring and evaluation of the
NGO programme and coverage achieved by the programme was obtained from the
Technical Resource Unit (the technical agency responsible for managing the APSACS
NGO contracts) and APSACS through interviews and document review. NGO
characteristics for the broader set of projects funded by APSACS, relating to HIV
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experience, organisation expenditure and staffing and project coverage were obtained
through a simplified postal survey of all NGOs contracted by APSACS (see Appendix
3). This was sent out to all NGOs that had been under contract with APSACS to
deliver targeted HIV prevention projects (n = 101). After follow up with phone calls, 82
(81.2%) of the NGOs responded. The data from this survey were entered into an MS
Excel spreadsheet by a member of the research team and data entries cross-checked
with the survey forms by the author.
3.4.2.3. Assessing the quality of available data
As well as describe the nature of the NGO targeted HIV prevention projects, the
mapping survey also set out to assess the quality of information available for an
economic cost analysis at a representative sample of these NGOs. Economic costing
requires the understanding of all resources used and includes those inputs that may
not be reflected in the financial costs as well as the outputs generated by the service.
Routine monitoring systems can be used to collect output data and therefore they were
evaluated to see if they met the costing requirements. In addition, economic costing
requires documentation of activities and inputs, expenditure records and input prices.
The survey therefore requested information on the indicators recorded as part of
monitoring systems. Interviews with funding agencies and NGOs sought to assess the
availability and quality of this information (see Appendix 1). A convenience sample of
eleven NGOs in Tamil Nadu and 5 NGOs in Andhra Pradesh were visited by the author
to confirm the types and quality of information recorded at the NGO level. Where
Possible records themselves were examined to verify statements made in the
interviews and the degree to which planned monitoring and evaluation activities were
followed and recorded.
3.4.2.4. Selection of the case studies
A focussed sample of NGOs from each state was selected for the economic cost and
transaction cost analyses based on the results of the mapping survey. A case study
approach was used in order to enable in-depth insights and to ensure the collection of
full economic costs, required for understanding how and why costs might vary. The
selection process aimed to identify NGO projects that would be able to explain the
impact on costs of the governance arrangements and to gain further insights into how
production costs change with scale. Given the consistently high numbers of CSW
prOjects, relative to the other targeted HIV prevention projects, across the states, it was
decided to focus the case study sample on CSW projects.
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Projects were selected from different states, funding agencies and with different
funding histories in order to explore the influence of different institutional arrangements
and funding mechanisms on services delivered through similar production processes.
The results of the mapping survey were used to group the NGOs according to the
different states and funding agencies. The NGO projects were then selected, using the
survey results and consultation with the funding agencies, based on their institutional
arrangements, geographical location, HIV experience, availability of cost and output
data and the funding agency's knowledge of the quality of their services.
Permission was requested to carry out the work from the National AIDS Control
Programme as well as the funding agencies and their NGO partners (letters of
permission are provided in Appendix 4). In the case of Andhra Pradesh, APSACS and
their bi-Iateral donor (DFID) agreed to the study and they requested the NGOs to
cooperate with the study. In this way, all 9 NGOs working on CSW projects that were
selected participated in the study. In addition, 2 NGO projects working with trucker
populations were included in the case studies. These projects were added to help
provide insights into differences in transaction and production costs across target
groups and historical differences in funding arrangements for targeted HIV prevention
prOjects in Andhra Pradesh (see Chapter 4), although there are limitations in the
potential to make generalisations from such a small sample size.
In Tamil Nadu, four different funding agencies were identified: AIDS Prevention and
Control (APAC); the Chennai Corporation AIDS Prevention and Control Society
(CAPACS); Christian Council for Rural Development and Research (CCOORR); and
the Tamil Nadu State AIDS Control Society (TNSACS). On first approach APAC
provided permission for the study and facilitated access and permission from their
partner NGOs. Verbal approval was received from their funders, USAID.
Unfortunately, this permission had been granted prematurely and USAID subsequently
withdrew permission resulting in the withdrawal of APAC and their NGO projects from
Our sample. Permission was obtained from CCOORA. They then facilitated access to
their NGO partners, two of which were selected for the study based on geographical
location and experience.
Given the NGO focus of the study, TNSACS and CAPACS required the research team
to seek permission from the NGOs themselves. Only 5 of the 38 NGOs funded by
these agencies completed the statement agreeing to the cost analysis in the postal
survey. Of these only two were CSW projects. The research team therefore contacted
each of the CSW projects that had not replied or had not provided permission (n=17).
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The only two CSW projects working with the Chennai AIDS Prevention and Control
Society at the time of the survey agreed to participate in the cost analysis. Of the 21
named CSW projects funded by the Tamil Nadu State AIDS Control Society, it was
discovered through the survey and interviews that many were not so focussed and
actually covered a broader range of target groups. Furthermore, some NGOs proved
impossible to reach by courier, telephone and even telegram. Due to this, 4 NGO
projects were selected based on three criteria: the knowledge that they targeted
CSWs, derived from visits to the NGOs and discussions with TNSACS; that they were
geographically dispersed across the state; and that they responded to phone calls or
email.
3.4.2.5. Selection of a sample for the econometric modelling
Based on the review of the hospital and health services literature, a sample size of a
minimum of 30 projects was found to be required for the econometric modelling
(Barnum and Kutzin, 1993a; Wouters, 1993), although this number is also dependent
on the number of explanatory variables included in the model (Dougherty, 2002).
Small sample sizes will inevitably restrict both the choice of functional form and the
number of variables that will be permissible in the model to obtain significant results.
From the mapping analysis 29 and 20 projects working with CSWs were identified in
Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, respectively. At the outset of the study it was
planned to carry out economic costing at all these projects to create a sample of cost
data from a single service type that was large enough to be used in the econometric
modelling. This approach was reconsidered during the initial stages of the fieldwork.
The sampling problems encountered in the case study sample selection led the
research team to believe it would be difficult to achieve a large enough sample this way
(see Section 3.4.2.1). In addition, the pilot testing of the costing tools (see below)
indicated that the time required to carry out economic cost analyses at all forty-nine
prOjects would be beyond the feasible timeframe of the fieldwork. To ensure a large
enough sample, it was therefore decided to collect financial data, in the form of annual
reported expenditures, and output data, in the form of routine monitoring indicators,
from NGOs both working with the four major funding agencies identified and willing to
participate in the study. This information could then be supplemented by information
regarding the NGO characteristics from the postal surveys. Financial cost information
can provide insights into how expenditures might change with different levels of activity.
Although the data do not provide as complete a picture as economic cost data, they
can suggest patterns and the impact of different factors such as scale or target group
on the average cost.
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Further review of the available data at the funding agencies was then carried out to
assess the feasibility of this approach. The quarterly monitoring reports at TNSACS
were full of gaps and inconsistencies that were indecipherable so that annual figures
on both expenditures and outputs could not be compiled for the majority of NGOs. The
samples of projects at CAPACS (n= 8) and CCOORR (n=4) were too small to be
considered for an econometric model. Only at APSACS were data of adequate quality
and availability to be included in the sample. It was therefore decided to use these
data for the econometric modelling.
3.4.2.6. Implications of the sampling process for the thesis
Difficulties encountered in the mapping survey and sample selection led to some
significant changes in the sampling approach and plans for the data collection. Table
3.4 mirrors Table 3.1 but provides an overview of the revised sampling approaches
used for each of the components of the study and how they varied from the original
research plan. It also summarises the final data collection techniques used and how
these were adapted as a result of the mapping survey. The final data collection
approach comprised: two postal surveys for the mapping analysis and econometric
modelling - one in Tamil Nadu and one in Andhra Pradesh; semi-structured interviews
and document review for eliciting information on transaction costs; economic cost data
collection at the case study NGOs; and a review of expenditure reports for compilation
of financial data for the econometric model.
The two postal surveys have been described in 3.4.2.1 and 3.4.2.2, above. The survey
of NGOs had some limitations in terms of achieving the objectives of assessing the
feasibility of the cost analysis. Firstly, initial response to the postal questionnaires was
lower than hoped in spite of follow up with telephone calls and emails and a series of
NGO visits to raise the response rate. Of the 133 NGOs identified only 48 responded.
However, an agreement with TNSACS was established to use their monitoring records
that would provide information on coverage and financial expenditures. A rapport with
the major funding agencies also allowed insights into the nature of the some of the
non-responding HIV prevention projects and so strengthened our sampling frame. The
low response did result in a limited overview of small scale projects that were not
supported by the major funding sources interviewed as part of the research in Tamil
Nadu. Unfortunately, it is not possible to assess the direction of any resulting bias.
Second, terminology related to coverage of the target population used in the
questionnaire appeared to be relatively new to many of the NGOs. This resulted in
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some uncertainty in the responses, in spite of the pilot test. Further clarification of
responses was sought through NGO visits, email and telephone correspondence to
address this as far as possible. Thirdly, and also related to coverage, where projects
are working with more than one target group it was not possible to break the coverage
data down by target group and in most cases no estimate of the size of the target
group living or working in the intervention area was available. In addition, itwas not
possible to assess the quality of the coverage data through the postal survey. It was
felt, however, that these issues could be addressed during site visits for the production
cost analysis.
Finally, APAC denied access to their NGOs. This narrowed the sampling frame for
both the production and cost analyses. As anecdotal evidence suggests that these
NGOs had both high coverage and higher expenditures it is unclear whether average
costs in a sample of APAC NGOs would be higher or lower than in NGOs supported by
TNSACS or APSACS. Again from anecdotal evidence, it is likely that.the transaction
costs are high in the APAC model due to intensive monitoring and supervision and
dependence on external consultancy support. However, as the APAC programme
operates independently of government, the lessons learnt are of less relevance to
government supported programmes in other states than those of the State AIDS
Control Societies.
The following section describes the techniques for the collection of data on transaction
and production costs.
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3.5. Data collection
3.5.1. Production costs
At the outset of the research it was planned to collect financial and economic
production cost data covering the period of one year from a large sample of NGO
projects for the econometric modelling. In addition, to gain further insights into how
costs change with scale and the role of time in this relationship, economic cost data for
the entire project life time were to be collected from the case studies. The difficulties in
achieving the sample size required and in gaining access to historical data and the
data collection duration observed in the pilot testing led to the decision to collect annual
cost data from the case studies and to seek out expenditure data for the econometric
model (see Table 3.4). This section therefore lays out the methods to collect annual
financial and economic cost data of the HIV prevention projects from the case study
NGOs, to collect expenditure data for the econometric model and to measure scale at
the service delivery level.
3.5.1.1. Collecting financial and economic cost data
Information collected
Financial and economic cost data were collected from each of the case studies
between December 2002 and May 2003 and cover the financial year April2001 to
March 2002. The cost analysis takes the perspective of the provider of HIV prevention
services. This includes costs incurred at the project level and the technical support,
monitoring and contractual management costs of the agency responsible for funding
and managing the project. Where possible the ingredients approach to costing is used
(see, for example: (Creese and Parker, 1994; Kumaranayake, Pepperall et al., 2000))
so that all inputs to production are quantified and unit prices subsequently attached to
each unit of input.
Data collection methods
Four research assistants, 2 from each state, were trained by the author for the data
collection and entry. The author visited each of the projects to gain an understanding
of the functioning of each of the projects and closely supervised the data entry into the
UNAIDS costing worksheets adapted for the purpose of this study (UNAIDS, 2000b).
In Andhra Pradesh, the study and its methods were introduced to the NGOs in a
workshop attended by the project directors and managers of all the participating NGOs.
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Although a basic understanding of the principles of cost analysis was conveyed during
this process, it was found that the English language ability of the workshop attendees
limited their ability to fully comprehend the purpose of the study. It was concluded that
introductions to the study were better made through one-to-one meetings. As a result
the workshop was not repeated, as had been planned, in Tamil Nadu.
A two part structured questionnaire used as a guide for the data collection was piloted
at one NGO project in each state in December 2002. The questionnaire format was
found to be too inflexible to ensure the collection of all cost data. The questionnaire
was therefore adapted into a fieldwork guide which was then used for the data
collection at the remaining projects (see Appendix 5). A separate questionnaire was
used to collection information about peer educators' time and value of time (see
Appendix 6). Information was required to first identify the inputs to production and then
value those inputs.
(i) Input identification
Inputs were identified through a description of activities using project documentation
and interviews with personnel at the NGOs and funding agencies. They were classified
as fixed and variable according to a combination of standard definitions Le. variable
inputs are those that vary with changes in output, whereas fixed do not (see Table 3.5)
(Creese and Parker, 1994).
Table 3.5: Classification of fixed and variable costs
Classification Costs included
Fixed costs All agency level costs (including training and educational materials)
Building and office rent and running expenses
Equipment and vehicles
Training
Monitoring
Project personnel (Project Director, Project Manager, administrative and other support
staff)
Variable costs Project personnel (outreach staff)
Peer educators
Condoms
Educational materials
STI treatment costs
Meetings
Transport
Note: STI = sexually transmitted infection
Where quantities were not available, expenditures on the items, as reported in financial
statements, were used to represent the input levels. This latter approach was used for
buildings and associated expenses, office running expenses, transport and meetings at
both the NGO and agency levels of analysis. All staff budgeted to work full time on the
projects were assumed to do so. Key staff members (e.g. the project manager or
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director) were interviewed to ascertain the time inputs of other personnel. The hours
per month of peer educators' involvement in project activities were estimated from
interviews with the peer educators and included in the economic costs. Information
derived from these peer educator interviews was cross-checked with the outreach staff.
STI treatment at the projects takes the form of provision of clinic services, the provision
of a subsidy or referral for care. As a result, categorising the inputs to STI treatment
along with the other project activities blurs the differences in production technology
used by the projects. To enable valid comparisons of cost profiles across the HIV
prevention projects with these differing technologies, STI treatment was considered an
input category in itself. Where symptoms treated were readily identifiable in the project
records, this information was used, in combination with syndromic case management
guidelines, to identify the drugs used for treatment (National AIDS Control
Organisation). Where the NGO had their own STI clinics, the inputs of physician time
and drugs purchased were measured over a one year period, a time period long
enough to provide a reasonably accurate estimate of actual drug use. In the case
where records were unavailable, it was only possible to estimate an average drug
dosage per patient with the use of the total number of STls, STI symptom prevalence
data from Andhra Pradesh (Bhuyan, Shobarani et al., 2001) and the syndromic case
management guidelines (National AIDS Control Organisation).
Funding and technical support agency inputs are allocated to each NGO project using
different methods according to the agency and line item. At APSACS, educational
materials, training and project officers are allocated based on number distributed,
sessions attended and number of NGOs under their responsibility, respectively. All
other agency inputs at APSACS and the other funding agencies are allocated equally
across all the contracted NGOs by each agency.
(ii) Cost valuation
Financial costs are valued at the purchase price as recorded in expenditure statements
or receipts held at the project. Economic costs are valued using local market prices
collected from local retailers, unless otherwise stated. In the case of budgeted
personnel, it was assumed that salaries, including benefits, reflect the opportunity cost
of time. The values of non-budgeted personnel and peer educators were obtained
from interviews with the respective individuals, the project director and outreach
Workers. Where it was possible to interview the peer educators, their time was
ascertained through a simple bidding game. The bidding commenced by asking the
individual for the minimum daily wage they would work for in non-sex work activity.
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Subsequently the bid was halved and doubled until the response converged on a single
value. These values were then validated in interviews with the outreach staff, who also
supplied peer educator income estimates when interviews were not possible.
STI drug prices were taken from a directory of all current drug prices for India (Drug
Today,2003). For the value of educational materials, we obtained price information
from the marketing agency contracted to supply such materials to the APSACS
programme and local printing shops. The cost of training was extracted from
accounting records. Condoms distributed for free were valued using the price of the
lowest cost alternative in the market Le. Nirodh Deluxe, a subsidised socially marketed
condom. As there were no data at any of the NGOs on the revenue from condom
sales, it was assumed that all costs were re-couped and the net cost of condom sales
(Le. cost of condom procurement - revenue from sales) was zero.
Capital costs were annualised. The annual financial cost is calculated by dividing total
cost by the expected length of life of the capital item. Annualised economic costs were
calculated using a standard discount rate of 3% (see for example (Drummond, Stoddart
et al., 1997)). Capital items were assumed to have a life of between 3 and 10 years
depending on the item based on consultation with project staff and suppliers of similar
products (see Appendix 7). All costs are presented in constant 2003 prices and
converted using the GDP deflator (Reserve Bank of India, 2003).
Limitations
Due to the retrospective nature of the data collection, several constraints were faced in
obtaining full information required for the cost analysis relating to missing data,
inaccuracies in the data and where price measures had to be used in place of cost.
Systematic records on quantities of educational materials and training sessions were
not available. Similarly, records of condom revenues were either not kept or not made
available and it was unclear in many cases what the revenues were used for if retained
by the organisation. In addition, some indicators of coverage and volume were also
missing and not standardised across the funding agencies Le. coverage indicators for
two NGOs and volume indicators related to contacts for the TNSACS NGOs were
missing.
Inaccuracies in the data are related to a number of factors. First, the data contained
the usual flaws and mis-reporting to which all routine monitoring systems are subject.
Second, the values obtained for peer educators' time and income are constrained by
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the limited numbers available for interview, drunkenness or false replies resulting from
the CSW expectations of the interviewers. The bidding game was kept as simple as
possible to minimise errors arising from misconceptions and drunkenness. The
outreach workers were also interviewed to fill in gaps in peer educator information and
validate the responses to minimise these errors. Third, there was a tendency for
project directors' to under-estimate incomes or, where the research team were
perceived as evaluators, a tendency to over-report time spent on the project. Finally,
STI treatment records were not available at all sites. In these cases, the numbers of
syndromes treated were estimated using the average prevalence for the only available
CSW specific data on prevalence for the region, previously collected from two of our
case study sites (Bhuyan, Shobarani et al., 2001).
Where quantities of inputs were not available, e.g. building space, transport and
community meetings, prices have been used to represent costs. These data might be
a better reflection of the budget than the resources used, as expenditures tend to be
budget driven. This approach also limits the analysis from looking at the relationship
between the production and cost function for these particular items.
3.5.1.2. Collecting expenditure data for the econometric model
Information collected
The expenditure data used for the econometric model comprised the NGO expenditure
reports submitted to the agency responsible for managing the NGO contracts for
APSACS. These expenditures differ from economic costs in that they include only the
resources used for which there is a reported financial transaction and they value those
resources at the price used in that transaction. Economic costs would include the
value of all resources employed to produce the service valued at their opportunity cost.
This financial data set is therefore not comparable with the case study data set which
comprised economic cost data.
Data collection methods
Expenditures were obtained from the audited quarterly statements of expenditure
covering the contractual period 2001/02. These were collated and entered into an MS
Excel spreadsheet by the research team. Quarterly expenditures were entered by line
item and summed to obtain annual expenditures. The expenditure statements were
broken down by line items that varied across the expenditure reports. These line items
were then grouped by the author into the major categories of personnel, office
expenditures, behaviour change communication, peer education, condoms, sexually
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transmitted infection management, creating an enabling environment, training, travel,
monitoring and evaluation and other. The totals were cross-checked against the
expenditure reports. Where discrepancies were found, the causes were identified and
corrections to the data made.
The postal survey of all the APSACS projects (see Section 3.4.2.2) was used to obtain
project-reported information regarding project coverage and NGO organizational
characteristics (see Appendix 3). Other contextual factors hypothesized to influence
average cost were collected from the NGO contract management agency. These data
were entered into a separate MS Excel spreadsheet. The two spreadsheets were then
merged.
Limitations
The financial dataset is subject to the flaws of much accounting data including mis-
reporting and false claims and the need for line item expenditure to match line item
budgets. However, this is most likely to affect the proportion of spending on individual
line items rather than total cost as projects are likely to adhere to the overall budget. In
addition, the financial dataset pertains only to expenditures at the NGO level and
therefore excludes the agency level category of costs including training, monitoring and
evaluation and other support provided by the funding or management agencies (see
Table 3.5).
3.5.1.3. Collecting measures of scale
Information collected
For the production cost analyses, scale was interpreted as the volume of services and
ultimately coverage of the population. It was therefore measured using the different
indicators of coverage and volume as defined in Table 3.6. These are all indicators
collected as part of routine monitoring systems and recommended by the National
AIDS Control Programme. To ensure clarity in this analysis, the number of people
reached is referred to as "coverage" and the remaining indicators of scale as
descriptors of "volume".
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Table 3.6: Definition of the Output Measures
Indicator Definition
Coverage
Indicator
Number of target The number of people reached by the project.
group reached
(coverage)
VOlume STI' referrals
• STls .. Sexually transrnutec Infections
The number of people referred to health care providers by
the project for consultation on sexually transmitted
infections
The number of people that have been treated for sexually
transmitted infections by project partners as a result of the
project referrals.
No. of condoms The number of condoms distributed is the number of
distributed condoms distributed to the target group - both free and
through social marketing.
STls treated
Contacts Three measures of contact are used in the monitoring
reports:
• 1st project contact with an individual in the target
group;
• The number of all contacts (1st and repeat) with
members of the target group; and
• The number of all contacts (1st and repeat) with
external stakeholders - those linked to the target
group but not the primary focus of the project.
(They are reported here as number of 1st target group
contacts. the number of all target group contacts (sum of
1st and repeat) and all contacts (sum of total target group
contacts and contacts with external stakeholders) .
For the transaction cost analysis, scale was considered from the perspective of the
funding agency and its efforts to implement more HIV prevention projects by issuing
increasing numbers of contracts.
Data collection methods
The number of contracts issued by the funding agencies was collected from
documentation at the respective funding agencies. The ease of ascertaining the
number of contracts held by the different funding agencies varied according to the
agency. At APSACS records of the NGOs contracted to deliver HIV prevention
services were clear and up-to-date. It was also evident which NGO contracts had been
terminated. However, the wealth of documentation from different sources on the
number of NGOs working with the funding agency TNSACS provided conflicting data
and led to a range of different numbers. This problem was addressed in a visit to India
fOllowing the main period of fieldwork in an interview with the new NGO advisor. He
was requested to complete a small questionnaire for the research team and the
numbers provided his response were taken as final.
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The production cost analyses scale measures were collected as part of the economic
cost data collection process at the case study NGOs, through review of monthly
monitoring reports. For the econometric model, the data were requested in the postal
survey sent to all APSACS NGO projects (see Section 3.4.2.2 and Appendix 3).
Limitations
As with the production cost data the quality of the information on output is subject to
the flaws and mis-reporting of all routine monitoring systems. However, there were
some further problems related to each of the specific indicators. The measure of
coverage was taken to mean the number of the target group reached by the
organisation. This implied that the number of people that had had some minimal level
of contact and been provided with education regarding HIV prevention and behaviour
change. However, the level of contact and education provided may not have been
consistent across the projects and it was not clear in the records whether the number
recorded is cumulative across the years. Given that the reports refer to the current
year of activity and current contract, it was assumed that these are annual rather than
cumulative figures.
In the case of sexually transmitted infections treated, it was found that in general only
those that have been treated with expenses covered through the project budget were
recorded in the monitoring reports, leading to a probable underestimate of the true
number of people treated. On the other hand, the indicator did not distinguish between
first and repeat visits to the health care provider. This leads to double counting which
in some cases was deliberate. Where the cost of STI treatment is reimbursed by the
funding agency and if the reimbursement level is too low, clients are encouraged to
make two visits to the health care providers, claiming from the NGO each time and
therefore covering the cost of the full course of treatment.
The fourth measure of output, the number of condoms distributed, is heavily influenced
by available supply and can be easily exaggerated through dumping of condoms where
they are never likely to be used. Finally, the number of contacts suffers from
definitional problems in that the nature of a contact can range from an introduction to
an individual to a long discussion on the issue of HIV prevention.
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3.5.2. Transaction costs
Information collected
A qualitative approach was applied to gain information regarding the transaction costs
of contracting. Information was collected on the process of designing and negotiating
the contract, the nature of monitoring mechanisms for the contract and actions taken to
ensure the contract is enforced during the implementation period. The Williamson
framework was used to characterise the nature of the transaction costs and to enable a
comparison of the transaction costs across the different institutional models (see
section 2.7.2.1). To achieve this, transaction cost-specific characteristics of the
contractual arrangements were noted, particularly those pertaining to asset specificity,
bounded rationality and opportunism (see Chapter 2). Information was also sought to
establish whether these governance arrangements would suffice for the further
expansion of activities and to understand what changes would be needed to enable
further scaling up. The time period covered by the data extended from approximately
June 2001 to April 2003.
Data collection methods
Data collection took the form of semi-structured interviews and document review and
was complemented by background information on the institutional environment
compiled during the mapping survey. Documentation such as programme and project
descriptions and annual and quarterly reports were reviewed at the funding agencies,
technical support organisations and NGOs themselves. The semi-structured interviews
were carried out between December 2002 and May 2003 by the author (a white, non-
Indian female, with no local language knowledge) in the presence of a research
assistant from the state in which the project was located, following an interview guide
(see Appendix 8). They were carried out with the directors, finance managers and
those responsible for the management of the HIV prevention projects at the contracting
and NGO management agencies, project directors and project managers at the NGOs
and a set of key informants (KI). Key informants were identified during the process of
data collection and included those individuals found to have extensive either current or
historical knowledge of one or all the HIV prevention programmes. In the case of NGO
personnel the interviews took place during the site visits made for the economic cost
data collection (see 3.5.1.1 p.88).
The interviews were conducted in English. In the majority of cases, the interviewees
were Indian with English as a fairly fluent second language. If a problem of language
arose, the research assistant translated questions and responses. However, English
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language ability was sufficient that it was not necessary for any of the interviews to be
Wholly conducted in a local language. Where permission was granted, interviews were
taped and transcribed by the author. Notes were taken by both the author and
research assistant and cross-checked against each other and the transcriptions, where
available, for consistency. The interviews and document review were complemented
by the author's and research assistants observations recorded following on-site visits.
Limitations
With regards to the information that could be generated from the semi-structured
interviews several limitations need to be acknowledged. First, many of the NGOs
perceived that we came from their funding agencies, in spite of explanations that we
were not. Their answers could have been shaped by this perception. Second, there
were unexpected differences between Indian English and British English, which
complicated the explanation of some issues and possibly led to mis-understandings or
mis-interpretation of questions and responses. Finally, interviews were not taped if the
interviewees either denied permission or were found to be uneasy with the presence of
a tape recorder. Although the notes of the interviewer and the research assistant
present were cross-checked against each other, it is recognised that there can be flaws
in note taking and they can be more prone to the inclusion of subjectivity than taped
and transcribed interviews.
In addition to the interview material, documentation was subject to some uncertainty.
Documentation sourced for the study was mixed in quality and in some cases undated.
In addition, there were conflicting figures on expenditures, coverage and number of
NGO contracts given in different documents. It was often difficult therefore to discern
the reality. Where a single number was required to make comparisons or descriptions,
official figures as reported to the National AIDS Control Organisation (NACO) were
used. The level of uncertainty in reporting also served as an important finding in the
thesis.
3.6. Research permission and ethical approval
Consent for the study was sought and given at the levels of the National AIDS Control
Programme, funding agency and NGO prior to data collection (see Appendix 4 and
3.4.2.4). As described above this was not granted by USAID which therefore limited
Our sample. Ethical approval was granted by the ethics committee at the london
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine according to the ethics application provided
in Appendix 9. In addition, ethical approval was sought in India through IIT(Madras),
the research project collaborators. Ethical approval was not required by the Indian
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National or State Governments for a study focussed on the organisation rather than the
individual.
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Chapter 4. Mapping of HIV prevention services in
Southern India
4. 1. Introduction
This chapter present the results of the mapping survey of the delivery of targeted
interventions for HIV prevention in Southern India. As described in Chapter 3 the
mapping survey was carried out to develop a sampling frame for the production and
transaction cost analyses. Its specific aims are to:
• describe the state level response to the HIV epidemic in the context of the
epidemiology of 2 high prevalence states
• present the results of a census of targeted HIV prevention projects that was
undertaken in 2 states in India to identify HIV prevention projects for the costing sample
and assess the feasibility of carrying out economic cost data collection at a
representative sample of NGO interventions
The situational analysis begins with an overview of the epidemiology of HIV in India
and the national response to the epidemic. Next, the chapter summarizes the
epidemiology and responses at the state level in the four states considered for the
analysis. Finally, the methods and results of the surveys in the two selected states are
presented.
4.2. The nationsl response to HIVIAIDS in Indis
4.2.1. Historical background
The number of people estimated to be living with HIV/AIDS in India in 2005 was 5.7
million concentrated in the six states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra,
Manipur, Nagaland and Tamil Nadu (National AIDS Control Organisation, 2004a;
National AIDS Control Organisation, 2005a; UNAIDS, 2006) (see chapter 1). The
national response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in India was initiated in 1986 with a
national surveillance programme and mass media campaigns focussing on risky
behaviours to raise general awareness. In spite of this early and commendable action,
the response met with continued denial and was reported to be generally inadequate
(Dube, 2000; YouandAIDS: the HIV/AIDS portal for South and North-East Asia, 2002a;
Solomon. Chakraborty et al., 2004). Rather than fostering prevention and safer
behaviour. much of the early prevention effort led to stigmatisation of vulnerable groups
(Dube.2000). In 1991, the realization of the threat and the commitment arising from a
World Bank loan to the Government of India (GOI) for a National AIDS Control
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Programme (NACP) led to increased action (Solomon, Chakraborty et al., 2004). In
Spite of progress in the following years in the areas of blood safety and public
awareness, HIV prevalence soared among high risk groups (Solomon, Chakraborty et
al.,2004). The programme made little progress largely due to lack of political
commitment at the state level and expenditure falling consistently below the budgetary
allocation (personal communication National AIDS Control Organisation, Director
Finance, 2002) and (Imam, 1994).
4.2.2. The current phase of programming
With the epidemic accelerating, the second National AIDS Control Programme
(NACP2) was launched in 1999, with a five-year loan from the World Bank as well as
Government of India and bi-lateral funding. The NACP2 budget is INR 14,251 million
(over USD 327 million4), later extended for 2 years and revised upwards to INR 20,647
million (USD 474 million), see Table 4.1 (National AIDS Control Organisation, 2000b;
National AIDS Control Organisation, 2004a). An effort to decentralise the programme
to the state level has been realized through the creation of state AIDS control societies
(SACS). These are quasi-governmental organisations that receive funding direct from
the National AIDS Control Organisation (NACO) rather than through the state health
budget and are responsible for the implementation of the state AIDS programmes.
This builds on the successful model first implemented in Tamil Nadu that was found to
improve fund absorption and has led to a stabilisation of the epidemic (National AIDS
Control Organisation, 2000b; Ramasundaram, Allaudin et al., 2001).
The State AIDS programmes implemented by the SACS comprise 5 main components:
1. Priority interventions": 2. Preventive interventions for the general community; 3. Low
cost AIDS care; 4. Institutional strengthening; and,S. Inter-sectoral collaboration.
4 Exchange rate: USD 1 • INA 43.56 (www.oanda.com accessed 14111July, 2005)
5
This includes both targeted prevention programmes for high risk sub-populations and referral and
treatment of STI patients
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Table 4.1: Financing of the National AIDS Control Programme, Phase 2 (1999-2004)
millions INR (current prices). '
Funding source
Initial
outlay for
1999-2004
(millions
INR)
Revised budget
approved 2003
for 1999-2006
(millions INR)
Additional
budget for
2004105 &
2005106
(millions INR)
Government ot India
World Bank
USAID (US Agency tor International
Development) - APAC project, Tamil
Nadu
USAID (US Agency for International
Development) - AVERT project
Maharashtra
Department of International Development
(UK)
CIDA (Canadian International
Development Assistance)
AusAID (Australian Agency tor
International Development)
United Nations Development Programme
Global Fund tor AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria
1,960
11.550 9.591
645.8
1,660 1,660
1,040 4,870
378.1
246.5
64.7
1,227.4
Source: (National AIDS Control Orqarusanon. 2000b: National AIDS Control OrganisatIon, 2004a)
Total 14,250 19,419.1 20,646.5
4.2.3. Priority targeted interventions
International evidence on the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of HIV prevention
programmes has led to the consensus that within lower prevalence settings targeted
interventions for high-risk sub-populations should be a priority (World Bank, 1997). As
a result the response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in India includes these targeted
interventions as one of the priority interventions in component 1 and they comprise
OVer23% of the total budget allocation (see Figure 4.1) (World Bank, 1997; World Bank
Health Nutrition and Population Sector Unit. South Asia Region, 1999; National AIDS
Control Organisation, 2000b; Jha, Nagelkerke et al., 2001). As a major component of
the Indian response to the HIV epidemic, targeted interventions in India form the focus
of this thesis.
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Figure 4.1: Budgetary allocations to National AIDS Control Programme, 1999
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Due to limited cover e of HIV prevention services by the public sector and NGOs'
better bility to re ch m r in lised populations (Solomon, Chakraborty et al., 2004),
the delivery of th t r eteo interventions is contracted out to NGOs. The targeted
intervention ororects themselves re shaped by guidelines provided by NACO including
best pr ctice docum nts, methods for high risk group identification, guidelines for NGO
recruitm nt, bud t lIoc tion nd monitoring and evaluation based on best practice
interventions t r et d t hi h-rtsk groups usin community based approach (National
AIDS Control Or rus tion, 2000 ; N tronal AIDS Control Organisation, 2000b;
R m sunc r m, All udin et 1.,2001; R m sund r m, 2002; YouandAIDS: the
HIV/AIDS port I for South nd North- st ASI ,2002b; Lenton, Hawkins et ar., 2003).
r inin on the contr ctin for nd implement tion of targeted interventions for the
SACS nd NGOs h s b n bUilt in to th NACP2 programme to support this process.
Th b st or ctic mod I of tnt tv ntion comprises HIV education, condom distribution
nd ref rr I of c s s of S Is for tre trnent for high nsk groups (Jana, 8andyopadhyay
et I., 1 8, J nkins, 2000. N lion I AIDS Control Org nisation, 2000a' National AIDS
Control Or rus tion, 2001 ). Also includ d is component th t recognises that
f CIII! tin b h viour ch n mvolv S workm to educ te community mfluencers, e.g.
providin HIV uc tion to Ion ! rm p rtners of se workers and working with the
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POlice to reduce harassment levels (National AIDS Control Organisation. 2000a:
National AIDS Control Organisation. 2000b: National AIDS Control Organisation.
2004a).
4.2.4. Institutional arrangements
NACO works with the UN theme group on HIV/AIDS and bi-Iateral donors and partners
in various ministries to carry out the NACP2. This includes formulation of policy and
implementation of prevention and control programmes. The SACS receive funds
directly from NACO. Working with technical support from and in coordination with
NACO. the SACS manage and deliver prevention and control at the state level. Bi-
lateral donors provide support to individual SACS and are co-ordinated by NACO, to
avoid duplication of activities. In addition to the government and bi-Iaterally supported
efforts. there has been a strong movement of international foundations and local NGOs
working independently to provide HIV prevention and care services".
As part of their activities. the SACS are responsible for the contracting out to NGOs of
targeted interventions. In this way. NACO. through the SACS. aimed to train and
finance over 600 NGOs to implement targeted interventions between 1999 and 2004
(National AIDS Control Organisation. 2000b). In fact. by July 2004 the various SACS
held 933 contracts with NGOs to deliver HIV/AIDS activities (National AIDS Control
Organisation.2004a).
As a result of differing donor partnerships. different institutional arrangements have
been developed for the management of NGO contracts at the state level. The three
best established models are set out in Figure 4.2. The national model corresponds
with the NACP guidelines where SACS directly contract with the NGOs. An adaptation
of this model operates in states whose HIV/AIDS activities are supported by the United
Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID): Andhra Pradesh.
GUjarat. Kerala. and Orissa. In these four states the SACS contract with the NGOs
and employ a technical support agency that manages the contracts and provides
technical support to the NGO programme (the DFID model). Finally. the United States'
Agency for International Development (USAID) supports an independent large NGO in
Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra to contract directly with smaller implementing NGO
partners. in coordination and with the approval of the local SACS and NACO (the
1.
II
Major lunders Idenltfied are: HIVOS (Humanist Institute for Development Cooperation): Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation: National Institute for Health (United SlateS); HIV Alliance: MacArthur Foundation; and
Ihe Ford Foundation.
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USAID mod I) Oth f msntution I mod Is re evolving s the remaining donors finalise
agreements with NACO nd mov torw rd In their support of other state programmes.
Figure 4.2: Institutional arrangements In the 2nd National AIDS Control Programme for
India
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4.2.5. Financial flows
100ft I
The st te AIDS control soci ties were set up to provide for more flexible management
of the AIDS control pro ramme t the st te level as well as to expedite the release of
funds (Ram sund r m, All udin et I., 2001; YouandAIDS: the HIV/AIDS portal for
South nd North- st Asl ,2002 ). When the first state AIDS society was established
in Tamil N cu, it w s found th t the distribution of funds direct to the SACS rather than
through th st t Ministry of He Ith I d to the avoid nce of many bureaucratic delays.
In contr st to the AIDS pro r mmes in other states, expenditure increased to meet its
targets (Ram sund r m, All udin et I., 2001).
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In theory. for all states. the budget of the SACS and their acnvities is based on annual
plans submitted and negotiated with NACO. In reality. budget setting is only partially
based on these plans. The World Bank releases funds to the Government of India.
which distributes monies to the Ministry of Health in accordance with the annual plan.
The Ministry of Health. In turn. releases funds to NACO which makes the budgetary
allocations to the states. The funds distributed to NACO in any year are largely
unpredictable as the actual allocation rarely meets the planned allocation. This arises
from the government's commitment to the g'" and subsequently the 1O!h five year
expenditure plans (National AIDS Control Organisation. 2004a). Along with an end of
year surplus allocations. approximately 80% of the total annual budget is usually met.
This persistent under-allocation of funds was one of the key reasons behind the
extensions of NACPl and NACP2.
During the financial year. the SACS receive three payments: an ad hoc amount of up to
50% of the budget at the start of the year; the balance. minus a small retention amount
and based on a statement of expenditure is paid about 7 months later; and the final
release is made at the end of the financial year based on budget availability. The ad
hoc nature in the release of funds makes planning for the programme extremely
diHicult. Further. the fluctuations in the availability of funds lead to diHiculties in the
SACS meeting their contractual obligations in the latter part of the financial year
(Personal communication. Director Finance. NACO. 2002).
In the USAID model. funds are channelled directly from USAID through the
autonomous NGO that manages the contracts and provides technical support to the
implementing NGOs.
4.3. Survey of NGOs In Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu
4.3.1. Targeted HIV prevention activities in Tamil Nadu
4.3.1.1. State level funding of NGO targeted Interventions
The Tamil Nadu NGO sector has been working on the issue of HIV/AIDS longer than
any state. The first AIDS case was identified in Chennai in 1986 and a core group of
NGOs took up both advocacy and programme activities in the late eighties through
their existing links with key vulnerable groups. At the time of the study, Tamil Nadu
had three government-supported targeted HIV prevention programmes running in
parallel in which the funding agency contracts with NGOs:
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Tamil Nadu State AIDS Control Society (TNSACS): this was the first of the SACS,
established in 1996. TNSACS implements the state programme according to NACO
guidelines and contracts directly with NGO partners to deliver targeted HIV prevention
projects. It increased the number of NGOs contracted by the state programme from 17
in 1994-5 to over 100 In 1997/8 (Seshadri, 2003a). Having been documented as a
model of best practice in terms of ability to spend and increasing the number of NGO
Contracts (Ramasundaram, Allaudin et al., 2001; Seshadri. 2003b). the TNSACS
programme model was exported around the country.
Chennai Corporation AIDS Prevention and Control Society (CAPACS): this was
established in 2001 and took over responsibility for all Chennai based activities of
TNSACS. NGO contracting activities commenced in 2002. with the transfer of all
Chennai based. TNSACS funded NGOs to the CAPACS programme. As with
TNSACS. CAPACS implements the state programme according to NACO guidelines
and contracts directly with NGO partners to deliver targeted HIV prevention projects.
At the time of the fieldwork CAPACS was funding 8 targeted HIV prevention projects.
APAC (AIDS Prevention and Control): this is being implemented by Voluntary Health
Services. a large NGO. with direct support from the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) and in coordination with the national and state
AIDS programmes. It was established in 1996 with funding of USD 10 million for the
period to March 2002. The programme has since been extended. As well as
delivering prevention projects through 34 NGOs. at the time of the study. APAC has
been responsible for implementing state-wide behavioural surveillance. a state-wide
condom social marketing programme and providing capacity building in the form of
training of trainers at 5 state institutions. The targeted HIV prevention projects follow a
standard model of peer education as described in 4.2.3. combined with IEC (pamphlet
distribution. puppet shows. films etc). training of health care providers and development
of condom retailing network.
Total expenditures on these three state level programmes are shown in Table 4.2.
Over the years 1999/2000 to 2001/02. APAC expenditures have exceeded the
combined expenditures of the other two programmes. The low level of CAPACS
expenditures reflects the start-up phase of this programme.
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Table 4.2: Total expenditures (and budget allocation) for the Tamil Nadu state supported
targeted HIV prevention programmes, INR millions, current prices.
CAPACS
TNSACS 55.57 (46.98) 31.71 (47.88) 33.44 (31.30) 26.47
2.92 (12.5) 2.82 (10.15) 6.25** (44.66)
55.00 (55.00) 90.87 (75.87) 43.30 (43.30)
(51.14)
7999-2000 2000-07 2001-02 2002-03"
nJa n/a
APAC n/a nia
Sources (.Jayaral 200;') NACP & TNSACS expenditure reports
" funds rtlleased. n a not avaliabltl
In addition to these major programmes. there are several NGOs in Tamil Nadu working
at a state and even national level on HIV/AIDS. namely: YRG Care. HIV Alliance.
Deepam Educational Society for Health. South Indian AIDS Action Programme and
Christian Council for Rural Development and Research (CCOORR). HIV Alliance and
YRG Care focus their work on care for people living with HIV/AIDS in Tamil Nadu and
outside the state. YRG Care also has an extensive research programme. Deepam
Educational Society for Health. funded by the Gates Foundation. provides HIV
prevention activities as part of a reproductive health programme integrated into existing
health and education services.
The South Indian AIDS Action Programme was established in 1992 to encourage
existing NGOs (in South India) to integrate STD/HIV related issues into their
programmes. Intervention programmes were initiated with trucking and sex worker
communities with the support of Inter-Aide. a French support organisation. It also
supported programmes in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. By 2000 South Indian Aids
Action Programme had become focussed on the empowerment of these vulnerable
groups rather than the primary activity of HIV prevention and the training of counsellors
for voluntary counselling and testing for HIV and prevention of mother to child
transmission of HIV for TNSACS.
CCOORR. an NGO hospital and health service provider. took up the provision of HIV
prevention services by networking with other NGOs. as an extension of its existing
Work as a training institution for APAC. With funding from the Humanist Institute for
Cooperation with Developing Countries, a Dutch NGO. they established a network of
targeted HIV prevention projects in 2001.
Finally. since the completion of data collection. the Gates Foundation established the
USD 200 million Avahan initiative in 2004, a nationwide HIV prevention programme for
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high risk groups. which works in partnership with Voluntary Health Services in Tamil
Nadu
4.3.1.2. NGO targeted HIV prevention projects
A total of 133 organisations delivering 139 different HIV prevention projects were
identified through the document review and interviews (see Table 4.3 and Table 4.4).
Each of these NGOs was sent a questionnaire. 48 NGOs responded either in full or in
part to the survey. The HIV prevention projects were funded by a number of different
Sources. both internal and external to the state. Table 4.3 describes the number of
NGOs contracted to work on HIV prevention projects by the different funding agencies.
Eighty-five NGOs received funding solely from TNSACS. 20 received funding from
APAC and 7 from CAPACS. Eleven of the NGOs received funding from both TNSACS
and APAC for HIV prevention projects for different target group populations. Table 4.4
shows the number of HIV prevention projects identified by funding agency and target
population group. Sixty percent were funded by TNSACS and 22% by APAC. Other
donors. including international funding agencies and foundations, accounted for 11.5%
of the projects funded.
Table 4.3: Number of NGOs Identified In Tamil Nadu as Implementing targeted
Intervention prevention projects, their funding agencies and their response rate to the
questionnaire·-
-
Number of
NGOs
Also funded by other"
funding agencies for HIV
prevention activities
Response rate
APAC
TNSACS
CAPACS
APAC and TNSACS
or CAPACS
_Other" 9 44%
20 3 45%
85 32%
7 0%
73%11
_Number of NGOs 133 36%
., NGO may Implement multiple HIV orevennon prOlects; "Other Includes Gates. FOrd. MecArthur. Elton John. HIVOS.
OFID, local donations, HIV Alliance, MISEREOR, CCOORR
108
Table 4.4: Number of HIV prevention projects identified In Tamil Nadu by major funder
and POpulation target group and response rate to the questionnaire·
APAC Total of Response
rate
% of total
8 16
TNSACS CAPACS Other"
Sex workers
Truckers
Factory;
Industrial;
Construction;
Agricultural
workers
Migrant
Workers
Slum
Clients of sex 6
Workers
(tourists.
temple town
interventions)
General
population
~ixed group
Interventions
MSMI HiJra
Tribals
Youth
Prisons
Total
6 19
14
24
3
2
1
2
3
29
29
27
11
12 12
8 1
3
10
9
2 4 6
5 5
2
4
2 4
4
3
1
139
2
1
8431
(22.3%) (60.4%) (5.8%) (11.5%) (100.0%)
%
total
20.9%
20.9%
19.4%
8.6%
7.2%
6.5%
4.3%
3.6%
2.9%
2.9%
2.2%
0.7%
100.0%
35.5%
46.7%
44.4%
25.0%
33.3%
50.0%
66.7%
100.0%
50.0%
50.0%
33.3%
0.0%
• TNSACS prOJeclS may have dlfferenl primary group 10 Ihal slaled In TNSACS liSI of saocnoned projects as In some
cases Ihe sanctioned 1IIIe IS only nominal and the NGO works with a vulnerable group In their locality that does not ht
With TNSACS clasSification. One NGO may Implement multiple HIV prevention proiects: care projects and those for
~.eople lIVIng with HIViAIDS have been excluded
c26~~I~'udes Gates. Ford. MacArthur. Elton John. HIVOS. OFiO. local donations. HIV Alliance. MISEREOR.
Classifying the targeted interventions by target group was more difficult than would be
expected. In particular at TNSACS some NGOs were funded under the major
classification of one vulnerable group when in reality they were working with broader
populations or those that did not fit into the typology. For example one NGO was
reported to be working with CSWs when in fact it was quite openly addressing the
needs of the fishing communities. Many of the other responding NGOs also reported
reaching a number of different target groups beyond the focus under their contract.
This research has used the NGOs own classification of the primary target group.
The most common target populations identified were commercial sex workers and
truckers (20.9 % of the total number of projects each). Workers defined by their
oCCUpation were the next most frequent target group (19.4%). TNSACS covered the
broadest range of vulnerable groups within its NGO prevention projects (10 different
population groupings) whereas APAC projects were focussed on four high risk
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populations (commercial sex workers. truckers. clients of sex workers in tourist and
temple town locations, and slum dwellers).
The difference in target population groups noted between the two major HIV prevention
programmes (APAC and TNSACS) in Tamil Nadu derives in part from their different
planning methods. Table 4.5 highlights some of these differences. APAC is reported
to have taken a more top down approach to planning and contracted 1 NGO to deliver
a project for 1 risk group. TNSACS planning has been led by the NGOs. addressing
the NGO identified needs of the local population such that one NGO implements a
project working with multiple groups according to the need identified by the NGO. In
Spite of the emphasis on NGO-Ied planning. TNSACS contracts are issued annually,
with no guarantee that projects will continue each year. In contrast. APAC NGOs have
a 3 year contract period.
Table 4.5: Characterisation of the APAC and TNSACS HIV prevention projects for
vulnerablel high-risk groups In Tamil Nadu
APAC TNSACS
Location
Planning methods
Costs
Target group coverage
Contract timeframe
Training & capacity
building
Role of people living with
HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) and
care
Condom distribution
STJtreatment
Urban
Top down; based on pre-
identified themes; ''Whitecollar"
approach
Costs are large
Coverage: 1 NGO = 1 target
group
Rural
Bottom up. NGO led. needs
based: grassroots approach
Costs are less
Some NGOs maybe covering
same group! multiple groups;
many different occupational
groups
1yrl NGO (but changing)
Weak
Greater involvement of
PLWHA
Free distribution (changing)
Integrated with project (drug
costs included
Time frame: 3 yrsl NGO
Strong
Limited involvement of PLWHA
Social marketing
Source: Personal communication. NGO Adviser. NACO
STD treatment - private sector
trainin referral
Beyond the basic characterisation of the targeted HIV prevention projects presented
here. it was possible to gather further information on the NGO characteristics and their
history of working on HIV through the survey responses. There was a relatively low
response rate (36%) in spite of follow up and frequent reminders made to the NGOs.
As a result. the characteristics are only a partial description of NGOs working on HIV
prevention in Tamil Nadu.
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The major characteristics of the NGOs related to expenditure and experience are
described in Table 4.6. There is a considerable mix. The age of the organisations
ranged from 2 to 27 years. Experience working on HIV/AIDS ranged from 0 to 11
years. Of the NGOs responding to the survey. only 5 started out with HIV related
activities as the focus of their work. The range in NGO expenditures and total staff
numbers suggest that organisations of a" sizes are working on targeted HIV
prevention. The range of HIV-related staff and expenditures is far more limited. This
POSsibly reflects the fact that the majority of HIV prevention projects are based on the
NACO best practice model and therefore have fairly similar structures. Alternatively.
the limited variation in expenditure may reflect the early stages of the response and the
fact that oroiects have not yet had the time to establish themselves and increase
Coverage levels. It was also found that NGOs funded by APAC (n=16) were on
average allocated three times the budget of TNSACS NGOs (n= 28) and HIV-related
expenditures were 2.1 times greater.
Table 4.6: Total and HIV-related annual expenditures, total and HIV-related staff
numbers, NGO age and HIV experience of NGOs responding to survey (N:48)
Average Median Max Min No response to
uestion
Organisation age. 12.1 11 27 2 0
yrs
Total organisation 4.816.794 1.115.149 44.194.174 181.675 6
annual
expenditure. INA
Total no. of 60 22 1.057 4 7
organisation staff
HIV experience 5.21 5.00 11.00 0 0
yrs
HIV expenditures 493.236 395.378 1.200,000 96.614 4INA .
HIV-related no. of 10 10 24 3 7
staH
The survey also requested information regarding the coverage of the intervention in
terms of number of people reached in each of the population groups targeted.
However. it was clear that this question was interpreted differently by each
organisation. In addition. there were inconsistencies across sections of the surveys in
the target groups reached. The validity and comparability of these data were therefore
brought into question and not further analysed. An attempt to address this information
gap and increase the data on HIV-related expenditures was made through accessing
monthly and quarterly monitoring records at TNSACS. Unfortunately, the records were
incomplete and it was not possible to get a picture of the annual coverage for each of
the organisations. Data on many NGOs were missing for each month and a complete
year's information was not available for the majority of the NGOs due to missing
documents.
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4.3.2. Targeted HIV prevention activities in Andhra Pradesh
4.3.2.1. State level funding of NGO targeted Interventions
The state of Andhra Pradesh has been receiving support for its HIV prevention
activities from a number of different sources since 1997. Prior to this. there was little
HIV prevention work. The key actors in the support of HIV prevention work in this state
were the UK Department for International Development and APSACS. In addition.
some support had been provided by the NGO South Indian Aids Action Programme for
encouraging NGO action. condom distribution and peer education among commercial
sex workers. As of 2004. the Gates Foundation Avahan initiative is now also active in
the state.
Support from DFID came in the form of two programmes: the Healthy Highways
Programme - a national level programme employing NGOs to work with truckers and
their sexual partners throughout the country; and the Partnership for Sexual Health
programme - a state level initiative implemented by a State Management Agency
(SMA) that was funded by DFID to contract NGOs to deliver HIV prevention
interventions for high risk groups. In 2001. it was decided that all DFID bilateral
support to the HIV/AIDS activities should be channelled through the SACS. The
contracts for all the NGOs participating in DFID programmes were then transferred to
APSACS to be managed alongside the APSACS-supported NGOs. The management
of all NGO-SACS contracts was thus streamlined and then contracted out to one
agency. the Technical Resource Unit (TRU) (see Figure 4.2. p. 104). The TRU has a
managerial function as well as providing technical support to the targeted HIV
prevention programme in the form of training. monitoring and evaluation and technical
assistance. It reports directly to APSACS.
APSACS expenditures on targeted HIV prevention projects are reported in Table 4.7.
However. information was not available on the expenditures of the early HHP and SMA
DFID programmes. The increase in expenditures from 1999/2000 to 2000/01 therefore
reflects the expansion of the APSACS programme and the initial recruitment of NGO
prOjects. The almost negligible expenditure in 2001/02 is a reflection of the re-
organisation of the NGO contracts and the merging with the DFID programmes.
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Table 4.7: Total expenditures and budget allocation for the Andhra Pradesh state
supported targeted HIV prevention programmes. INR millions. current prices.
1999-2000 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03
Expenditure 15.55 49.82 1.23 34.62"
BUdgetary 40.42 37.4 2.6 151.76
allocation
?~urces IT~hn'cal Resource Un,!. 2003) NACP & APSACS e~pend'!ure reports
unds releaSed. n a _ no! ava,lable
4.3.2.2. NGO targeted HIV prevention projects
The survey in Andhra Pradesh covered only those projects supported by APSACS. At
the time of the study APSACS held 101 NGO contracts. all delivering a single project
for APSACS. except for one NGO which had the responsibility for two projects. The
NGOs were recruited under the different programmes in different phases so that they
can be grouped according to the agency that recruited them and the batch in which
they were recruited. Table 4.8 provides the breakdown of projects by recruitment
agency. batch of recruitment and target group. Seven Healthy Highways projects were
the first prOjects to be implemented in the state through bi-Iateral funding. starting in
1997. The State Management Agency then recruited 16 NGOs to implement projects
for commercial sex workers. street children and slum dwellers in early 1999. These
Vulnerable groups had been identified through a behavioural surveillance survey
conducted with support of DFID (TNS Mode. 1998; TNS Mode. 2001 b: TNS Mode.
2001 a). This programme was scaled up with the recruitment of a further 20 NGOs and
the addition of two further risk groups to the programme (transgenders and men who
have sex with men) in December 2000. APSACS began recruitment of NGOs for the
targeted HIV prevention projects in mid 2000. They recruited 2 batches of NGOs to
implement truckers and slum dweller projects. before the merging of the NGO project
management in 2001. By the time of the merger. 101 NGOs were under contract to the
different agencies for delivery of targeted HIV prevention projects. Nearly half of these
(45.5%) were slum dweller projects. 23.8% were trucker projects and 19.8% were
commerCial sex worker projects (see Table 4.8).
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T:ble 4.8: Number of HIV prevention projects funded by APSACS by agency and batch
o recruitment and target group.
Funding OFIO's State OFIO's APSA CSagency at Management Agency Healthy %0'recruitment to
Highway Batch Batch
Total
totalprogramme Batch t ' Batch 211 Programme 1" 2l1li-
Commercial
sex workers 9 11 20 19.8%
Truckers 7 7 10 24 23.8%Slum
dwellers 4 1 20 21 46 45.5%
Transgenders 2 2 2.0%MSM
2 2 2.0%Street
_children 3 4 7 6.9%
Total 16 20 7 27 31 101 100.0%- (15.8%) (19.8%) (6.9%) (26.7%) (30.7%).
Start date ot HIV prevention project February 1999; , start date ot HIV prevention project- December
~?OO; start date ot HIV prevention proJect·· June 1997; 00 start date ot HIV prevention project· July 2000;
start date ot HIV prevention project October 2000
Further characterisation of the NGOs could only be achieved through the simplified
survey sent out to the NGOs (see sections 3.4.2.2 and Error! Reference source not
found.). As with Tamil Nadu there is a considerable mix in the size and experience of
NGOs working with APSAGS. Table 4.9 shows that the organisations range from 3 to
over 80 years of age and have total annual expenditures ranging from INR 150
thousand to INR 150 million. The range of HIV experience is also mixed.
Table 4.9: Total annual expenditures, total and staff numbers, NGO age and HIV
eXperience of NGOs responding to survey (N:82)
Average Median Max Min Missing
Organisation age, years 15.6 14.6 80.1 2.9 19
Total organisation annual 6,922,646 1,935.005 150.000.000 150.000 22
expenditure, INA
Full time staff (all organisation) 62.1 28.0 550.0 8.0 20
HIV experience, years 6.0 5.0 14.6 3.1 20
4.3.3. Quality and availability of the information for the
production cost analysis
4.3.3.1. Activity and Input documentation
From project visits it was determined that the APAG and APSAGS project activities had
been documented and records of inputs such as condoms, lEG materials and STD
drugs were well kept and available. For the projects funded by TNSAGS the quality of
this reporting varied. On several occasions the research team were told that the
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mOnitoring of TNSACS prorects was poor due to the lack of training provided and the
inadequacy of evaluation visits. There was a clear diHerence in documentation
between those NGOs with a history of working with a large international funding
agency records and those that did not. Records were better kept and easier to identify
in the former. However. the latter organisations were smaller in size so that capturing
the information through interviews with long-standing staH members was thought to be
Possible.
4.3.3.2. Routine monitoring
A" interventions across the states and the diHerent funding programmes are required to
submit monthly monitoring reports. Data from the questionnaire indicated that there
are two forms of internal monitoring: first. through discussion of activities and lessons
learned and. second. through production of indicators according to a framework set
dawn by the funding agency. In Tamil Nadu. for APAC. TNSACS and CAPACS.
monitoring reports are submitted on a monthly basis. These reports included
information on both coverage and activities. In addition. for TNSACS and CAPACS. a
Joint Appraisal and Review Team (JART) make twice yearly evaluation visits to the
TNSACS NGOs and submitted reports to the TNSACS. CAPACS follows the same
system of management. APAC has a similar external evaluation mechanism to ensure
quality of service provision. In Andhra Pradesh. interviews with the TRU and NGO
visits revealed that careful monitoring records. including monthly records on coverage
and activities. were being kept. Monitoring is seen as an integral part of the project and
the importance placed on this activity suggested that the data observed were of
reasonable quality.
4.3.3.3. Financial data
Although financial statements do not necessarily reflect the cost structure of the
intervention as a result of variations in reporting requirements and donations in-kind.
they do provide a guide to expenditures and require documentation of prices and inputs
for which there is a financial transaction. A" NGOs are required to submit quarterly
finanCial statements to funding agencies. Across the board annual audited statements
are compiled for each intervention and for the organisation as a whole. For all the
SACS and APAC these statements need to be supported by vouchers providing
records on expenditures on project inputs.
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4.4. Summary of findings
This chapter has presented the results of a situational analysis of targeted HIV
prevention programmes in Southern India. conducted to identify the sampling frame
and assess the feasibility of the production cost analysis of scaling up. The analysis
found that the 2"(1 phase of the National AIDS Control Programme was designed to fit
with the early stage of the epidemic and allocated 23% of the total budget to targeted
interventions. A comparison of the state level response in two of the high prevalence
states also found:
• A number of different funding sources for NGOs working on HIV prevention for
high-risk groups including international and national NGOs. bi-Iateral donors and
state funding
Variation in the institutional arrangements and mechanisms for contracting NGOs
across the different funding sources and state AIDS control societies
Variation in the methods of planning the delivery of NGO projects across the
different funding sources
•
•
In spite of lack of access to the USAID supported APAC programme. the mapping
survey found that the remaining HIV prevention programmes could provide both a
sufficient sample of projects for the analysis and an important difference in institutional
arrangements for comparative analysis of the transaction costs.
The available NGO HIV prevention projects for the sample in Tamil Nadu were funded
by TNSACS, CAPACS and a group of non-governmental donors in Tamil Nadu. In
Andhra Pradesh, the HIV prevention projects identified to make up the sampling frame
were sUpported by APSACS alone. The NGOs supported by these funding agencies
repreSented a mix in terms of size and experience. However, the sampling frames
across the two states comprised similar characteristics. Organisation expenditure and
staff, organisation age and HIV experience fall in similar ranges (see Table 4.6 and
Table 4.9)
A turther important tinding ot the survey was that, in spite of missing coverage and
output information in the questionnaire responses, centralised monitoring systems
require reporting that allow comparing NGO projects by level of output. Monitoring
systems and standard NGO records are therefore likely to yield sufficient information
for full economic costing ot a sample of case study NGOs.
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The next three chapters present the analyses and results of the cost analyses of HIV
prevention services delivered by contracting out to NGOs and identified through this
situational analysis. Using an accounting approach. Chapter 5 starts with an analysis
of the production costs of a set of 19 case study HIV prevention projects.
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Chapter 5. Cost analysis of HIV prevention services
for vulnerable groups in Southern India
5. 1. Introduction
As a starting point to understanding the costs of the HIV prevention activities identified
in the mapping analysis. this chapter uses the case study NGO projects to explore the
prOduction costs. The chapter's objective is to describe how costs of HIV prevention
prOjects change with coverage level. This is achieved in the following steps:
• calculating the total costs. average costs and cost profiles of 19 case study
NGO HIV prevention projects in two states in Southern India
exploring how uncertainty in the data affects the cost estimates
identifying and explaining the causes of average cost variations with particular
focus on project scale using quantitative and qualitative analvsts
testing the sensitivity of the relationships between costs and scale to
uncertainty in the data
•
•
•
In describing these steps. the chapter first sets out the background and rationale to the
analysis of costs of HIV prevention interventions before providing a brief overview of
the methods used to do so. Next. it presents the case studies analysed, including their
costs and scale. The following section analyses the causes of variation in the total
costs. scale and average costs of the HIV prevention projects. The results and their
limitations are discussed in the penultimate section. Finally conclusions regarding the
causes of cost variation are drawn and presented. A version of this chapter was
Published in the October 2005 issue of the Bulletin of the World Health Organisation
(see Appendix 10) (Guinness. Kumaranayake et al.. 2005).
5.2. Background
Comparing costs of a particular health service intervention across different sites can
provide insights into operating efficiency and a better understanding of cost profiles in
order to ensure efficient use of resources in the process of scaling up. Examples of
such analyses in the public health literature include Creese, Sriyabbaya et al., 1982;
Robertson, Davis et aI., 1984; Over, 1986; Gilson, 1992; Robertson, Hall et at. 1992;
and Mansley, Dunet et at., 2002. Few cost analyses of HIV prevention interventions
exist (Kumaranayake and Watts, 200Oc; Creese, Floyd et al., 2002; Scotland, Van
Teijlingen et al., 2003; Walker, 2003). The cost analyses presented in these reviews
look at one project in one setting at a single point in time. Two exceptions are a cost
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analysis of condom social marketing that notes how programme maturity reduces
average costs (Stallworthy and Meekers. 1998) and an analysis of costs and efficiency
of voluntary counselling and testing services in Andhra Pradesh. India (Dandona,
Sisodia et al.. 2005b). Potential differences in costs and efficiency likely to arise with
different locations. time periods and scale of operation, have therefore only been
addressed to a limited extent in the HIV/AIDS literature.
By analysing the costs of 19 case study targeted HIV prevention projects in Southern
India. this chapter begins to address this information gap. These NGO projects all form
part of the National AIDS Control Programme's (NACP) efforts to scale up targeted
interventions by replicating best practice HIV prevention projects targeted at high-risk
groups (National AIDS Control Organisation. 2000a; National AIDS Control
Organisation. 2000b; Ramasundaram, Allaudin et al., 2001; Ramasundaram. 2002).
The guidelines on best practice prescribe the key components of the targeted HIV
prevention projects: HIV education. condom distribution and referral of STI cases for
treatment for high risk groups (Jana, Bandyopadhyay et al., 1998; Jenkins, 2000;
National AIDS Control Organisation, 2000a; National AIDS Control Organisation,
2000b). Also included is a component that recognises that facilitating behaviour
change involves working to educate those groups or individuals that may influence the
target community, e.g. providing HIV education to long term partners of sex workers
and working with the police to reduce harassment levels (National AIDS Control
Organisation, 2000a; National AIDS Control Organisation, 2000b). In addition. the
National AIDS Control Organisation (NACO) guidelines recommend budget structures
and budget levels. set according to an estimated constant average cost per person
reached (National AIDS Control Organisation and UNAIDS. 2001). With these
gUidelines. NACO in partnership with the State AIDS Societies (SACS) have rolled out
over 900 NGO targeted HIV prevention projects throughout India (National AIDS
Control Organisation, 2004a). Due to the use of guidelines. the structure of the
prOjects and therefore their production functions, including the ratio of variable to fixed
costs, is likely to be fairly uniform across the country. Collecting detailed cost data
from a sample of these projects, it is possible to explore how and why costs might vary
despite these budgetary guidelines and similar production processes.
5.3. Statement of hypotheses
Accounting cost studies have frequently found variation in average costs across sites,
in spite of looking at the same health service interventions using the same
methodologies (Creese, Sriyabbaya et al., 1982; Robertson, Davis et al., 1984; Over,
1986; Gilson, 1992; Robertson, Hall et al., 1992; Creese and Parker, 1994; Stallworthy
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and Meekers, 1998; Grieve, Dundas et al., 2001; Mansley, Dunet et al., 2002; Hutton,
FOX-RuShby et al., 2004). Economic theory and evidence describe a number of key
dimensions related to the production technology, scope, wastage. input prices. context,
timeframe and scale of operation that will cause this variation. Another aspect not
identified as explored in the health services literature is the influence of different
financing mechanisms (for example: payments are made in full prospectively or
retrospectively or whether all or some of the payment is linked to performance) on
costs.
The hypothesis for the following analysis is that scale is a leading factor influencing the
average cost of the HIV prevention projects. In theory, as discussed in Chapter 2, as
output increases the average cost first falls and then rises. The falling average cost in
the short run is a manifestation of fixed costs spread over an increasing number of
units of output. The same phenomenon is illustrated by a changing rate of increase in
total costs and increases in the ratio of variable to total costs as scale increases.
A variety of different output measures collected as part of routine HIV prevention
project monitoring can be said to represent scale of operation at the NGO project level:
number of people reached, STis referred, STls treated (where relevant), number of
Condoms distributed, number of 1st contacts with the target group, total number of
Contacts with the target group and total number of contacts with the community (see
Chapter 3). Number of people reached reflects scale of the HIV prevention project as
indicated by national policy which aims to increase coverage in order to achieve
behaviour change among increasing numbers of the population. The remaining 6
indicators reflect different aspects of scale in terms of the volume of services provided
by the projects. To ensure clarity in this analysis, the number of people reached is
referred to as "coverage" and the remaining indicators of scale as descriptors of
"volume". In theory, coverage and volume should be related Le. as coverage increases
so should the volume of services provided. However, projects with the same coverage
may provide different volumes of services. For example, a project reaching 1000
CSWs may treat 0.5 STls per CSW reached in one area. In an area with lower STI
prevalences, a project reaching the same number of CSWs may only treat 0.2 STls per
CSW reached. For planning purposes, if objectives are set according to coverage,
knowledge regarding the relationship between volume and coverage is an important
factor in determining resource requirements.
At the programme (or funding agency) level a similar distinction can be made between
Coverage (number of people reached or number of NGOs contracted) and volume (e.g.
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number of training programmes provided. number of monitoring visits made. number of
educational materials produced) indicators of scale. This chapter focuses on the NGO
project as the unit of analysis and examines how the different dimensions identified in
the literature (see first paragraph of this section and section 2.7.1.3) influence the
differences between the average costs of the NGO projects.
Aside from scale and input prices. proxy variables are required to measure the different
dimensions that theory predicts will affect average costs. Differences in production
technology were identified during data collection and the projects grouped accordingly.
Differences in context. at the state level. are captured in a comparison of the NGOs
across the two states. The district level literacy rate. taken from the All India Census
2001. is used as an indicator to also represent contextual variations as well as
population differences at the district level (Census of India. 2001). The funding agency
and the actual project budget are used as variables to reflect differences in financing
mechanisms. Programme maturity is defined by the number of years the NGO has
been working on the HIV prevention project. Given its multi-dimensional nature and
associated measurement difficulties (Lafond. Brown et at., 2002). capacity is measured
using four indicators: holding of an FCRA cernncate': size of the organisation. as
defined by total annual expenditure and percentage of staff working on HIV; funding
agency; and the funding batch. defined by the agency that made the original contract
with the NGO to implement the targeted HIV prevention project (see Table 5.1). The
hypotheses for the direction and strength of the relationships between these
dimensions and average costs are stated in Table 5.1.
1.
7 An FC.RA(Foreign Contribution Regulation Act) Certi.ticate allo.wsan NGO ~r indivi~ual t~ n~~eivefunds
for se.rvlces. Without this they are only able 10 receive donations from Indian nallonal Individuals and
organisations. An NGO has 10 meet certain criteria 10 obtain this certificale.
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5.4. Methods
5.4.1. Data collection and cost calculation
Economic cost data were collected from 17 commercial sex worker projects funded by
4 different agencies in the states of Tamil Nadu (TN) (Tamil Nadu State AIDS Control
Society (TNSACS). Chennai Corporation AIDS Prevention and Control Society
(CAPACS) and Christian Council for Rural Development and Research (CCOORR))
and Andhra Pradesh (AP) (Andhra Pradesh State AIDS Control SOCiety (APSACS)),
see Table 5.3. In addition two truckers' projects in Andhra Pradesh were included in
the analysis to incorporate the range of historical differences in funding aqencies" and
the impact of resulting contractual experience on costs in the analysis. Total costs
were then calcualated for each NGO project. Scale was measured using the different
indicators of coverage and volume as described in Table 5.1 and defined in Chapter 3.
Average costs were calculated for each of these scale variables by dividing the total
cost by the scale measure.
5.4.2. Limitations in the data
Due to the retrospective nature of the data collection, several constraints were faced in
obtaining full information required for the cost analysis relating to missing data,
inaccuracies in the data and where price measures had to be used in place of cost.
Inaccuracies in the data are related to: first, the usual flaws and mis-reporting to which
all routine monitoring systems are subject. including missing values for coverage (1
NGO) and volume (2 NGOs) indicators; second. the values obtained for peer
educators' time and income are constrained by the limited numbers available for
interview. drunkenness or false replies; third, there was a tendency for project directors
to under-estimate incomes or, where the research team were perceived as evaluators,
a tendency to over- report time spent on the project; fourth. STI treatment records were
not available at all sites; and finally, systematic records on quantities of educational
materials. training sessions and condom revenues were not available.
1.
II U .
nlll June 2002, AP had 3 different agencies managing and funding targeted interventions at the state
level - APSACS, the DFID funded state management agency and the DFID funded regional management
Unit of the Health Highways Programme. The management of these was merged in 2002 and aUstate level
funded targeted HIV prevention projects are managed by a technical resource unit contracted by APSACS
(see Chapter 4),
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The assumptions used to minimise these limitations are described in Chapter 3. In the
case that quantities of inputs were not available, e.g. building space, transport and
community meetings, prices have been used to represent costs. These data might be
a better reflection of the budget than the resources used, as expenditures tend to be
bUdget driven. Importantly, this limits the ability of the analysis to examine the
relationship between the production and cost function for these particular items.
5.4.3. Addressing uncertainty in the data
Ranges for total costs and the ratio of variable to total costs were generated to account
for data limitations related to missing data and data inaccuracies in the input and price
data described above. Table 5.2 presents the assumptions made to generate these
ranges. To obtain an estimate of the types and quantities of materials and training
sessions, a combination of the author's understanding of projects, available records
and interviews with funding agency staH or contractors were used. A standardised
quantity and cost for training and educational materials that would be expected for
each NGO was then generated for each funding agency . To obtain an alternative
estimate for the cost of condoms sold by the organisation, it was assumed no revenue
from condoms was received by the service providers. In the case of personnel and
peer educators the input and price values were varied according to the range of
responses received in the full NGO sample.
To generate ranges in the average cost we first used a one way analysis dealing with
the uncertainties in the cost data. Where coverage data were missing. the target
population set down in the contractual document was used as a proxy. Where volume
indicators are missing. no proxies were identified so these were left as missing values.
One- and two-way sensitivity analyses were then used to account for the limitations of
the coverage data. Coverage variables were varied by 10% above and below the initial
level.
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Table 5.2: Assumptions accounting for uncertainty arising from the data limitations
Input Baseline Problem Value(s) used in Source
assumption sensitivity
anal sis
No. of Number of Data incomplete Funding agency Funding agencytraining sessions based at many NGOs specific accountssessions on NGO data standardised
Educational
quantity and cost
Materials on site Data incomplete Funding agency Designer andmaterials or recorded as at many NGOs; specific supplier of
distributed, based materials worn out standardised educational
on observational or nol available. quantity and cost materials
lour, interviews
and records of
Condoms
distribution
Revenue from No records No revenue from
sold condoms = cost available; many condom sales
of condoms NGOs not selling
purchased by condoms that are
NGO procured for sales
Personnel Project director's Inaccuracies in Interquartile Sample of PO's(prOject own estimation of self-reported data range of value of reporting incomedirector) average income and missing data PO income
Peer At each NGO: Inaccuracies in Min and max Sample and
educators (median value of self-reported data values of time average income
time) x (median and missing data cost per capita for low
time spent on income groups
project activities) (National Council
based on of Applied
interviews with Economic
eer educators Research,2001
5.4.4. Analysing the relationship between coverage and
volume
A Spearman's rank order correlation coefficient test was used to determine if there is a
relationship between coverage and volume, with a null hypothesis of no relationship
between the two variables. Number of people reached was used in comparisons of
CSW projects. However, in comparing projects working with different target groups,
this indicator is likely to be invalid due to the different nature of 'reach" - a CSW project
requires a long term relationship with each member of the target community whereas in
the trucker community, one-off as opposed to repeat contacts are necessary as the
individual moves on from truck stop to truck stop. Comparisons of volume for the
different groups, on the other hand, are valid for across-target group comparisons as
they relate to the same activities.
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5.4.5. Analysis of variation
Scale, total and average costs (with respect to each scale variable) were compared
across the projects. In addition, comparisons of cost profiles provide a description of
the differing patterns of resource use. Due to the small sample sizes non-parametric
methods were used to look at the relationship between scale and the three cost
variables: total costs, cost profile and average costs. The same relationships between
the cost variables and scale were then explored using scatter plots. Then. to identify
whether these are non-linear relationships. the cost variables were regressed on scale.
first using a linear form equation and then comparing it with the quadratic form.
Further analysis was then carried out to look at whether the scale. total costs. average
costs and cost structure are affected by the dimensions described in Section 5.3 and
Table 5.1. namely capacity. context. prices, programme maturity. financing
mechanisms. production technology and wastage.
The relationships between the dimensions of capacity. context. prices. programme
maturity and financing mechanisms (Table 5.1) and the cost variables were tested
using non-parametric methods. Two tests were used to explore the impact of the
seven dimensions: the median test for categorical explanatory variables and
Spearman's rank order correlation coefficient test for independence of samples for the
continuous explanatory variables (see for example (Pett. 1997)). The null hypothesis
for each test was that there is no relationship between the scale or cost variables and
the explanatory variable.
In the case of production technology. which varies due to the different methods for STI
management and the different target groups. the numbers of CSW NGOs with STI
clinics (3) and the number of truckers' projects (2) were too small to allow statistical
tests of the relationship between production technology and costs. Cost variations were
therefore explored through visual inspection of the data.
In looking at the impact of prices on costs. unit prices of personnel and peer educators
were compared with average costs using the average project cost of an outreach
Worker and a peer educator at each project (total cost divided by number of people).
There is no variation in the prices of educational materials, condoms and STI drugs.
The price of training varies only at the funding agency level. so the impact of any
differences will be picked up in inter-agency comparisons. For other inputs, quantities
were not known and therefore price differentials cannot be discerned.
127
It was not possible to capture wastage in quantifiable form so observation, interviews
and documentation of these factors served to enrich the quantitative analyses.
5.4.6. Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity of the results to the assumptions made in addressing data limitations in
section 5.4.2 was tested in a further sensitivity analysis. The non-parametric tests and
regressions were re-run to explore if the relationships still hold using the extreme
values of total cost, ratio of variable to total costs and average cost.
5.5. Results: the costs of HIV prevention projects
5.5.1. Description of the HIV prevention projects
The seventeen CSW projects are characterised in Table 5.3. Eight of the CSW
prOjects are from Tamil Nadu and 9 are from Andhra Pradesh, where the two truckers'
prOjects are located. As can be seen from Table 5.3, there is a wide range in coverage
achieved by the CSW projects (250 to 2008 CSWs reached) as we" as variation in the
HIV prevention budgets and activities in the form of methods chosen for managing STI
treatment. HIV prevention budgets range from INR 204,000 to INR 1.1 million and two
out of the 17 projects run their own clinic for provision of these services, whereas the
remainder refer potential patients to local health care providers. The NGOs
themselves vary in terms of avera" levels of annual expenditure (INR 225,000 to 46
million) and HIV experience (3 - 13 years). In addition, 14 of the 17 NGOs have
sufficient capacity to have obtained a government certificate which permits the
organisation to receive foreign funds Le. they have been in operation for a set period of
time and have submitted accounts of sufficient quality to the government.
As a result of problems in the selection procedures (see chapter 4), there were some
differences in the characteristics of the case study NGOs from those in the avera"
sampling frame described in chapter 4. In the case of TNSACS, the characteristics of
the NGOs included in the case study had on average lower avera" expenditures and
staff numbers but more experience than those that made up the sampling frame (see
Table 4.6 and Table 5.3). In the case of APSACS, the case study NGOs had on
average lower avera" expenditures and numbers of staff, were older but had less HIV
experience than the sampling frame average (see Table 4.9 and Table 5.3).
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Despite the prescribed structure of the targeted interventions (TIs) in India. there is also
variation in the production technology or structure of services across the target groups:
the methods with which it is best to reach marginalised communities such as
commercial sex workers (CSWs) or injecting drug users will be different to those for
reaching migrant workers, truckers or men who have sex with men (MSM). In addition,
service delivery methods were found to vary within the sample of CSW projects in the
case studies. Two different approaches to STI management were used: the provision
of STI services or referral for treatment at partner health care providers. 1 TNSACS
NGO project and 1 CAPACS NGO project as well as one trucker's project in Andhra
Pradesh incorporate an STI clinic into their activities.
Input price variation is evident in both the values of staff and peer educator time (see
Table 5.4). The range of costs for the 4 staff categories is from 134% to 184% of the
median value. For all categories except administrative staff, CCOOAA has the lowest
prices. CAPACS has the highest prices for 2 out of 3 staff categories (project director
and outreach staff). For peer educators, the range of prices is over 300% of the
median value. There is no statistically significant difference in the prices across states
or funding agency except in the case of outreach workers across the funding agencies
(see Table 5.4).
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5.5.2. Total costs and cost profiles
The total costs of the projects are described graphically in Figure 5.1 and numerically in
Table 5.5. The median total cost of the CSW projects is INR 839,644, ranging from
INR 474,000 to INR 2.2 million. The projects in Andhra Pradesh are more costly on
average With a median value of INR 1.2 million. This compares with median total costs
of INR 726,320, INR 503,780 and INR 597,520 for CAPACS, CCOORR and TNSACS,
respectively.
Figure 5.1: Variation In total costs by state, agency and target group, INR (2003 prices)
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Total costs vary across NGO projects and agencies (see Figure 5.1 and Table 5.5) as
do the levels at which costs are Incurred and the cost profiles (Table 5.6). Nine percent
and 11% of total costs (median value), respectively, are incurred at the funding agency
level for APSACS and TNSACS. The median value of the proportion of costs incurred
at the agency level in APSACS hides a wide variation across the NGOs projects
ranging from 4~o to 14.6%. In contrast, for the CCOORR projects, 38% (median value)
of costs are incurred t the agency level.
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Variable costs of the CSW projects range from 39.7% to 70.7% of total costs. with a
median value of 53.2%. Variable personnel (staff time) costs are the largest portion of
variable costs for the CAPACS and APSACS projects and represent 27.0% and 19.7%
of total costs. respectively. Within the APSACS group of projects there is a wide
variation in staff costs as a proportion of the total. ranging from 12.2% to 28.9%. At
CCOORR an anomalous high contribution of condoms (median: 14.7% of total costs)
combined with low absolute staff costs have led to a low ratio of staff to variable costs.
However. the method in which condom distribution is recorded is likely to have led to
an over-estimate of condom costs at these projects".
The cost of peer education is on average the next largest part of variable costs and the
greatest share of variable costs at TNSACS (median = 20.1%). Again the range is
large: from 1.2% to 34.9% of total costs. No significant relationship, on average. is
observed between the cost of peer educators and staff (Spearman's Rho = 0.1368,
probability 1<1= 0.6764). although at some projects they may be a substitute and others
a complement to staff.
The cost of education (IEC) materials as a percentage of total costs is highest at two
TNSACS projects (12.8% and 6.8% at NGOs 6 and 16. respectively) that have close
relations with and use donations of materials from a separate state-wide HIV
prevention programme (APAC)!O to support their activities; at a CCOORR project
(5.4%, NGO 1) where the NGO also implements an HIV prevention project for the
APAC programme and therefore shares materials; and at a truckers' project (5.1%.
NGO 12) in Andhra Pradesh. which had a collection of materials developed and
provided when it was initiated under a previous externally supported HIV prevention
programme! I.
STI treatment forms a greater share of costs in those projects that operate STI clinics
(NGOs: 14,6,17,12), relative to other projects within the same funding agency group.
This difference is not statistically significant (Pearson's chi squared = 1.6410, Pr =0.2)
and there may be other factors influencing this part of the cost ratio e.g. the share of
peer educator costs is also low where the share of STI treatment costs is high.
1.
9 In monitoring the intervention. the NGO staff are required to assess not only what the intervention itself is
dOIngbut also its project partners. For this reason staff visit health facilities and other project partners to
obtain data on condoms distributed and STis treated to the target community. These figures are included
\~ the final monitoring reports and could be seen as inflating the direct output of the project .
AIDS Prevention and Control Projecl: a USAID funded HIV prevention programme running In parallel to
\~e other programmes in Tamil Nadu. .
The nationwide "Healthy Highways Programme" supported by the UK's Department for InternatIonal
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ransport costs re 4.6°'0 of tot I costs at the median. There is large variation in this
part of the cost profile, from 1.2% to 9.3%. Fixed cost profiles also show a degree of
variability. Personnel m ke up the most important fixed cost with a median value of
15.7%, ran in from 6.5% to 22.6°'0 of total costs. Building expenses is another major
fixed cost (m dl n = 12.7%, r nging from 3.6% to 26.1%). The maximum value for the
share of buildin costs observed at NGO 14 is due to the combination of low personnel
inputs, hi h rent I prices in their locality and rental of a clinic in addition to NGO office
space. Tr min costs pp r low in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6, as the majority of these
costs are incurred at the gency level. As can be seen in Appendix 11, training costs
Comprise between 6.1 °'0 and 27.5% of agency costs, where training costs are covered
by the funding gency nd once the NGO has completed the start up training - defined
here s the tr inin received In the first year of the project.
5.5.3. Scale of the HIV prevention projects
Coverage of the CSW projects is shown in Figure 5.2 and Table 5.7. As with costs
cover ge of the projects v ries considerably, from 250 to 2008 CSWs reached. The
med; n COver ge levels for CAPACS, CCOORR, TNSACS and APSACS are 700, 281,
859 and 1,610 people reached, respectively. The two truckers' projects reach 14,390
and 7,985 people e ch p r year.
Figure 5.2:
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Volume at the projects was measured using 6 variables (see Table 5.1 and Chapter 3).
As coverage levels varied across the projects. comparisons of service volume were
made by first dividing the volume descriptors by coverage. Large variations in service
VOlume continue to be observed. Table 5.8 shows tor example that the median number
at condoms distributed per person reached are 47.87 and 101 for the TNSACS
CAPACS and APSACS projects. respectively; and the higher number of 703 is
observed tor the CCOORR projects. This is equivalent to 0.96. 1.7. 1.9 and 13.5
Condoms per person per week. respectively and varies widely between the projects
themselves. Similarly. the number of STls treated ranges from 0.11 to 0.71 per person
reaChed. This compares with an average prevalence of STls of 48% measured in the
CSW communities at NGOs 2 and 3 (Bhuyan. Shobarani et al., 2001). The maximum
value is incurred by NGO 6 which treats 0.71 STls per person reached. This high
number may be due to their STI clinic enabling them to treat beyond the target
population and to encourage other projects without this facility to refer there. inflating
their numbers. Both the truckers' projects treat 0.07 infections per person reached. in a
population with estimated prevalence rates of syphilis and gonorrhoea of 9.6 percent
and 7.5 percent. respectively (Ekstrand. Garbus et al., 2003).
No statistically significant relationship between coverage and volume was found. Table
5.9 indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no correlation
except in the cases of coverage with STls treated and 1st contacts with the target
group.
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Table 5.8: Output per person reached for the case study HIV prevention projects in the
year of analysis
State Fundmg NGO Output per CSW covered
agency STls STls Condoms 1st contacts All contacts All
referred treated distributed with TG with TG contacts
CAPACS 13 0.73 nla 53 1.16 1.68 2.94
14' 0.20 0.46 121 1.49 8.05 8.75
Median 0.47 0.46 87 1.33 4.87 5.84
CCOORR 1 0.91 nla 1,001 nla nla n!a
::J 7 2.20 404"0~
Medianz 1.55 703
E TNSACS 6' 0.09 071 13 0.20 nla nla~~ 8 032 0.43 82 nla
16 0.47 0.17 11 1.06
17 0.27 0.25 87 nla
Median 030 0.34 47 0.63
Median 0.40 0.43 85 1.11 4.87 5.84
APSACS 2 0.42 0.43 155 0.49 2.84 3.14
3 0.27 0.26 87 0.75 2.05 2.61
4 0.28 0.11 15 0.27 9.22 10.19
.c 5' 0.07 0.07 4 0.88 1.20 1.30
l!l 9 0.66 0.50 416 1.00 3.43 3.88"0~
101 0.71 5.74"- la 1 11 0.29 6.34Cl.
~ 11 0.19 0.11 127 0.65 3.09 3.27"-s:
"0 12" n/a 0,07 11 1.06 1.18 1.19c::
<CC
0.38 131 0.50 2.02 2.3015 0.43
18 0.37 0.36 195 0.90 3.60 3.83
19 0.19 0.19 86 0.64 7.16 7.16
- Median 0.33 0.26 101 0.71 3.09 3.27
VI Median 0.37 0,32 101 071 3.43 3.83
~~ Min 0.09 0.11 11 0.20 1.68 2.30(1)._
l)~
Max 2.20 0,71 1,001 1.49 9.22 10.19-
n/a .. not available; , truekers'/healthy highways project; 'NGO project provide STI services directly,
Table 5.9: Spearman's rank order test of relationship between coverage (cost per person
reached) and volume of the CSW HIV prevention projects (Null hypothesis: there Is no
relationship between coverage and the volume variable)
N Spearman s Rho
STis referred 17 0.3235
sn, treated 14 0.6205*
Condoms distributed 17 0.2304
1st contacts with TG 15 0.4500"
All contacts with TG 11 0.2091
All contacts 11 0.3455
~ significant at 5%; "signifieant at 10%; ns : not significant; TG = target group; STls: Sexually transmitted
Infections.
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5.5.4. Average costs of the HIV prevention projects
Average costs of the projects are summarized in Table 5.10. The cost per person
reached ranges from INR 105 to INR 2.133. The median value over all projects is INR
797. The median cost per person reached of the CSW projects is INR 808 and the
minimum is INR 415. For the truckers' projects. the costs are INR 105 and INR 122
per person reached each. which may be low due to the high coverage of population
achieved. CCOORR projects have the highest median cost per person reached (INR
1.829). In contrast. the higher total cost APSACS projects have a median cost per
person reached of 721 Rs. The median cost per person reached of the TNSACS and
CAPACS projects is INR 707 and INR 1.103, respectively.
Table 5.10: Average costs of the case study HIV prevention projects for the year of
analysis, INR (2003 prices)
4 669
5~ 105
9 1.106
10 1.026
11 645
12.\· 122
15 819
18 721
19 898
721
Funding
agency
NGO Total cost per output unit
code No. of STis STis
people referred treated
reached
Condoms 1st All All
distributed contacts contacts contacts
with TG with TG
CAPACS 13
14·
797
1,409
1,103
2,133
1.525
1,829
415
868
622
792
707
1.091
7046
4,069
2,349
693
1.521
4,475
2,712
1,321
2,926
2,819
2.530
1.938
2.096
2.350
1.544
1.669
927
3.372
nla
1.891
1.939
4.773
1.939
nla
3,039
3.039
nla
585
2,034
3.665
3.126
2.580
3.039
1,882
2.130
5,940
1.588
2.219
3.526
5.673
1.678
2.129
2,027
4.773
2.130
15.0
11.7
13.3
21
3.8
30
32.6
10.6
54.5
9.1
21.6
688
944
816
nla
474
175
325
271
161
216Median
CCOORR 1
7
Median
TNSACS 6·
8
16
17
Median
2.025
nia
584
nla
1,305
nia
nla
Median 832 216
APSACS 2
3
808
563
11.1 816 325
285
274
73
87
323
179
209
103
406
200
125
200
257
216
66
80
285
162
197
103
356
188
125
188Median
5
6
45
29
3
10
5
11
6
4
10
6
1.659
748
2.516
119
1.106
1.446
987
115
1.624
805
1.393
1.106
9
2
1.106
584
209
73
197
66
3: II Median
en.~ MinUe
Q. Max 2.133 7.046 5,940 54 2.516 474 356
808
415
2.096
693
2.629
585
rva '" not available: .\ truckers'/healthy highways prolect;·NGO project provide STI services directly.
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Variation is also evident in the cost per unit of volume of services. For example. the
median cost per STI treated and cost per 1st contact with the target group. over all
oroiects. are INR 2.174 (range: INR 585 to 5.940) and INR 987 (range: INR 115 to
2.516). respectively. For CSW projects only. the median values are INR 2.629 (range
unchanged) and INR 1.106 (range: INR 584 to 2.516).
5.5.5. Addressing uncertainty
Figure 5.3 shows the low and high estimates of total cost. variable to total cost ratio
and cost per person reached resulting from the one-way analysis of uncertainty.
Details are provided in Appendix 19. The uncertainty varies across the projects. as
measured by the range and the range as a percentage of the value generated for the
baseline analysis. The range of total project costs lies between INR 7,407 and INR
529.825 and 6% and 66% of the baseline value. The average cost range (two-way
analysis) is between INR 35 and INR 1.512 and 27% and 89% of the original values.
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Figure 5.3: Impacts of data uncertainties on total cost, cost profile (variable as a
percentage of total costs) and average costs
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5.6. Results: scale and other causes of cost variation
This section explores the reasons for variations in total and average costs, including
scale. It then examines whether these relationships still hold under the sensitivity
analysis.
5.6.1. Scale
As can be seen in Figure 5.3 total costs and the ratio of variable to total costs appear to
Increase and average costs appear to decline as coverage increases. Total cost has
statistically significant and positive relationships with both coverage and all but one (all
Contacts with the target group) of the indicators of volume (Table 5.11). Figure 5.4
shows how total costs increase with coverage and suggests that total costs do not
increase linearly but at an increasing rate. Regression analysis confirms a positive
relationship between total costs and scale, in the form of coverage (see Figure 5.4).
The results indicate that this relationship is likely to be non-linear. The quadratic model
has a higher R2 than the linear form, supporting the non-linearity hypothesis. The
Positive relationship between total costs and scale also applies to volume indicators. It
is less clear whether these are linear relationships or not (see Figure 5.1 and Appendix
13a.). Table 5.11 shows that the ratio of variable to total costs also increases positively
with coverage and number of STls treated. The relationship of this ratio with the
remaining scale variables is more ambiguous (see Table 5.11 and Appendix 13b.).
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Table 5.11: Spearman rank order tests of total cost, cost profiles, average costs
relationships with scale (CSW projects only)
Total cost Cost rofile A vera e costs
N Spearman's N Spearman's N Spearman's
Rho Rho Rho
Coverage 17 0.7990* 17 0.5415* 17 -0.5221*
STls referred 17 0.4828* 17 -0.2642 17 -0.8750*
STls treated 14 0.5017** 14 0.5692* 14 -0.7987*
Condoms distributed 17 0.4804*· 17 0.1243 17 -0.9216·
1st contacts with TG 15 0.4500·· 15 0.0395 15 -0.7964*
All contacts with TG 11 0.4273 11 0.2989 11 -0.7182·
All contacts 11 0.5545*· 11 0.4368 11 -0.5000
• significant at 5%: ··significant at 10%: ns = not significant: TG = target group: STls= Sexually transmitted
Infections;
We can also reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between average
cost and measures of scale. The results of the non-parametric tests of cost per unit of
scale against the respective scale unit are all negative and, with the exception of all
contacts, statistically significant (Table 5.11). The scale variables explain over 70% of
the variation in average costs for all average cost measures except cost per person
reached and cost per contact. The scatter plots in Figure 5.5 and Appendix 13c
illustrate these and suggest non-linear relationships between average costs and scale.
As the unit of scale increases. average costs fall at a decreasing rate for all volume
variables. It also appears that average costs are higher at both lower and higher levels
of coverage. Comparing linear and quadratic models of average costs against
coverage. it appears that the non-linear model is a better fit and there is a fitted line
resembling a classic 'u' shaped average cost curve.
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Figure 5.4: Scatter plots and fitted regression lines (linear and quadratic forms) of total
costs against coverage of the CSW projects, INR (2003 prices)
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N F Adj R- Coefficient Coefficient Constant
squared (sq)
CSWs linear 17 22.61" 0.5746 575.55' 280954.4'
reached Quadratic 15.38' 0.6425 383.02 0.4358' 658893.9
STls rsferr d linear 17 16.48" 0.4917 949.4?" 462750.6'
Quadratic 10.8?" 0.5523 -356.24 0.9999" 755843.9'
STls treated linear 14 4.74" 0.2234 698.85' 700530.6'
Quadratic 4.69' 0.3622 3038.49' -1.8393·' 222627.9
Condoms linear 17 28.35' 0.6309 1841.95' 633209.8'
distributed Quadratic 13.53' 0.6104 1351.54 0.6096 675171.9'
T rget group lin ar 15 13.04' 0.4624 619.72' 480004.1"
1st contacts Quadratic 8.21· 0.5074 -26.96 0.3427 695912.8"
Targel group line r 11 0.5 -0.0526 26.43 980611.5'
all contacts Quadratic 1.13 0.025 217.04 -0.0104 367218.4
All contacts linear 11 0.53 -0.0496 25.38 970238.4"
Quadratic 1.61 0.1088 283.44 -0.01214 6640.153
" .. -significant t 5%; ··Slgnlflcant t 10%
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Figure 5.5: Scatter plots and fitted regression lines (linear and quadratic forms) of costs
per person reached against coverage of the CSW projects, INR (2003 prices)
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N F Adj R- Coeffi- Coeffi-cient Constant
squared cient (sq)
CSWs linear 17 16.56' 0.4931 -0.7013' 1831.02'
reached Quadratic 48.83' 0.8567 -3.2228' 0.0011' 2825.20'
STts linear 17 11.45· 0.3951 -3.1191" 4115.19"
referred Quadratic 15.13' 0.6385 -11.2303' 0.0062' 5935.93"
STls linear 14 13.88' 0.4976 -3.2661' 4525.05"
treated Quadratic 8.13" 0.5231 -7.8993" 0.0036 5471.33"
Condoms line r 17 4.2" 0.1668 -0.0365" 19.75'
distributed Quadratic 7.58" 0.4513 -0.1651' 0.0002' 30.7510'
Target linear 15 5.16· 0.229 -9.2491' 11561.08"
group tst quadralic 7.78· 0.492 -33.7229' 0.0130' 19732.15"
contacts
Target line r 11 7.93' 0.4094 -0.0214' 369.99"
group II quadratic 5.79" 0.4893 -0.0651'· 0.0000 512.69·
contacts
All contacts linear 11 6.09" 0.3374 0.0126" 288.29"
Quadratic 2.74 0.2578 -0.0177 0.0000 30722"
" .. ..slgnlflc nt at 5%; ··slgnlflcant at 10%
5.6.2. Production technology
Identified variations in production technology or method of service delivery included
different services for different target groups and different methods for STI management
within the sample of CSW projects. However, with only two trucker projects and only
two CSW projects delivering their own STI services, it is not possible to make statistical
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comparisons and it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about differences in costs
between these groups.
From the data, it is clear that the number of people covered is different across target
groups. The two truckers' projects are reaching 7,985 and 14,390 people in the year of
analysis. The median coverage of a CSW project is 967. In spite of the greater scale
in terms of coverage, the volume of services provided by the truckers' projects is lower
than the CSW projects: both projects treat 0.07 STls per person reached compared
with the median of 0.32 for the CSW projects; and distribute 4 and 11 condoms per
person reached per year. as compared with a median for the CSW projects of 101.
Median total costs for the truckers' projects are higher (INR 1,295,210) than the CSW
prOjects (INR 839,660) (see Table 5.5, p.133). The high coverage rates give rise to
lower average costs. The median of INA 113 per person reached compares with a
median cost per CSW reached of INR 800 (see Table 5.10, p.143). This differential in
average costs between the target groups does not extend to the average costs
associated with service volume (see Table 5.10, p.143).
In terms of variation in production technology, two of the three projects providing STI
services are covering larger than the median population size (see Table 5.7, p.139).
However. one of these is a truckers' project. The total costs of each of the three
prOjects are on the higher side within their respective funding agency groups, indicating
that it is more costly to provide STI services but that this might facilitate outreach to a
larger group of people (see Table 5.5, p.133). In spite of this, there does not appear to
be a pattern regarding the average costs: the costs per person reached are INR 415
and INR 1,409 and the costs per STI treated are INR 585 and INR 3,039, respectively,
for the CSW projects with STI clinics.
5.6.3. Context
Variations in context are defined by two variables: literacy of the local population; and
the state in which the project operates (see Table 5.1). There is clearly a cost
differential between the state locations (see Figure 5.1) with lower total costs in Tamil
Nadu. Table 5.12 shows that total costs have a significant relationship with state and
a significant negative relationship with literacy.
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Table 5.12: Median and Spearman's rank order tests of total costs and cost profiles
relationShips with factors hypothesised 10 cause variation in the CSW HIV prevention
proJects
PoSsiblecause of
variation
.Test N Test statistic
Total costs Vartable/Total
costs
State 17 10.1011' 0.0664
Funding agency 17 , 3.432'· 5.0698
Fund batch (AP only) Median test (X2 ) 9 1.4063 1.4063
STI service provision t 7 1.3560 0.1563
FCRA 17 1.3506 0.3506
Budget 15 0.9071· 0.1643
PrOjectage 17 0.5056 0.7612*
NGO expenditure Spearmans Rho 14 -0.0110 0.1033
Staff share 16 0.0441 -0.0235
_Literacy . . . 17 .-0.8357· -0., 415
• significant ai 5%; ·~sj9nirj~1 al 10%:CSW commercial sex worker; AP;:: Andhra Pradesh; TN ;::Tamil
Nadu; STI. soxually tr nemirted Infection; FCRA certification for receiving of foreign funds.
The rnecran coverage is also different: it is approximately 2.5 times higher in Andhra
Pradesh than in Tamil Nadu yet this does not result in a statisticially significantly
association with state (see Table 5.13). Similarly, Table 5.14 shows that the median
average cost is lower In all scale variables for Andhra Pradesh than for Tamil Nadu,
except cost per 1st contact with the target group, but this difference is not statistically
significant. On the other hand, literacy is significantly associated with coverage (see
Table 5.15). A statistically significant difference does not extend to the relationship of
aVerage costs (see Table 5.16) but, counter-intuitively, average costs are lower in
areas of lower literacy (all in the state of Andhra Pradesh).
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Table 5.15: Spearman rank order tests of scale relationships with potential causes of
variatIon (CSW prolects only). (Null hypothesis: there Is no relationship between the
measure of scale and the explanatory variable).
Measure of scale Spearman's Rho
Budget PrOject age NGO expenditure HIV Staff share literacy
n 17 17 14 16 17
Coverage 0.7527" 0.2034 0.0549 0.1321 -0.5817'
STls referred 07000' -0.4205' 0.0418 -0.0441 -0.4923'
STls tre ted 0.5039" 0.3123 -02916 -0.3389 -0.3389
Condoms distributed 06857' -0.1722 -0.1648 -0.0324 -0.5600"
1st contacts with target 0.4679" ·0.0146 0.1956 -0.0321 -04345"
group
All cant cts with target 0.3091 0.3082 0.4727 -0.2636 0.0782
group
All cont cts with 0.4727 04238 05727" -03545 -0.0828
community
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5.6.4. Funding agencies
From tables Table 5.12 and Table 5.13 it can also be seen that the variables
representing budget and funding agency both have statistically significant relationships
with total costs and coverage. The budget size explains over 90% of the variation in
total costs and 75% of the variation in coverage. Despite this. no relationship is evident
between funding agency and average costs (for all scale variables). statistically
significant or otherwise (see Table 5.14). nor for budget and average costs (except for
cost per condom distributed). with less than 40% of the variation explained (see Table
5.16). The hypotheses that average costs vary with the funding agency or budget are
therefore rejected.
5.6.5. Programme maturity
Non-parametric test results do not allow the rejection of the null hypotheses that there
is no relationship between project age and total costs (Table 5.12). scale (except STls
referred) (Table 5.15) and average costs (except cost per STI referred and treated)
(Table 5.16). There does appear to be a significant relationship between the ratio of
variable to total costs and project age (Table 5.13).
5.6.6. Capacity
Total costs and coverage vary with funding agency and agency of recruitment
(measured as funding batch). as described above. Aside from a positive relationship
with cost per STI treated. there are no statistically significant relationships between
agency of recruitment (funding batch) and average costs. Organisation capacity. as
measured by holding of a FCRA certificate. and size do not have statistically significant
relationships with total costs, coverage or average costs.
5.6.7. Input prices
The variation in input prices does not manifest itself in statistically significant
relationships with average costs (Table 5.16). In fact for the most part, the results are
Counter to the idea that lower prices should lead to lower average costs as many yield
negative test statistics. A scatter plot of the average costs and the prices shows a
clustering of data points in one area making it difficult to determine if there is any
relationship at all.
5.6.8. Sensitivity analysis
Table 5.17 reports the results of the sensitivity analysis. The positive relationship
between total cost and scale holds when extreme values for scale, peer educators'
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time and prices, project director prices and the cost of STI inputs, educational
materials, training and condoms were applied (see section 5.4.2). Furthermore, the
non-linear relationship derived in the original analysis is also maintained (see Figure
5.S and Appendix 14a). Similarly, the non-linear relationship between average costs
and coverage holds (see Figure 5.S). However, the results of the analyses for the
volume variables do not stand up to the sensitivity analysis. The impact of the
sensitivity analyses on the nature of these relationships is shown in the tables in
Appendix 14b.
Table 5.17: Sensitivity analysis: the impact of varying assumptions on spearman rank
order tests of total costs, cost profiles and average costs relationships with scale
N Total cost Cost profile Average costs
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
value value value value value value
Coverage 15 0.7770' 0.8113' 0.7634- 0.5447* -0.6225- -0.7157'
STls 17 0.5686- 0.4853- 0.0184 -0.2280 0.1005 0.0074
referred
STls 14 0.4928- 0.5501' 0.6066' 0.3685 0.1078 -0.0440
treated
Condoms 17 0.5539- 0.5319- 0.2680 -0.0197 0.2917 0.2132
distributed
1SI 15 0.5679- 0.5107* 0.3029 0.0126 -0.3500 -0.3071
contacts
with TG
All 11 0.3273 0.3273 0.3425 0.4690 0.2909 0.1909
contacts
with TG
All 11 0.4727 0.4727 0.4658 0.5104 0.3182 0.2000
contacts
, .. . . . .significant at 5%; "slgnlflcant at 10%; ns = not significant; TG = target group, STls= Sexually transmitted
infections; " outliers excluded
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Figure 5.6: Impact of sensitivity analysis on relationship between coverage and total
costs and cost per person reached, INR (2003 prices)
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5.7. Discussion
The production cost analysis of targeted HIV prevention projects presented here
explores how costs vary across similar projects, with a particular focus on how costs
vary with scale, In order to facilitate comparisons of costs with scale of operation, the
sampling procedure controls as far as possible for epidemiology, production technology
and context. Inevitably, as the sample is taken from an active programme, these
factors do vary across the projects. For example, two of the 17 CSW projects provided
STI services with their own clinic whereas the remainder referred clients to health care
providers to see out treatment. Some projects placed an emphasis on peer educators,
where they appeared to be a substitute for staff (eg NGO 8), while in others they acted
as a complement to the outreach workers (eg NGO 10). In addition, two truckers'
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prOjects were chosen deliberately to explore the differences in costs between HIV
prevention projects for different target groups. It is interesting to note that the median
cost per STI treated and condom distributed fall within the same ranges for both
truckers' and CSW projects, suggesting that a similar level of efficiency with respect to
volume of services is possible across the different target groups. However, given the
small sample and limited number of trucker projects and those CSW projects with their
own STI services, it is difficult to make generalisations regarding the cost implications
of variations in production technology.
Context also varied across the projects. The projects are in two states and located in
different districts within these. The differences in states and district level literacy
appear to have an impact on average cost. although this is not statistically significant.
It should be noted that differences that appear to result from literacy may also be
picking up other state-level differences as the projects in districts with the lower literacy
rates are all in a single state - Andhra Pradesh. A further analysis of these differences
and identification of the causes of lower average costs in Andhra Pradesh is required to
explore this further. The higher proportion of costs incurred at the agency level in
Tamil Nadu may be one explanation and the higher median number of people reached
by the projects in Andhra Pradesh is an important driver of the lower average costs.
The reason that the projects in Andhra Pradesh have higher coverage on average are
not known and could be attributed to any number of reasons including the population
size within the project area and coverage targets set by the providers.
Beyond the production technology and context, it is apparent that the funding agency
and contractual history exert an influence on total and average costs. The variation in
the roles of the funding agencies is illustrated by the difference in the proportion of total
costs that is incurred at the agency level. Further, APSACS contracts out the
management and technical support for targeted interventions, whereas the other three
funding agencies internalise these roles. The funding agencies' links to the budget and
coverage of the NGO projects are through contractual agreements. Statistically
significant relationships between both total costs and coverage with budget and funding
agency were found supporting this point. Given the statistical significance, the funding
agency and budgets appear to be more important drivers of total costs and coverage
than the capacity indicators of NGO size and holding a FCRA certificate. However,
capacity could also be seen as related to the funding agency. The funding agencies
are responsible for selecting those NGOs of relative quality and to bring all NGOs up to
a similar level through technical support and monitoring.
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The idea that costs fall with project age are raised in a number of cost studies. for
example: (Robertson. Hall et al., 1992: Soucat. Levy-Bruhl et al., 1997; Stallworthy and
Meekers. 1998; Terris-Prestholt. Kumaranayake et ar., 200Sa). This increase in
efficiency can be attributed to learning and programme maturity (Over. 1986:
Stallworthy and Meekers. 1998). On the other hand. increased uptake of services and
economies of scale may be responsible (Robertson. Hall et al., 1992; Soucat. Levy-
Bruhl et at., 1997; Terris-Prestholt. Kumaranayake et al., 200Sa). The analysis here
finds no particular relationship of project age with total costs. scale (except STls
referred) or average costs 12 across the full sample. Project age appears to account for
some of the variation in the ratio of variable to total costs. The ratio has a positive
relationship with age which is logical if coverage is also positively related to age. In a
sub-analysis of the Andhra Pradesh projects (results not shown). there is a link. but not
statistically significant. between coverage and time since recruitment to the
programme. No such pattern was found when looking at cost per person reached. so
although coverage may be increasing over time. there do not appear to be any
complementary improvements in efficiency. However. data analysis also finds that
programme maturity varied with contractual history - i.e. the TNSACS projects had all
been in operation for over four years. the CCOORR projects had been active for 1
year. and the age of the APSACS NGOs depended on which agency recruited them
into HIV prevention work and the round in which they had been selected. This implies
that any relationship between project age with costs or scale may be a result of the
different contractual history rather than age itself.
The variation in input prices observed across HIV prevention projects is a phenomenon
encountered in other mum-sue costing studies. for example. Grieve et al (2001) noted a
fifteen fold difference between the highest (Portugal) and lowest (Latvia) cost per hour
of European mid grade doctors (Grieve. Dundas et al., 2001). even after adjusting for
purchasing power. In the case presented here. peer educator prices vary from INR
200 to INR 9.000 per month; and the average annual cost of outreach workers (or
equivalent) ranges from INR 1.200 to INR 5,800. Ranking prices for each category
across the NGOs did not yield any particular pattern: no one NGO has consistently
higher or lower prices. In addition. there were no significant differences in prices
across states or funding agencies. This is manifested in the results of the non-
parametric tests, which do not allow us to reject the hypothesis that there is no
relationship between prices and total or average costs. Where prices do not vary and it
is Possible to identify quantities of inputs. some difference in the level of inputs is also
1.
12
Although cost per STI referred and cost per STI treated have staltsltcally sIgnificant relationships WIth
proJect age, the relationshIps are In opposIte direchons which therefore question the validity of the result.
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found. For example. although prices are constant. the cost and quantity of educational
materials varies with ability to access these materials - larger quantities were available
at NGOs with links and access to APAC materials (eg NGOs 6, 16. and 1) and projects
that were set up under an agency providing extensive support to the provision and
distribution of these types of materials (NGO 12 - a truckers' project). Similar patterns
are found with training inputs. Another input that varies without apparent relationship to
scale is the condoms used by the project. It was found, through interviews with staff,
that the number of condoms used is driven by numbers received by the projects rather
than the demand. This. in turn. is driven by supplies available at the local distribution
offices and the ability of NGOs to network with other sources of supply such as primary
and other health care facilities.
Where technology. context and input prices are similar. cost variations can result from
inefficiency (Gilson. 1992; Barnum and Kutzin, 1993b; Creese and Parker. 1994;
Fiedler and Day, 1997). It could be argued that that costs may be close to a minimum
as the NGOs operate within budgets allocated by funding agencies who are unlikely to
over-budget due to their reported distrust of NGOs. However, this is unlikely: the cost
variation is not only evident across different coverage levels but also at particular
coverage levels, indicating that at the least not all the NGOs are not cost-minimising.
Causes of ineHiciencies might include staff productivity, prescribing practices, wastage
and inappropriate technology. Unfortunately, it was not possible to capture staff
productivity, inefficiencies or wastage in the analysis of the projects due to the inability
to carry out detailed observations of staff and heath care provider practice. The
objectives of the organisation can also aHect average costs. It is difficult to assume
that organisations are necessarily cost minimising, particularly in public health, where
as Mansley at al. (2002) highlight "(the assumption of cost minimization) may not hold
for public health programmes that have no competitive incentive to minimise cost
(Mansley, Dunet et al., 2002). Ideally the objectives of the organisation and their staff
should be analysed in more detail to assess whether this might be a cause of deviation
from cost minimising service delivery. NGO corruption was apparent from interviews
with NGO staff and funding agencies (see Chapter 7). For example, in areas were
local wages are low, it had been the practice of some NGOs to hire staff at rates lower
than that which they signed for. Whether the excess went to other project activities,
towards the NGO or to line the pockets of the management staff was not clear. It was
also not possible to explore these factors and their impact on costs in-depth at the
NGO projects. Although greater inefficiency would lead in theory to higher average
costs, only one NGO where we had heard rumours of corrupt practices was found to
have a relatively higher average cost than the rest of the group.
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In examining the different potential causes of cost variation possible within this dataset.
it is evident that scale is the most consistent factor in determining the average cost.
The importance of scale as an influence on average cost was confirmed by simple
regression analysis. The regressions indicate that there is a quadratic relationship
between average cost and scale so that there are non-constant returns to scale with
average costs beginning to rise beyond a coverage of approximately 1500 CSWs.
Although these results are statistically significant. the final sampling procedure may
have led to some bias in the regression outputs. The characteristics of the NGOs
selected as case studies were marginally different from those in the full sampling
frame. In particular. the lower average expenditures and staff numbers implies that the
case studies comprised of smaller NGOs. perhaps limiting the possibility of efficient
expansion of services and so economies of scale at higher levels of coverage.
In spite of the possible sampling bias with regards to coverage. all scale variables have
a statistically significant relationship with their respective average costs (except all
contacts). The strength of this relationship compared with the other dimensions can
only be determined through multivariate analysis and is not feasible using a case study
approach because of the small number of observations. The relationship between the
scale variables is less consistent and the analysis found that only 2 of the volume
variables (STls treated and 1st contacts) were significantly associated with service
coverage. Reasons for the lack of relationship may include: methods used for
recording STI referrals differ such that some projects include repeat referrals. others do
not; in the case of condom distribution. the number of condoms distributed is
constrained by supply and is therefore less likely to be driven by demand or numbers
reached; and the measure of all contacts is unlikely to be related to number of people
reached due to the different characteristics of the populations within which the CSWs
are living or working i.e. the number of people contacted is more likely to be associated
with the local context than the number of people reached by the project. As well as
scale. fund batch. project age and input price variables were found to have some
influence on cost per STI treated. cost per STI treated/ referred and cost per STI
referred/ all contacts with the target group/ all contacts. respectively.
Although budgets are set according to guidelines using a constant average cost per
person reached (National AIDS Control Organisation and UNAIDS. 2001). total costs
appear to increase and do so at a varying rate as coverage increases. As a result
average costs (in terms of coverage) also vary with scale and these relationships hold
under the sensitivity analysis. The findings fall in line with a classical 'U' shaped
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average cost curve and the regression analysis appears to confirm this. This cost
function is not derived from a production function. It is a descriptive cost function due
to the data limitations. This makes it more difficult to identify the analysis of causes of
change in average cost and to explain the different relationships between costs and
coverage and costs volume.
The analysis is limited by the variable quality of the data arising from using a
retrospective analysis and routine monitoring systems that were not specifically
designed for cost analyses. Inputs to the project in some cases had to be estimated
based on interviews with staff rather than actual records. Outputs were taken from
routine monitoring systems which are known for mis-reporting and errors and also
Subject to under or over-reporting depending on the incentives within the system.
Financial data were used as a proxy for economic costs for transport and monitoring as
no better records were available. Interviews regarding peer educators' and project
directors' time and value were subject to bias and false responses. In spite of these
problems. one way analysis of uncertainty showed the results to be relatively robust.
Although the two way analysis resulted in wide value ranges, these probably over-
estimate the error in the monitoring figures. Finally. the small sample compounded by
the diversity in the organisations' characteristics limits the ability to allow confident
inference from the non-parametric and regression analyses and the interpretation of
the results should therefore be made with caution.
5.8. Conclusion
From the case studies, it is clear that scale is a key factor in influencing the average
cost and this results in a 'u-shapec average cost curve. This has crucial implications
for planning resources for scaling up. Resource requirement estimation needs to take
into account the changing average cost. In addition, it appears that within the range of
Coverage achieved by these NGOs there is a point of minimum efficient scale. If this is
the case, increasing coverage beyond this point will result in increasing average costs.
The optimal size of a project will be at the lowest point on the average cost curve and
the identification of this optimal level for a given production technology can help in
ensuring more efficient use of resources as activities are expanded.
This chapter has presented the results of the costs analyses of 19 case study targeted
HIV prevention projects in Southern India. It has identified wide variations in total
costs, scale and average costs and that scale is a major factor identified that influences
average costs of these NGO projects. From the findings, the paper hypothesises that
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the projects are operating with a classic 'u' shaped average costs curve, so that
average costs first fall as coverage increases before beginning to rise again with higher
levels of coverage. This has important implications for planning the optimal coverage
of targeted HIV prevention interventions and improving methods for estimating
resource requirements. The following chapter uses econometric techniques to test this
cost-output relationship further using this case study data and a larger data set.
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Chapter 6. Estimation of a cost function for HIV
prevention services for vulnerable groups in
Southern India
6. 1. Introduction
The analysis in Chapter 5 identified that the cost-output relationship is the main driver
behind the cost variations across HIV prevention projects. However. other contextual
factors. including contractual history. can also influence total costs. This chapter builds
on these previous results and uses econometric techniques to inform NGO contracting
policy by:
• Identifying economies of scale in HIV prevention projects targeted at high risk
populations for different levels of coverage by estimating marginal costs;
Identifying whether some point of minimum efficient scale exists in the
implementation of targeted HIV prevention projects. if economies of scale are
found to exist
• Assessing the impact of other key contextual factors on total and average
•
costs of HIV prevention
The chapter starts with a brief overview of the rationale for the analysis including some
background to econometric estimation of cost functions. Next, the datasets collected
according to the methods laid out in Chapter 3 are described. The following section
lays out the analytical methods used including choice of the model. description of the
variables used and the process of the model building. The results are presented in
three sections: the descriptive statistics; the choice of best-ut model; and the cost
function estimates. The chapter is completed with a discussion of the results and some
key conclusions pertaining to this analysis.
6.2. Background
The case study analysis of the production and transaction costs of HIV prevention
prOjects in this thesis suggests three important implications of the expansion of HIV
prevention services. First. production costs vary with scale. Second. projects are likely
to be able to take advantage of economies of scale when scaling up to a certain level
of output. Third. governance arrangements are likely to influence the relative efficiency
of prOjects. Econometric methods can be used to examine the relationship between
cost and scale further by estimating the shape of the cost function and hence marginal
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costs. Econometric methods estimate cost functions using multivariate analysis to
explain how costs vary with level of output. In relating total costs to different output
variables. the regression parameters are used to estimate the average and marginal
cost. so describing how costs vary with scale of activity (Berndt. 1990). Such statistical
cost functions allow the exploration of the impact of scale on costs and the extent of the
impact of other factors such as geographical location and governance arrangements.
price levels. production technology. timeframe. technical efficiency and range of
services provided.
Chapter 2 describes how econometric applications in the estimation of cost functions
for health care services have been used to look at issues of efficiency. scale and scope
in both high and low income country settings with a focus on the estimation of hospital
costs e.g.(Cowing. Holtman et al.. 1983; Barnum and Kutzin. 1993a; Aletras. 1997;
Weaver and Deolalikar. 2004). These statistical methods are the only way to calculate
marginal costs and an index of economies of scale.
In order to isolate the eHect of scale on the cost function and marginal costs. an
econometric analysis for individual HIV/AIDS projects needs to control for variations in
project approaches. prices. epidemiology and the demographic and socio-economic
characteristics of the target population. Data focussing on one intervention type.
preferably in a single country setting or context are better able to minimise some of the
noise generated by these factors. Using economic cost and expenditure information
from targeted HIV prevention projects in India. this chapter estimates a cost function for
these specific interventions. focussing only on groups with high risk behaviour. and so
explores how marginal costs and economies of scale change with the scale of activity.
The chapter has three main hypotheses. First. average costs. and hence marginal
costs and economies of scale. vary with scale. Second. there is some minimum
efficient point of scale of operation for this type of intervention. And. thirdly. project
context. including the age of the project. contractual history. location. prices and
funding agency. also influences the average cost.
6.3. Description of the datasets
Two sets of data were used to test empirically the hypotheses. The first comprised the
economic cost data from 16 HIV prevention projects for commercial sex workers
(CSW) in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. analysed in Chapter 5 (one case study was
excluded from the analysis of the case study dataset due to missing coverage data.
see (Table 5.7. p.139)). The second dataset uses financial data collected from 101
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surveyed targeted intervention projects funded by the Andhra Pradesh State AIDS
Control Society (APSACS) and managed under contract by the Technical Aesource
Unit (TAU). Although financial data do not provide as complete a picture as economic
cost data. the large sample attainable with the financial dataset allows for more
powerful results. They also suggest patterns and the impact of different factors such
as scale or target group on the average cost. A summary of the datasets is provided in
Table 6.1. The collection of the two datasets is descnbed in Chapter 3.
Table 6.1: Sampling and methods of data collection for the AP financial dataset and case
study datasets used in the cost function estimations
sample frame
AP finanCIal dntaset
101 NGOHIV prevention projects
implomenllng targeted
Interventions under contract to
APSACS'
Sample size 78 projects from the sampling
Ir me ExcluSIon crtteria related to
non response, missing
documentation, mis-repof1tng '1'1
outputs and termination of project
Project report ed quarterly
expenditure statements subrnineo
to and coli ctec from tho
management agency alongside a
postal survey of NGOs to collate
information on coverage and
organisational characteristics.
DatA collection lnstruments
Case studies
40 NGO HIV prevention
lnterventions targeted at
commercial sex workers and their
clients, contracted by CAPACS',
CCOOAR", APSACS' and
TNSACS'
16 purposively selected NGO
HIV prevention proiecrs based on
geograph.callocahon. a range of
HIV experience and agency
knowledge of quality of services
Economic cost and coverage
data collect d using methods
based on UNAIOS costing
guidelines (UNAIOS, 2000a)
dUflng project visus and using
routine mOOlloring records.
Costs also include those incurred
for technical suppon. monitoring
ROdcontractual management
costs at the fundIng and
management agency levels.
nd Research:
The extended ans lysis of tho case studies presented here uses the data on economic
costs, output and funding context from the dataset used in Chapter 5. For this first set
of data. total cost (C) was defined as the total economic cost including training and
other technical and managerial support provided by the funding agencies and the value
of volunteer and peer educator time input. The extremely small sample size of the
case study d t set is limited in its strength to produce significant results in statistical
analysis.
The second and larger dataset was obtained from a combination of the financial
records at APSACS' NGO menagement agency, the TAU. and a postal survey of all
the targeted HIV prevention projects. Rather than being limited to CSW projects. this
dataset also includes projects targeted at a number of different high risk groups,
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namely: CSWs; men who have sex with men (MSM); street children: transgenders:
truckers; and slum dwellers. Although all are considered projects for high risk groups,
there are some important differences between these project groupings. Firstly. the
sizes of the target population within the limited vicinity of the NGO projects are larger
and more dynamic in the trucker and slum dweller projects. This results in the proiects
being able to reach a greater number of people but with less intensity than the smaller
and more stable populations of MSM. CSWs. street children and transgenders.
Secondly. in the case of MSM projects. APSACS contracts with civil service
organisations that have existing networks with the target group. For the remaining
target groups. the contracting partners are NGOs that mayor may not have existing
relationships with the target population.
In the financial dataset. total cost (C) was defined as the annual expenditure of the
projects at the project level and excludes the costs incurred by the funding or
management agency. These expenditures differ from economic costs in that they
include only the resources used for which there is a reported financial transaction and
they value those resources at the price used in that transaction. Economic costs
include the value of all resources employed to produce the service valued at their
opportunity cost.
Of the 101 APSACS projects. complete and feasible observations were obtained from
78. Expenditure reports were not obtained for 8 projects, either because the proiects
were no longer in operation (n=5) or documentation was missing. All eight of these
prOjects were included in the 19 projects that did not reply to the postal survey. In
addition, in 4 cases. coverage variables were in unrealistic ranges relative to the town
or district population size, probably a result of mis-reporting or a mistake in data entry.
These cases were therefore excluded from the analysis. The sample characteristics of
the financial data set are described in Table 6.2. For the case study data they are
described in Chapter 5 (see Table 5.3. p.129).
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6.4. Methods
6.4.1, Model specification
A standard cost function based on economic theory takes the following form:
= f(Q. ~ ), where C is the total cost of production, Q is output, and W is the set of
input prices (Scott and Parkin, 1995).
To ensure theoretical consistency yet still allow for the influence of other explanatory
variables beyond output measures, the hybrid functional form developed by
Grannemann et at (1986) is adapted here to the single product environment of these
HIV prevention projects (Grannemann, Brown et al., 1986). This implies that the cost
function is linearly homogenous in input prices (see section 2.7.1.4). For the model
used here. total costs are seen to be a function of output. input prices and different
characteristiCS of the projects. It is assumed that the NGOs behave in a cost
minimizing way given the constrained budgets available to them.
The equation for the total cost function is therefore'
.= e"u "';11 l' J 1(1 \ I (1)
Where, C total cost; Q is output of the project, X is a vector of independent variables
that shift the cost function and W is a variable representing variations in general price
levels across the different project locations.
Only a smgle price variable was entered into the model due to limitations in the data
available and price-settrng by APSACS. The prices of the major inputs of personnel,
drugs and condoms were set centrally and therefore constant across the projects,
eliminating the need to include these prices in the model (Smet, 2002). Where there is
input price varlation across observations, the implication of excluding prices is to
assume there were no input substitution possibilities across the observations (Cowing,
Holtman et al., 1983; Aletras, 1997; Smet, 2002). Input substitution across the other
inputs in this context (training, building and office expenses, monitoring and evaluation
etc) is limited. It was therefore considered valid to exclude all prices except for one
representing regional vari tions in prices of locally purchased goods.
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The model has a flexIble functional form with linear, squared and cubed variables in
output. Taking the log of both sides the equation becomes:
(2)
CoeHicient estimates were used to calculate marginal costs and economies of scale.
The marginal cost of output is:
(3)
Following We ver (2004) and Barnum and Kutzin (1993) the derived equations for
economies of scale are therefore'
(4)
Where EOS is the economies of scale index. a is the elasticity of a with respect to b
and k IS the capital stock. For this set of cross-sectional data with variations In capital
stock that h ve been controlled for (see 6.5.2, p.181) and a single output. trus simplifies
to:
f:DS -
Q(/>, lh~(J + 3/1,(/)
(5)
Economies of sc te are the gains in efficiency associated with the level of output. If the
economies of scale index is greater th n one then the level of output is less than the
most efficient level. If It is less th n one the level of output is greater than the most
efficient level Of output.
6.4.2. Variables
T ble 6.3 d scrlb s the v ri bles used in the model. The dependent variable. C (total
cost). w s th tot I annu I expenditure or economic cost of the project. depending on
the dataset. Output Wc. s defined s coverage (coverage) and measured as the number
of people r ched by the project (see Chapter 3). The re.nge of coverage varies across
the two d t sets. ThIs is bec use the c se studies focus only on CSW projects
where s th fin nci I d t set includes HIV prevention projects for other target groups
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such as mobile workers and truckers with their higher coverage levels. It is important
to consider whether output is actually an exogenous variable or if the project is able to
decide on the level of coverage it is to achieve. If the producer of services can choose
the level of output the regression coefficients will be biased (Smet, 2002). Although the
project nominates the target coverage at the outset of each year, this is done in
consultation with the funding agency or TRU and is influenced by the size of the target
population in the area. In addition. the target is not always met. indicating that the
coverage rates are more driven by the size of the population than the projects' plans.
The variable used to reflect location-specific variations in prices was cost of rent (rent)
to the project. Although. this variable is a line item also used in the summation of total
costs. its correlation coefficient with total cost was less than 0.6 (Spearman's R =
0.5166. p<O.OOl). indicating the relationship was insufficient to cause major bias in the
results.
In addition, a number of contextual factors were likely to influence the nature of the
costs. Their relevance to the model was tested by including sets of dummy variables
representing the target group (target group), contractual history and location of the
project. First. the target groups were split into two major groupings: the "vulnersbte
groups "of commercial sex workers (CSW). street children (SC), trans-genders (TG)
and men who have sex with men (MSM) and "non vulnerable groups" (but still high
risk) of truckers and slum dwellers. As described above. projects for "vulnerable
groups" tended to be focused on smaller numbers of population and in theory have
more intense interaction with the individuals of those groups over time. The "non
vulnerable group" projects are focused on larger populations that are potentially more
dynamic within which it is less easy to have repeated contact with individuals.
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Second, contractual history (funding agency! agency), in the form of the nature of the
project start up and investment at this stage, may influence costs. Start up initiatives
and the ongoing support in the form of training and support to needs assessment and
planning varies across the projects and their funding agencies. The projects are
spread out over two states and funded by four different organizations. In addition,
within Andhra Pradesh, the management and funding of the projects was merged in
2000 under one organization - the Technical Resource Unit (TRU) contracted by the
Andhra Pradesh State AIDS Control Society (APSACS). Previously the projects
operated under three different structures - the Healthy Highways Project (HHP)
(supported by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID)), the State
Management Agency (SMA) (also supported by DFID) and APSACS - with both the
SMA and APSACS recruiting NGOs to their programmes in two separate batches as
they scaled up activity. The start-up support to the NGOs not only varied across the
structures but also with the different phases in which an NGO was recruited to the
respective programmes. Variations in start-up can influence costs due to: improved
quality and hence efficiency; different levels of relationships with the funding agency
potentially leading to variations in budgets; and variations in project design or
emphasis. These variations also represent the major differences in capital stock or
fixed costs, in the form of investment in training and capacity development, across the
NGO projects. It was not possible to measure start up costs due to lack of records.
Instead, different sets of dummy variables representing the contracting agency at start-
up and the phase in which the NGO was contracted (institutional history) (agency), and
the project's funding agency (funding agency) were used to capture these variations
and so control for differences in capital stock (see Table 6.3). Third, state-level
differences in context might influence cost through a variety of institutional, cultural,
economic and social factors. A dummy variable reflecting which state the project
(state) was located in was therefore also included in the model.
Finally, age (age) was included in the model as an explanatory variable in the form of
years the project had been operable. Age of a project is likely to affect efficiency by
lOwering average costs through increased learning and skill development. Equally
average costs may rise over time as more experienced workers demand higher
salaries.
6.4.3. Model building and estimation
The models were run on both sets of data as well as separately for the "vulnerable"and
"non-vulnerable" group targeted project subsets of the larger financial data set. Stata
version 8 was used to estimate the models. Total cost was estimated using ordinary
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least squares regression. The starting point for the estimation of the model followed
equation (2) and took the following form:
Where In C is the natural log of total costs.
ao is a constant,
w is the price variable proxied by rent.
q is coverage and
x., X2. X3 and X4 are vectors of dummy variables representing target group,
funding agency, age of the intervention and institutional history.
The model was first estimated with the linear, squared and cubic coverage terms. The
regressions with higher order terms in coverage were potentially collinear causing
instability in the estimates and some negative values for marginal cost. The mean
variance inflation factor (VIF) was used to identify multicollinearity. If the mean VIF for
a model is greater than 1, multicollinearity is said to be a problem (Stataoorp, 2001).
In the cubic models. the mean VIF's were 503.2 and 79.17 for the case study and
financial datasets, respectively. causing concern. The joint significance of squared and
cubic terms in coverage was then also tested. We found that they were insignificant for
both datasets and so finally omitted them from the model. A non-significant result from
Ramsey's RESET test on the model for the financial data set indicated that there were
no higher order trends and the new specification was correct (HO: the model has no
omitted variables: F=0.35, p=0.9056). The results of the Ramsey RESET test for the
case studies were more ambiguous (HO: the model has no omitted variables: F=3.95, p
=0.0594) but the presence of higher order terms can be rejected at the 95% confidence
level.
To select the best fit regression model, the linear version was run with different
combinations of the dummy variables listed in Table 6.3. A single variable was omitted
based on its significance in the model. Where there was more than one variable or a
set of dummy variables. a Wald test was used to test for the joint significance of the
variables. Variables were omitted where p > 0.05. Finally, the model was run using
the direct values and subsequently the natural logs of the variables on the right hand
side of the equation. The model with the highest value for the adjusted R2was then
selected as the best fit.
The estimates were tested for heteroscedasticity using the Cook-Weisberg test. also
known as the Breusch-Pagan test. Although heteroscedasticity does not affect the
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coefficient estimates, it can cause incorrect inferences about their significance. It was
only a problem for the "vulnerable"group subset of data for which standard errors were
calculated using the Huber-White estimator of variance.
Marginal cost and economies of scale were calculated using equations (3) and (5),
respectively, with the predicted value of cost. Given the logarithmic nature of the
model, a smearing factor is required to transform the geometric mean of the logged
dependent variable to the arithmetic mean of the original variable (Duan, 1983;
Manning, 1998; Adam, Evans et al., 2003). For standard regression, the average of
the exponential of the residuals is used as the smearing factor so that:
E( )::: e tI" ~<lI" e /1 \ '. (/ I(/""'In( I"'\ld I (6)
Where robust regression was used to overcome problems of heteroscedasticity, the
predicted cost was calculated using equation (7):
(7)
Where smear is the predicted value generated from a regression of the squared
residuals on the independent variables in equation (2) (see (Weaver and Deolalikar,
2004)).
6.5. Results
6.5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 provide overviews of the two data sets. In the case study
data, as described earlier in the thesis (see Chapter 5). there is considerable variation
in the mean annual economic cost of the projects across both states (INR 0.61 - 1.2
million) and funding agencies (INR 0.5 - 1.22 million). The same is true for coverage
(704-1,523 and 281-1,523, respectively). In addition mean prices, as represented by
building rent, also vary from INR 37,779 to INR 57,525 across the two states and from
INR 17,468 to INR 58,350 across the funding agencies. These price variations are
consistent with the project locations as all Chennai Corporation AIDS Prevention and
Control Society's (CAPACS) and APSACS projects are focused in larger towns and
cities where prices are expected to be relatively higher than the more rural locations of
the offices of CCOORR and TNSACS. There is little variation in the mean project age
(7.0 - 7.13 years across the states and 5.5 - 9.0 years across the funding agencies). A
Correlation matrix of all the variables considered for the model is provided in Appendix
15.
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Descriptive statistics for the financial data set reveal variation in the annual
expenditures and coverage across both the nature of the target group and the
institutional history (see Table 6.5). The difference in mean coverage between target
groups (4,290 people reached) relates to the target group classification, as the
vulnerable group projects are associated with smaller populations than the non-
vulnerable group projects. The different agencies are also associated with specific
target groups, resulting, in part, in the variations in coverage across the institutional
groupings (from 2,525 to 18,624 people reached). The project age varies with the
institutional history as different organisations began contracting NGOs at different
times. There is also variation in the rent across both the groupings reflecting price
variations across the different settings. Appendix 15 provides the correlation matrices
of the variables considered for the models tested for the financial dataset.
Although, the two datasets contain different information in terms of costs, coverage is
defined in the same way i.e. number of the target population reached. As expected,
the range of coverage in the financial dataset, which comprises a HIV prevention
orolects for a number of different target groups, is far greater than in the case study
dataset. The "vulnerable group" subset of the financial data also has a higher mean
coverage than the case study data. This could indicate bias in the case study data
associated with lower coverage. On the other hand this could also result from the fact
that the "vulnerable group "classification includes other target groups as well as
Commercial sex workers.
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6.5.2. Identifying the best-fit model
The final model specifications that were used were as follows:
AP financial dataset:
In :;:Uu + al IIHV+hl'l + ('IXI ' where XI is a dummy variable representing vulnerable
group intervenuons (non-vulnerable group being the excluded category).
AP 'vulnerable group If only sub-detsset:
In C::: au +al In 1I'+bllf+ LeI/x" , where n=1-3 and x, represents a dummy variable for
the target group of the interventions (men who have sex with men, transgenders and
street children with commercial sex workers being the excluded category)
AP "non-vulnerable group" only sub-dataset
In ::: C/o + III In( price) + hi (I + tl.\ I where XI is a dummy variable representing trucker
interventions (slum dweller interventions being the excluded category)
Case study dataset:
In :::{/o +°1111 ~1'+hlq+CIXI where x, is a dummy variable representing the state of
Tamil Nadu (Andhra Pradesh being the excluded category).
The results of the rejected model specifications are summarized in Table 6.6. For the
financial dataset and its subsets. the target group was the only additional factor beyond
price and coverage found to influence the total cost function. The variables
representing funding agency and institutional history did not improve the model, nor
were they significant. Assuming that these variables are a good indicator of the
variation in start up costs, it was therefore concluded that start up costs had little
influence on variable costs. As all projects were implemented within a recurrent budget
with minimal capital investment beyond training and other costs incurred at the agency
level, no further control for capital stock was considered to be required. For the case
studies, the state in which the project was located was identified to be the only other
factor influencing the cost function significantly. In addition, a better fit model was
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obtained with the direct values of price rather than their natural log. However, to
facilitate comparability with the analysis of the AP financial dataset and as F tests on
both specifications resulted in over 99% confidence, the natural log of the price variable
was used.
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Table 6.6: Summary of results from theoretically feasible models tested, excluding the
best-fit models·
Model AdjFi
Full sample
Price enters directly (not In) 0.2750
All terms entered as natural 0.4129
logs
Cubic 0.4561
Additional dummies
Funding agency 0.4548
Age 0.4553
Agency 0.4426
Alternative dummies
Funding agency 0.4486
Targel group 0.4631
Age 0.4304
Agency 0.4486
Targel group and 0.4616
Funding agency
Target group and 0.4571
Age
Agency and Age 0.4486
Vulnerable groups only
Price enters directly (not In) 0.5274
All terms entered as natural
0.5384logs
Cubic 0.4712
Additional dummies
Age 0.4282
Agency 0.4282
Alternative dummies
No dummy 0.4708
Agency and Age 0.4451
"Non vulnerable" groups
Price enters directly (not In) 0.2216
All terms entered as natural
logs 0.3678
Cubic
0.3801
Additional dummies
Age 0.3935
Agency 0.3912
Alternative dummies
No dummy 0.4025
Age 0.3999
Agency 0.3968
Agency and Age 0.3968
Exploratory tests! notes
F.. 1O.73. P <0.0001
F.. 1858. P <0.0001
Mean VIF" =79.17: Joint lest on sq & cubic terms:
Prob>F=0.3598
Joint test on dummies: p = 0.0724
Joint lesion dummies: p = 0.0698
Joint test on dummies: p = 0.252
Joint test on dummies: Prob > F = 0.1178
Joint test on dummies: p = 0.1722
Joint lesion dummies: p = 0.1422
Joint lest on dummies: p = 0.1692
Joint lest on dummies: p = 0.1722
F = 6.13, P = 0.0017
F '" 6.36, P '" 0.0014
Mean VIF = 367.16: Joint test on sq & cubic terms:
p=0.5092
Joint test on dummies: p = 0.3779
Joint lesion dummies: p = 0.3779
(Age is dropped from Ihe model)
F ...6.03, P = 0.0014
F...l0.89, p<O.OOOl
Mean VIF=133.82: Joint test on sq & cubic terms:
p=0.6918
Joinl test on dummies: p = 0.5341
Joint test on dummies: p = 0.7998
Joint lest on dummies: p ,",0.3467
Joint test on dummies: p '"' 0.3468
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Table 6.5 (cont.): Summary of results from theoretically feasible models tested,
excluding the best-fit models·
Case studies
Model Adj Ff Exploratory tests notes
Price enters directly (not as
natural log)
All terms entered as natural
logs
Cubic
Additional dummies
Age
0.8041 F=21.53, P < 0.0001
0.7316 F=14.63, P = 0.0003
0.7793
Mean VIF=503.02: Joint test on sq & cubic terms:
p=0.1336
0.7764 Joint test on dummies: p = 0.1737
Agency 0 7887 JOint test on dummies; p '" 0.1799
Alternative dummies
No dummy 0.7399
Age 0.7212
Agency 0.7887 Joint test on dummies: p = 0.1799
Agency and Age 0.7739 Joint test on dummies: p = 0.2838
• The F statistic on all models IS significant at the 95% confidence level; "Variance inflation factor
6.5.3. Cost function estimates
6.5.3.1. Goodness of fit
The results from the best fit regressions for each of the datasets and sub-datasets are
presented in Table 6.7. For the full AP financial dataset. the adjusted R2 is 0.4622 and
the F statistic is significant at 99% confidence (F=22.48, p <0.001). The adjusted R2
indicates a slightly worse fit for the non-vulnerable group sub-dataset (R2= 0.3983).
although this was still significant at 99% (F=12.25. p<O.OOl). The model specification
for the vulnerabla group sub-dataset was heteroscedastic and therefore re-estimated
with robust regression with Huber-White standard errors. The robust regression
estimated the model as having a better fit for the vulnerable group dataset than for the
financial data set as a whole (R2=0.5714; F=27.67. p < 0.0001).
The model specification for the case study dataset also resulted in a good fit (adjusted
R2 = 0.7891). with a surprisingly strong significance on the F test. given the small
sample size (F= 19.71, P < 0.001).
6.5.3.2. Relationship between coverage and total costs
For each model, the coefficient on coverage is statistically significant but varies across
the datasets. The coefficients on coverage are statistically less significant for the case
study model (p=0.018), the vulnerable (p=0.087) and non-vulnerable (p= 0.028) group
sUb-data sets than the AP financial dataset as a whole (p<0.001). This decrease in
confidence may be in part due to the smaller sample sizes. The variation in the
coefficients on coverage indicates that the relative impact of scale on costs varies
across the datasets. In the case study data set there is a 0.03% change in total cost
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for each extra person reached compared with a 0.002% change in the financial
dataset.
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6.5.3.3. Marginal costs
The difference in the coeHicients on coverage, combined with the different ranges of
coverage included in each dataset, translate into variations in the value of marginal
cost i.e. the slope of the total cost curve. These differences are reported in Table 6.8.
The marginal cost at the median level of coverage in the case study dataset is over 25
times the equivalent value for the financial dataset. The higher value of the marginal
costs in the case study data is likely to be attributable to the different shape of the cost
function as well as the nature of the data, as these data also include the costs incurred
at the funding and management agency level associated with training, monitoring and
evaluation and contractual management. Analysis of the subsets of the financial data
show marginal costs of the vulnerable group are higher on average than for the non-
vulnerable group.
Table 6.8: Predicted marginal and average costs (Indian Rupees (INR» and economies of
scale index at the median and interquartile range's values of coverage
Sample AP Vulnerable Non Case
financial group only vulnerable studies
data subset group
subset
Marginal cost, INR
Median 14.26 25.48 9.97 227.06
25th percentile 13.00 23.71 10.84 334.58
75th percentile 15.40 19.74 12.27 450.01
Average cost, INR
Median [161.43 333.42 128.02 824.28
25th percentile 305.64 495.98 173.42 769.60
75th percentile 107.94 187.38 72.40 766.93
Economies of scale index ---
Median 21.29 19.61 17.38 3.39
25th percentile 12.40 14.06 11.82 2.48
75th percentile 7.01 9.51 5.90 1.71
In addition to differences across the datasets, Table 6.8 shows how for each dataset
the marginal cost varies across levels of coverage within each dataset. For the
financial dataset (median coverage = 3,927) the marginal costs are INR 14.26, INR 13
and INR 15.4 at the median, zs" percentile and 75th percentile of coverage,
respectively (see Table 6.8), indicating that marginal costs first fall and then rise with
increases in coverage. The relationship between marginal cost and coverage also
varies across the subsets of the financial dataset. Marginal cost falls from INR 23.71 at
the 25th percentile of coverage to INR 19.74 at the 75th percentile for the vulnerable
group subset (median coverage = 1970). whereas it rises from INR 10.84 at the 25th
percentile to INR12.27 at the 75th percentile of coverage for the non-vulnerable group
subssr (median coverage = 5071).
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The plots of predicted marginal costs against coverage for the financial dataset and its
subsets are given in Figure 6.1. They indicate that marginal costs increase over the
range of coverage for the entire sample and the non-vulnerable group subset. Over
the narrower range of coverage reached by the vulnerable group projects, the marginal
costs appear to remain relatively constant.
For the case studies (median coverage = 1,174 people reached), the marginal cost
falls and then rises as coverage increases with the marginal cost being INR 334, INR
227 and INR 450 at the 25th percentile, median and 75th percentile of coverage,
respectively (see Table 6.8 and Figure 6.2).
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Figure 6.1: Average and marginal cost INA, for the AP financial dataset.
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Figure 6.2: Predicted marginal and average cost, INR for the case study data
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6.5.3.4. Average cost
Figure 6.1 also describes the shape of the predicted and actual average cost curves for
the financial dataset and its subsets of data. These average cost curves are close in
both shape and values, further confirming that the model is a good fit. The average
costs decline at a decreasing rate over the range of coverage but do not reach a
minimum for any of the financial datasets. Nor does the marginal cost curve cross the
average cost curve. For the complete dataset, the minimum value for the predicted
average cost within the range of coverage is INR 37.4, whereas the maximum value
predicted for the marginal cost is INR 25.4. The equivalent values for the vulnerable
group are INR 33 and INR 104 and for the non-vulnerable group are INR 21 and INR
37, respectively.
In the case study sample, the average cost first falls and then rises. Again the
predicted average cost curve compares well with the actual average cost curve. The
minimum value for average cost is INR 594 and the maximum value for marginal cost
is INR 770. In other words, there is some minimum efficient scale of operation for
commercial sex worker projects, at around 1750 people reached.
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6.5.3.5. Economies of scale
The index for economies of scale is greater than 1 for all the datasets across the
interquartile range of coverage (see Table 6.8). This means there are economies of
scale to be taken advantage of in the project implementation that are not exhausted
Over the Observed output range. The shape of the average cost curve and the fall in
the economies of scale index as coverage increases also suggest that as coverage
increases the projects are moving towards greater scale efficiency (see Figure 6.1 and
Table 6.8).
Although the coverage range included in the case studies is within the coverage range
of the financial dataset, an examination of the predicted average cost curve for the
case study data in Figure 6.2 indicates that economies of scale are exhausted within
this range. However, due to the differences in the nature of the cost data, the indices
of economies of scale cannot be compared between the AP financial and case study
datasets.
6.5.3.6. Impact of non-scale factors on cost
The regression analyses also show that the case study costs vary with location and the
target group. For the case studies, the coefficient on the state dummy is negative and
significant (p=0.045), implying that project costs are 28% lower in Tamil Nadu than
Andhra Pradesh.
In the analyses of the AP financial dataset and its subset, including the target group
dummies provides for better fit models than if these variables were excluded (see
Table 6.6). The coefficient on vulnerable group is significant at 95% (p=0.0220),
indicating that the vulnerable group interventions are 11% higher in total cost than the
"non-vulnerable" group interventions, a finding supported by the sub-dataset analysis of
economies of scale and average cost, above.
Of the dummies for target group in the vulnerable group dataset only the coefficient on
men who have sex with men is significant. The coefficients on the dummies suggest
that the interventions for men who have sex with men and for street children are lower
cost (35% (p = 0.001) and 11% (p = 0.275), respectively) than those for commercial
sex workers. Finally, the "non-vulnerable" group trucker projects are 6% higher in total
cost than the slum dweller projects, although this is not significant (p = 0.423).
Price also has a positive and significant relationship with total cost across the datasets
and sub datasets. The cost elasticity is 0.17 for the case study data set (p = 0.017) and
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0.48 for the financial data set (p <0.001). Costs are therefore price inelastic so that in
the financial dataset a 1% increase in price leads to a rise in costs of 0.48%.
6.6. Discussion
The econometric analysis presented here has used two different sets of data to explore
how the costs of HIV prevention interventions change with coverage and the potential
influence of other contextual factors on the cost function. The extension of the case
study cost analysis allowed the exploration of hypotheses developed earlier in the
thesis. At the same time. the larger sample permitted a more powerful analysis of the
question of scale and. therefore. also the influence of the nature of the target group and
other contextual factors. including contractual history. on costs. Results generated
from the two sets of data are similar. supporting the findings of Chapter 5 that average
costs change with scale of operation and that at low levels of coverage there are scale
efficiencies to be exploited. At higher levels of coverage. the model based on the
financial dataset finds that these economies of scale are not exhausted, whereas the
model based on the case study data identifies a point of minimum efficient scale
beyond which average costs start to rise again.
The findings also suggest that variations both in price levels and the target group are
key factors in shaping cost whereas the influence of funding source. age of the project,
and institutional history were found to have no significant influence. In other words,
there are differences in costs across the targeted interventions associated with scale,
local prices and target group variations. The design of contracts for implementing
these projects needs to take account of these variations.
Differences between the target groups are an important influence on cost, changing the
intercept in the relationship between cost and coverage. The difference in costs
associated with the respective dummy variable is therefore linked to the level of fixed
costs of the project. Including the dummy variable that classifies the projects between
the major target group groupings in the model revealed that the total cost of vulnerable
group projects was on average 11% higher than for the non-vulnerable group. One
reason for this is that it is likely to be harder to reach the more isolated and
marginalized groups requiring greater investment in building trust with the target
Community at the start of the project. Similarly, the lower cost of the MSM projects
relative to CSW projects (35%) may be a result of institutional structure that affects the
ease of access to the respective population groups. These projects are contracted out
to civil society organizations which derive from existing MSM networks rather than
NGOs that are normally recruited for the targeted interventions and often have no prior
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experience of the vulnerable groups they are contracted to work with. A more complex
econometric model would be required to evaluate whether there are changes in
marginal cost too and this has not been explored here.
In the analysis of the case studies in Chapter 5. funding agency was found to be an
important factor influencing average costs. Here. the model including funding agency
was rejected as not the best fit model (Adjusted R2 = 0.7887, p< 0.001). However.
using this rejected model on the case study data i.e. with the agency dummy variables
while excluding the state dummy variable. finds that the total costs of the TN SACS and
CAPACS projects are 54% (p = 0.021) and 47% (p = 0.043) less than the APSACS
projects. respectively. This confirms that there is a major difference in the production
costs between the funding agencies.
Although these data represent the first of their kind in HIV prevention. in terms of
standardized datasets in a single country setting. they do have limitations. The quality
of the case study data has been discussed elsewhere (see Chapter 5). The financial
dataset is subject to the flaws of much accounting cost data including mis-reporting and
false claims. This is most likely to affect the proportion of spending on individual line
items rather than total cost as projects are likely to adhere to the overall budget. In
both cases the datasets are cross-sectional, excluding any possible time effects on the
cost from the model e.g. lagged cost or lagged coverage, and leading to a possible
bias in results. However. longitudinal data were not available as a result of the
organizational changes that the programme had undergone.
A further limitation relates to the budgetary guidelines for targeted interventions issued
by the National AIDS Control Programme. These budgetary guidelines, which were
under revision at the time of completing the fieldwork, provide the State AIDS Societies
and their contractual partner with advice on the types and number of personnel and
activities a project should include and the budgetary allocation for each of these items.
They also provide an estimated average cost per target group member reached to
enable planning at the state and national levels (National AIDS Control Organisation,
2000a). Guidelines for the budget setting process can restrict flexibility. As a result
costs may in fact be deterministic. If this is the case, it could be argued that a
stochastic method for deriving marginal cost is in fact inappropriate. However, the
state AIDS control societies were established to allow for flexible management and to
recognise that the design of targeted projects depends "on the context and
environment in which the vulnerable population lives" (YouandAIDS: the HIV/AIDS
POrtal for South and North-East Asia, 2002a). Furthermore, in Andhra Pradesh the
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budget setting process involves consultation with the NGO and consideration of the
project activities in previous years and, in both states, the individual budgets granted
bear little resemblance to the budget guidelines (see Chapter 5). Therefore it is
believed that there is sufficient variation among projects to warrant the econometric
approach.
The results from the financial and case study datasets are striking for both their
similarities and differences. In spite of the differences in the nature of the data and
how they were collected, the best fit functional form is almost identical across the two
datasets. However, there is a major variation in the results generated from the two
datasets in the form of the relative difference between the measures of marginal cost.
The difference in the coefficients on coverage in the regressions, i.e. the proportionate
change in cost associated with an additional person reached, results in the steeper
marginal cost curve generated from the case study data. This difference in the slopes
of the marginal cost curves could arise from a number of different factors. First. the
range of coverage in the financial dataset (675-24,111 people reached) is far greater
than in the case study dataset (250-2008 CSWs reached). However, the case study
dataset's range of coverage falls within that of the financial dataset. In effect these
data represent a subset of the vulnerable group subset of the financial dataset, rather
than a different interval along the total cost curve.
Second, there are differences in the variable definitions across the datasets. The
financial dataset includes expenditures as reported by the NGOs to the TRU and
therefore does not include inputs made at other levels of the targeted intervention
programme or any inputs that are not provided for under the APSACS NGO budget.
The economic costing used in the case studies incorporates the value of volunteer
time, the value of all inputs no matter the funding source and the inputs of training,
monitoring and supervision and management made by the funding or management
agency. As they reach the limit of their capacity, it is likely that it is these largely fixed
costs. associated with infrastructure and development. which lead to the riSing average
costs at larger scales of coverage seen in the case study data. This has important
implications for the marginal cost and whether a project is able to continue to take
advantage of economies of scale as coverage increases. The higher average costs
may also reflect the fact it is harder to reach more CSWs beyond the limit of the
population within a specific geographical location.
Third. the difference in definitions may imply that the functional form for the case
studies does not in fact coincide with that for the datasets. The more ambiguous
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results of the Ramsey RESET test indicate that it is possible that either higher order
terms or interactions of the dummies with output have been omitted from the model.
However. persistent problems with multi-collinearity across linear. squared and cubic
terms do not permit stable estimation of the model with higher order terms and the
small sample sizes do not allow for the large numbers of explanatory variables required
for the interaction of terms.
There are no studies of the impact of scale on the costs of targeted interventions with
which to compare the results presented here. Work carried out by Kumaranayake et al
(2000) using cost data from a range of HIV/AIDS prevention and care programmes find
a V-shaped average cost curve and that projects are likely to encounter diseconomies
of scale arising from infrastructural barriers as coverage increases (Kumaranayake and
Watts. 2000d). On the other hand. results from the larger financial dataset presented
here suggest that there are continuing economies of scale with increases in coverage.
The analyses of the case study data. however. serve to reinforce the more general
findings of a U shaped average cost curve and identify a point of minimum efficient
scale. This contrast in findings regarding scale of the projects between the two
datasets and the confirmation of the influence of contextual factors. including price and
target group variation. underline the importance of using full economic costing and an
understanding of a project's context. in the analysis of cost functions. estimating
resource requirements and for planning and contract design.
6.7. Conclus/on
This chapter has presented the estimation of a cost function for HIV prevention
services using two data sets. The analysis is based on techniques used for the
estimation of hospital cost functions allowing for a flexible functional form. The findings
indicate that there are economies of scale to be exploited as coverage of the projects is
increased. The case study dataset of commercial sex worker interventions identifies a
point of minimum efficient scale, beyond which average costs begin to increase.
whereas the financial dataset suggest that average costs continue to faU at a
decreasing rate over the range of coverage for the entire set of projects reaching the
different high risk groups. The results also show that not only is scale important in
influencing average cost but so are local price variations and the nature of the target
group the project is focusing on. The combination of a large standardized data set and
econometric techniques has provided for greater insights into how costs change with
Coverage and the key factors that influence the total costs of targeted HIV prevention
services. The analysis demonstrates the importance of understanding the nature of the
cost function in designing project contracts. selecting efficient levels of coverage for
195
these protects. constructing their respective budgets and for estimating resource
requirements for scaling up coverage of HIV prevention projects.
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Chapter 7. Transaction cost analysis of contracting
out HIV prevention services to NGOs in Southern
India
7. 1. Introduction
An understanding of both production costs and transaction costs is required to assess
gains or losses in efficiency associated with a particular strategy for delivering HIV
prevention services. Chapters 5 and 6 have explored the production costs of HIV
prevention services for high risk groups in Southern India. The mapping analysis
(Chapter 4) identified a range of different governance arrangements for scaling up HIV
prevention services in Southern India. In order to understand the economic
implications of these different approaches, the objective of this chapter is to identify
and analyse the transaction costs of different governance arrangements for scaling up
targeted HIV prevention projects by contracting with NGOs in three Government of
India supported programmes in Southern India.
7.2. Background
The governance of health service contracts, in the form of the processes and systems
with which they are managed, is likely to have an important influence on their costs and
effectiveness. Government contracting for health services is increasing throughout the
developing world as a mechanism to increase efficiency and coverage (Oliveira-Cruz,
Hanson et al., 2003; Liu, Hotchkiss et at., 2004; Loevinsohn and Harding. 2004;
Loevinsohn and Harding. 2005).
The rationale for the contracting out of HIV prevention services in India arises in part
from the size of the problem:
"It has been acknowledged by NACO (National AIDS Control Organisation) that NGOs
(Non-Governmental Organisations) ... are necessary and complementary actors on
this stage, as this is beyond the realm of either the Union or State Governments to
consider tackling this problem alone': National AIDS Control Programme (NACP)
Country Scenario Update (December 1995, p34) cited in (National AIDS Control
Organisation. Undated-a).
In addition. it forms part of a move by the Government of India (GOI) and donor
community towards New Public Management initiatives in the health sector which
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involve moving away from the bureaucratic models of activity and expenditure control
inherited from a colonial era (Bennett and Muraleedharan. 2000). Delivery by the
government health system implies the characteristic internalisation of decision-making
in the form of bureaucratic employment. controls and planning. According to
Williamson's framework (see Chapter 2). this is a transaction cost minimising solution
to governance of exchange where bounded rationality makes contract specification
difficult; and relational contracting is undermined by the combination of asset specificity
and opportunism. However. in India. the extent of central control in the health sector
has been shown to have slowed decision-making and action (Bennett and
Muraleedharan. 2000) and often resulted in failures in either the system to deliver as
planned or policy that did not meet need (Das Gupta. Khaleghian et al., 2003;
Varatharajan.2003). In spite of a concern regarding the limited capacity of government
to manage contracts (Bennett and Mills. 1998). evaluations of such initiatives in
Cambodia. Bangladesh and Central America have shown positive results in terms of
improved equity. efficiency and transparency (Abramson. 2000; Abramson. 2001;
Bhushan. Keller et al., 2002; Loevinsohn. 2002; Jack. 2003; Soeters and Griffiths.
2003; Loevinsohn and Harding. 2005). In their analysis of contracting with NGOs for
HIV/AIDS services in Brazil and Guatemala. Barnett et al. (2001) found increased
security. the improved accountability. speed and coordination as the four main reasons
for contracting with NGOs within in the national HIV/AIDS strategy (Barnett. Connor et
al., 2001).
Targeted interventions (Tis) are perceived as the most effective strategy for halting the
spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in its nascent stage (World Bank, 1997). The
Government of India has chosen to scale up these targeted HIV prevention efforts by
contracting out services to NGOs. where little HIV/AIDS related activity existed before
(Bennett and Muraleedharan, 2000). NGOs are seen as particularly appropriate for
accessing high risk groups who are most likely to be marginalised and least able to
access public health services (Solomon. Chakraborty et al., 2004). As described in
Chapter 4, the central government has decentralised the HIV/AIDS programme to the
state, and in some cases municipal level, and implementation to corresponding State
or Municipal AIDS Control Societies (SACS/ MACS). The SACS are then responsible
for contracting NGOs to implement the targeted HIV prevention projects according to a
set of guidelines issued by the National AIDS Control Organisation (NACO) (National
AIDS Control Organisation, 2004b). However. the combination of the SACS' autonomy
and presence of different donors in each state has led to the evolution of at least three
contracting models for HIV prevention services (see Chapter 4). Two of these are
implemented with funds channelled through the SACS: direct contracting by the SACS
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(the national model); and employment of an intermediary to recruit, manage, monitor,
evaluate and provide technical support to the NGOs (the OFIO model) (see Figure 7.1)
on behalf of the SACS. The USAID model is not considered here having been dropped
from the sample (see Chapter 3).
Figure 7.1: Contractual units within the organizational structure for the national (contract
model A) and DFIO (contract model 8) models of delivery of NGO targeted HIV prevention
proJects In India.
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Scaling up, from the SACS perspective, entails increasing coverage of the target group
either through expansion of target group coverage by a project within a limited
geographical setting or replicating projects in new geographical areas. As each project
is dependent on close ties with a particular community, it is perceived to have certain
geographical limits. Consequently, to reach the next community(ies), the SACS need
to increase the number of projects by recruiting new NGOs or contracting an existing
contractual partner to establish an additional project(s). By 2004, the National AIDS
Oontrol Programme had established 993 contracts NGOs for the delivery of these HIV
prevention projects (National AIDS Control Organisation, 2004a). In spite of these
large numbers and variations in contracting models across states and different funding
sources, there has been no analysis of the contracting models to identify the most
effective mechanism for managing the NGO contracts.
7.3. Theoretical framework
As Chapter 2 describes, transaction costs are defined as the costs of tnction in the
contracting process (Williamson, 1983). Transaction costs and associated
governance are shaped by the presence or not of bounded rationality and uncertainty;
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opportunism and asset specificity. The frequency of the transaction and the
institutional environment also serve to further influence the transaction costs
(Williamson, 1983; Williamson, 1996; Ashton, 1998; Palmer, 2000; Allen, 2002).
Assuming profit-maximisation, different organisational structures are established to
minimise the transaction costs (Williamson, 1983). Where transactions are costless
governance by the market and discrete spot contracts would be expected (as assumed
in the neoclassical model). As the cost of transactions rises, incentives to remove the
transactions from the market are created. With this move towards the internal
organisation of transactions or hierarchical governance, the role of the price
mechanism in resource allocation is reduced and the organisation itself becomes the
locus of control (Cease, 1937; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).
Applying this framework to the case of HIV prevention in India. there are five key
factors likely to affect the transaction costs and governance of contracts at increased
scale of activity. First. the monitoring of HIV prevention projects for vulnerable groups
such as commercial sex workers is unusually problematic. Data on the impact of an
HIV prevention intervention is rarely available as it requires expensive epidemiological
trials or mathematical modelling (Merson. Dayton et al., 2000; Grassly. Garnett et al.,
2002). Even if these data were available the impact would be difficult to attribute to a
specific project given the dynamics of the target populations and their sexual partners
and the possible presence of other HIV prevention activities in the same locality.
Equally. monitoring of projects that depend on the NGO's close relationship with the
target community can be undermined if access to the population is therefore controlled
by the NGO. Second. as scale increases. in the form of numbers of contracts.
monitoring becomes more difficult due to the increased volume of activity. This
compounds the problems of bounded rationality and other information problems.
opening up possibilities for opportunistic behaviour. Third. asset specific investments
are inherent in the contracting process due to the need to establish NGO-funding
agency relations and the capacity development component required in the establishing
of the contract and the project. And. fourth. more contracts imply more asset specific
investments along with their associated opportunity costs. Together these factors are
likely to lead to what Williamson terms "serious contractual difficulties" where more
hierarchical forms of governance are likely to evolve to minimise transaction costs
(Williamson. 1987).
A fifth factor is also likely to affect the transaction costs of scaling up. The Williamson
framework was developed to examine behaviour and governance in industry and has
therefore. for the most part. been applied in the context of profit maximising firms.
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More recently. the framework has been used to provide useful insight into the
transaction cost implications of the contracting out of public services. In seeking to
maximise profit. cost minimisation and therefore transaction cost minimisation forms a
part of a firm's objectives. In the context of contracting out services to NGOs the
subjects of analysis may have different objective functions to a profit-maximising firm.
The funding agency is a public sector purchasing body which may be assumed to be
seeking to improve welfare in the form of controlling the HIV epidemic. Cost
minimisation is not in contradiction to a welfare maximising objective. Indeed a welfare
maxi miser would seek to operate with optimal efficiency leading to cost minimising
behaviour in line with a profit maximising firm. In this case. it is likely that the agency
would seek the transaction cost minimising solution to governance of the contracts.
However, a lack of incentives in the public and not-far-profit sector means that cost
minimising behaviour may not hold for these funding agencies (Mansley. Dunet et al.,
2002). Alternative motivations for the public sector might include output maximising.
maximising prestige. non-maximising (satisficing) or budget maximising (Barnum and
Kutzin. 1993a). There is little evidence to suggest which is the most appropriate
objective to attach to the HIV prevention funding agencies in India. If cost minimisation
does not form part of the objectives. the governance of NGO programmes may not be
transaction cost minimising. As a result organisational structures are likely to develop in
alternative ways and result in forms different to the market or hierarchical governance
structures anticipated by the Williamson framework.
As shown in Chapter 4 and Figure 7.1. alternative forms of governance of NGO
contracts exist in India as a result of structures imposed by the government and
different donors on the SACS. A number of Indian states have introduced another
managerial layer by contracting out the management of the NGO contracts. This
arrangement is in apparent contrast to the theoretical prediction of internalisation of
transactions in addressing problems of bounded rationality and opportunism. These
states could therefore be seen to be increasing the transaction costs of delivering HIV
prevention activities. However. these costs need to be weighed against the
counterfactual costs of internalising transactions achieved through direct delivery or, as
is the case in other Indian states. the management of NGO contracts by the SACS
itself.
Using qualitative methods. this chapter describes two different approaches to the
governance of scaled up NGO contracting programmes and their transaction cost
characteristics according to the Williamson framework. In so doing it attempts to test
the theoretical proposition that. in the case of publicly financed health services.
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although behaviours are not necessarily aligned with profit-maximisation, more
hierarchical forms of governance are still better able to cope with serious contractual
diHiculties and the complexities of contracting with large numbers.
7.4. Methods
7.4.1. Methodological framework
Transaction cost economics first departs from a neoclassical framework in that it is no
longer assumed that the transaction is frictionless and therefore costless. A second
departure lies in the focus and methods of analysis. As individuals are no longer
assumed to be guided only by the price mechanism, organisations and their patterns of
behaviour, rather than the individual, become the focus of analysis (Coast, 1999).
Furthermore, the non-explicit nature of some transaction costs and the need to
understand the transaction characteristics, including patterns of institutional behaviour
and the institutional environment, mean that quantitative analyses alone fail to capture
the transaction cost problem. The sources of evidence used to identify these patterns
and assess the validity of theories are necessarily diHerent from the individual level
quantitative data usually used in standard neoclassical economic analysis (Coast,
1999). As a result, qualitative research methods using case studies, semi-structured
interviews, focus group discussions and survey of documents have been frequently
applied in studies hoping to gain a greater understanding of transaction costs (Masten,
Meehan et al., 1991; Ashton, 1998; Allen, 2002; Palmer and Mills, 2003).
In general, qualitative research depends on inductive reasoning to generate
hypotheses from the data (Thorne, 2000). However, deductive approaches that start
with an idea and use data to test a hypothesis are also acknowledged to have a role in
qualitative research, in particular in looking for evidence on theories generated
inductively (Dingwall, Murphy et al., 1998). This chapter uses a deductive approach to
examine whether the governance implications of variations in transaction cost patterns
suggested by Williamson (1983) hold for contracting out HIV prevention services
(Williamson, 1983). Following Mays and Pope (2005), the paper assumes a "subtle
realist" approach Le. that in spite of the subjectivity of research, there is some
underlying reality, independent of the researcher, that can be identified through the
research process (Mays and Pope, 2000; Fulop, Allen et al., 2001). A combination of
semi-structured interviews and document review are used to obtain information
regarding case studies, purposively selected to represent and describe different
contracting models.
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7.4.2. Sampling
Two Indian states. Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. were selected according to HIV
prevalence (1% or higher). number of targeted HIV prevention projects funded by the
government (greater than 40), variations in contracting models and agreement to
participate (see Table 7.1). At the time fieldwork for the study was undertaken. Tamil
Nadu had three government supported targeted HIV prevention programmes running in
parallel: Tamil Nadu State AIDS Control Society (TNSACS), Chennai Corporation
AIDS Prevention and Control Society (CAPACS) and Voluntary Health Services' (VHS)
AIDS Prevention and Control programme (APAC). APAC is being implemented by a
large NGO with direct support from the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) and in coordination with the National and State AIDS
programmes. However. it was excluded from the analysis as USAID denied
permission to visit and interview the NGOs (see Chapter 3). TNSACS and CAPACS
contract directly with the NGOs, managing the relationship from within the organisation.
In Andhra Pradesh, the Andhra Pradesh State AIDS Control Society (APSACS) is the
government agency responsible for contracting NGOs to deliver targeted HIV
prevention projects. APSACS follows contract model B (see Figure 7.1), employing an
intermediary. the Technical Resource Unit (TRU), to manage the NGO contracts.
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Table 7.1: Description of the State AIDS Control Societies' Targeted Intervention
Programmes In Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu and the NGO Case Studies, 2002
Programmes Merging of DFID & APSACS
programmes (2001)
Intermediary carries out
contract management, technical
support and monitoring and
evaluation on behalf of
APSACS2
101
TNSACS; CAPACS; USAID
APAC5
Direct contracting with NGOs
Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu
Method of contracting
Number of NGO
targeted HIV
prevention projects
Of which sex worker
oroiects:
Si-lateral donor
No. of case studies
Of which sex worker
projects:
Average Age of NGO,
years (range)
Average years
experience with HIV
(range)
Average annual
expenditure of NGO
tl •
INR (range)
Average no. of staff" in
NGO (range)
Number of NGOs with
FCRA' certificates
TNSACS-65,
APAC-31
CAPACS-7,
18 TNSACS-21,
APAC-6
CAPACS-2,
DFIDl USAID5
TNSACS - 5, CAPACS - 211
9 TNSACS - 4, CAPACS - 2
18 (5-89) 19 (6-38)
5 (3-14) 7 (4-12)
2,420,160
(224,800-105.372.462)
3.862,403
(700,000-45,784,404)
26 (10-477) 43 (8-176)
10 5
Department ollnternaltOnal Development (UK); -Andhra Pradesh State AIDS Control Society; Tamil Nadu State AIDS
Control Society; "Chennai Corporation AIDS Prevention and Control Society; 'United States Agency for International
~evelopmentlunded AIDS Prevention and Controt project (not Included In anatysis): "N.Slor Tamil Nadu;
.Government Issued certificate which allows NGO to receive foreign funds
For each contracting model, a further case study approach was used to collect data on
the transaction costs of contracting from the NGO perspective. Commercial sex worker
(CSW) projects were selected from the range of different projects, to control for
production technology and to strengthen comparative analyses (see section 3.4.1). For
CAPACS. TNSACS and APSACS. 2. 4 and 9 CSW projects. respectively. were
selected from the mapping study (see Chapter 4 and Table 7.1). Where possible,
prOjects were selected in consultation with the funding agency to represent a range of
project history, levels of capacity and experience and location. At TNSACS. these
selection criteria failed as many of the NGOs chosen did not respond to our request.
As a result. interviews were held with those NGOs available and willing to participate.
At CAPACS. the only 2 CSW projects functioning at the time of our census were
selected. In addition. to see how transaction costs varied across projects for other
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target groups. 2 non CSW projects were included in the analysis. As a result of these
selection procedures. there were some differences in the characteristics of the case
study NGOs from those in the overall sampling frame described in chapter 4. In the
case of Tamil Nadu. the characteristics of the NGOs included in the case study had on
average lower overall expenditures and staff numbers but more experience than those
that made up the sampling frame (see Table 4.6. p. 111and Table 7.1). In the case of
Andhra Pradesh, the case study NGOs had on average lower overall expenditures and
numbers of staff, were older but had less HIV experience than the sampling frame
average (see Table 4.9, p.114 andTable 7.1).
7.4.3. Data collection
Data Sources included both semi-structured interviews and document review, as
described in Chapter 3. Interviews were carried out between December 2002 and
May 2003 following an interview guide (see Appendix 8) by the author and one
research assistant. The material covered the time period from June 2001 to April 2003.
7.4.4. Analytical approach
Based on the theoretical construct described in sections 2.7.2 and 7.3, the transaction
costs of the contracting out of services to NGOs can be analysed by examining five
areas of influence: asset specificity; bounded rationality and other information related
problems; opportunism; the institutional environment; and the level of output or scale
(see Figure 7.2).
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Figure 7.2: Analytical framework for the analysis of the transaction costs of contracting
out publicly financed services.
Opportunism
Level of
corruption
practised by
both parties to
the contract
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specificity
InformatIonal
problems
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Information
flows
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environment
Nature of
relationship
between
contracting
parties.
Competition;
Techruco!
capacity.
Uncertainty-----
Transaction Costs
Level of
Outputl Scale
Evidence of these different aspects of transaction costs was extracted from interview
transcripts and documents. First, the different institutional environments and
contracting processes were documented. Key themes, related to the transaction costs
of contracting with NGOs, were then identified using a transaction cost economics
theoretical framework (i.e. asset specificity, bounded rationality and other informational
problems, uncertainty, opportunism and the institutional environment), documents and
the interview data (see Appendix 16). The qualitative data were then manually
classified according to those themes. Important themes were identified through
triangulation of data, in the form of issues raised by more than one source. Where data
Sources appeared to contradict the theory or each other, these contradictions were re-
assessed in light of the context of the data source. Comparisons of the themes were
then made across the contracting models.
A first draft of the findings was circulated around the research team and two key
informants, who agreed to read the document. for review. The author's findings were
corroborated by the research team. However, in spite of follow up, the key informants
never returned comments on the document.
The following section describes the results of the qualitative analysis. Sources are
given in brackets (KI-key informant). Where possible quotes are used to underline the
key themes identified. However these are not used extensively for two reasons: first,
due to the limitations in the English of some of the interviewees; and second, where
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interview notes were used these did not necessarily capture the exact phrases of the
interviewee. The section first describes the contracting processes under review. Next.
it explores the institutional environment and uncertainty in the contracting systems and
their impact on the ability to implement effective contracts. It then goes on to analyse
the transaction costs of the two models by characterising them according to the level of
asset specificity and how they address informational problems and opportunism as
they scaled up within their local contexts. Finally. the analysis explores the ability of
the respective governance structures to overcome the transaction cost problems
identified.
7.5. Results
7.5.1. The contracting process
7.5.1.1. The general model as guided by the National AIDS
Control Programme
NGOs are recruited to SACS programmes through an advertisement in the local
newspaper (see Appendix 17). The NGOs submit proposals and are short-listed on the
basis of a set of explicit criteria. an on-site appraisal and evaluation by a team of
experts. Once a shortlist has been drawn up. the Technical Advisory Committee
(TAC). conSisting of technical advisors of the SACS and the NGO members of the
Executive Committee of the SACS make the final NGO selection (National AIDS
Control Organisation. 2004b).
The project contracts are legal documents signed by the SACS and NGO appointed
project directors'J. The contract commits the NGO to implementing the project
according to their project proposal and on condition of following the financial reporting
requirements. Nothing is stated in the contracts as to what penalties would be imposed
if there were a breach of contract. nor what entails a contract breach. Given the
relatively new nature of the HIV/AIDS problem and the low level of awareness even
within the NGO community. technical and managerial capacity was weak at the outset
of the SACS programmes (National AIDS Control Organisation. Undated-a).
Investment in capacity development. in the form of training. monitoring and experience
sharing. is thus a core part of the NGO programme.
13
Contractual agreements fall under the Indian Contract Act of 1872. see for example:
hUD:J/WWWdvakllo01.cOm/bareaCIs/iOdlaocootractacViod;aocootractaCl.htmI. accessed 211dOctober. 2006
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The HIV prevention project design is largely shaped by guidelines issued by NACO
(National AIDS Control Organisation. 2000a). The SACS have closely adhered to
these structures. in spite of directives from NACO stating that these are to be used with
flexibility (Lenton. Hawkins et al., 2003). As well as addressing capacity weaknesses.
the prescriptive approach leads to uniformity and so simplifies the appraisal of
proposals and monitoring of the projects. Due to the inherent difficulties of measuring
HIV prevention project impact. NACO requirements focus on quantitative monitoring
indicators which reflect the outputs of the projects corresponding to the proiect's
components: condom promotion; behaviour change communication; STI treatmenU
referral; and creating an enabling environment for the project (see Appendix 18). In
addition to this the monitoring system comprises financial reporting. submission of
monthly and quarterly technical reports. a twice yearly visit from a team of experts who
complete a standard reporting format and the submission of an end of year report. The
NGOs also attend experience sharing workshops. All three of the contracting
programmes have undergone third party evaluations between 2002 and 2003 (Dalal
Mott MacDonald Pvt Ltd. 2002; Sexual Health Resource Centre. 2003)
Grants are released directly to the SACS/MACS by NACO for the NGO projects and
other activities according to approved annual action plans. The SACS/MACS in turn
remit quarterly expenditure statements to NACO. Funds are then released to the
NGOs between two and tour times per year. depending on the contracting model,
Subject to their submission of the NGOs tinancial and technical monitoring reports
requirements. The NGO contracts are renewed annually on condition of meeting
monitoring requirements as well as the submission at a proposal and budget.
7.5.1.2. Contract model A: direct contracting In Tamil Nadu
(see also Figure 7.1)
NGOs in Tamil Nadu have been engaged in HIV/AIDS longer than in any other state
(see section 4.3.1.1). The tirst AIDS case was identified in Chennai in 1986 and a core
group of NGOs took up both advocacy and programme activities in the late eighties
through their existing links with key vulnerable groups. Tamil Nadu State AIDS Control
Society (TNSACS) was also the first of the SACS. Established in 1996, it increased the
number of NGOs contracted by the state programme from 17 in 1994-5 to over 100 in
1997/8 (Seshadri. 2003a). There was no historical evidence to provide an indication of
the number of NGOs bidding to win the contracts in the original contract rounds.
Having been documented as a model of best practice in terms of ability to spend and
scaling up the number of NGO contracts (Ramasundaram. Allaudin et al., 2001:
Seshadri, 2003b), the TN SACS programme model was exported around the country.
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However. the scale of the TNSACS programme itself was not sustained. Between
1999 and 2002. the number of NGOs supported had fallen to between 40 and 65
NGOs. each of them delivering a single project for this funding agency. Chennai
Corporation AIDS Prevention and Control Society (CAPACS) was established in 2001.
NGO contracting activities commenced in 2002, with the transfer of all Chennai based,
TNSACS funded NGOs to the CAPACS programme.
Once an NGO has been recruited and started implementation, claiming funding
instalments requires the submission of monthly reports for the NACO monitoring
system and a report from a monitoring team. consisting of volunteer experts from other
NGOs. Contract renewal takes place annually with the submission of a proposal for
the following year reviewed by a Technical Advisory Committee consisting of technical
advisors of the State AIDS Control Societies, the NGO members of the Executive
Committee of the State AIDS Control Societies and where possible, a member of
NACO would also be part of the selection committee (National AIDS Control
Organisation, 2004b). In the event that malpractice is perceived to have occurred,
government officials are sent to the NGOs to investigate (TNSACS). If the malpractice
is proved to have occurred the contract is stopped and the NGO is blacklisted.
TNSACS has provided 8 different training sessions, attended by 137 NGOs from 1999
to the end of the period of analysis. These are complemented by the experience
Sharing workshops, although these tend to be sporadic (NG016). There is no
uniformity of participation in training or workshops across the NGOs. A single NGO
advisor, with support from clerical staff, is responsible for receiving and processing the
mOnitoring and financial reports. Although a post is assigned for a monitoring and
evaluation officer. this post was still vacant at the end of the data collection period. The
SACS are therefore dependent on the staff of a core group of capable NGOs for
Carrying out both capacity development and monitoring for the NGO programme.
7.5.1.3. Contract model B: the management agency approach
In Andhra Pradesh (see also Figure 7.1)
The state of Andhra Pradesh has been receiving support for its HIV prevention
activities from a number of different sources since 1998. Prior to this, there was little
HIV prevention work in the state. In 2001. it was decided that all DFID (Department of
International Development, UK) bilateral support to the HIV/AIDS activities in the state
should be channelled through the SACS and the management of all NGO-SACS
contracts streamlined and contracted out to one agency, the Technical Resource Unit
(TAU). Hindu Latex Limited (HLL) was awarded the contract through a competitive
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tender and is paid a pre-agreed fixed annual overhead for the management of the TRU
Over three years (see Appendix 19). The TRU is governed by a project steering
committee which meets on a regular basis and comprises representatives from the
Technical Resource Unit. Hindu Latex limited. APSACS. the state Government. DFID
and NACO. DFID. however. has followed a hands oH approach and distanced itself
from the governance of the programme (Kls 1.5). The number of NGO contracts rose
from 23 in 1999 to 101 in 2002. all delivering a single project for APSACS. except for
one which has the responsibility for two projects. Interviews with the TRU revealed that
there was a significant competition for these contracts when the work was first initiated.
with Over 1000 applications made. However. during the second round NGOs were
selected from the shortlist made in the first round of recruitment.
The TRU employs a team of full-time experts outside standard government
employment conditions. implying higher salaries and the freedom to hire and fire
personnel. The TRU's budget also allows for the recruitment of additional agencies to
provide further technical support for research. planning and development of
educational materials. subject to the approval of APSACS. allowing the programme to
draw in extra expertise in a timely manner. As well as providing flexibility. the TRU is a
third party to the transaction and therefore able to lobby APSACS on behalf of the
NGOs. if necessary. while also increasing transparency in NGO recruitment decisions.
The TRU is intrinsically involved in the contract design and renewal process. Once
recruited the NGOs are invited to participate in proposal development workshops and
trained in carrying out needs assessment surveys. The proposals are subsequently
revised in consultation with the TRU. Contract renewal is a consultative process and
again the TRU provides direction in activities. target setting and budgeting. Written
guidelines in financial management have also been provided to the NGOs to support
the contracting process.
The TRU has provided a higher quantity of training sessions than in Tamil Nadu, with
greater uniformity across the NGOs. In 2001/02 alone they trained 57 batches of NGO
staff, covering 13 technical areas (see Appendix 20). Monitoring visits are also used as
a capacity development exercises. The technical team at the TRU processes the NGO
reports and provides monitoring and supervision through visits to the NGOs as well as
drawing in monitoring expertise from outside where necessary. If malpractice comes to
light in Andhra Pradesh, APSACS requests an investigation which is carried out by the
TRU. During the investigation the project is suspended and does not receive funds.
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Most of the investigations are initiated as a result of anonymous letters or phone calls
to APSACS (TRU).
7.5.2. Transaction cost characteristics at the state level
7.5.2.1. The Institutional environment and uncertainty
The process of document review and interviews revealed that a number of factors
related to the institutional environment and uncertainty in the management of the
contracts constrain and facilitate the ability of the SACS to contract effectively with
NGOs and adhere to a contracting model. The key factors are described below and
include endemic corruption in India which increases the level of distrust in contractual
relations. uncertainty. in the form of funding delays. and the level of capacity. Identified
examples and the impact of corruption and funding delays are also summarised in
Table 7.2.
Distrust between the contracting partners
First. contracting takes place in an environment in which there is already significant
distrust between NGOs and corruption is well known (Bennett and Mills. 1998;
Transparency International. 2002; Oas Gupta. Khaleghian et al., 2003). This distrust
appears to be exacerbated in the SACS programmes and manifest in both the reports
of opportunism in the interviews for this study and an imbalance in the contractual
relationship. Corruption appears to be an endemic problem. It is present both at the
funding agency and NGO levels, comprising bribery. staff exploitation. mis-reporting
and the funding of non-existent projects. As can be seen in Table 7.2, these practices
have led to an effective reduction in expenditures and therefore activities. a poor
reflection of actual activities in monitoring reports. a skewed distribution of budgetary
allocations and further mis-reporting.
The imbalance in the relationship between the NGOs and their funding agencies was
also evident from discussions with the interviewees. The NGOs do not feel they have
many rights within the contract, although the contractual document is signed by both
parties (NGOs 9, 14, 18; TNSACS).
"It is a one-sided document. except to counter-sign the bond. .. there is nothing legal
we can do if they do not deliver .... (we are) powerless in a legal sense to fight funding
delaYS"(NG014)
"They can't ask questions - that is the government system "(TNSACS).
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Table 7.2: Level and Impact of funding delays and corruption on the Implementation of
the HIV prevention projects
c
,Qa
:J.......o
U
Mis-direction of funds (NGO 6)
Under-appointment and under-payment of
staff for whom full salaries are claimed (KI :
TAU: NGOs 9,10)
Mis-reporting of activities (NGOs 6,9,10):
mis-use of STI drug and travel allowances
(NGO 10: TAU)
Staff and target group exploitation (NGO 9:
TAU)
Bribing of government officials and
management agency staff (TNSACS; Kls
1,3,4; NGOs 8,10,14,16,17)
Projects tunded but not in existence
(research team observation)
Impact on implementationLevel of problem
Effective reductions in expenditure on
activities
Monitoring does not reflect reality and
therefore inability to identify gaps in
services
Activity levels lower than reported and
funded
Encourages NGOs to mis-report in order
to demonstrate they have met targets
Larger budgets awarded to those NGOs
willing to pay bribes rather than those
with greatest need
-
Funding delay of approximately 11 days
per NGO (Sexual Health Aesource Centre,
2003)
3 case studies experienced delays on 7
different expected releases over 4 years,
ranging from a tew days 10 8 months (TAU
planning survey data - see Appendix 21)
NGOs not reporting delays in quantitative
form complained that were always delays
(NGOs 6, 14,9, 12)
Without being able to plan for the funds
NGOs borrow or spend from their
reserves (NGOs 5,8,9,10,14,16),
NGO budgets are squeezed (NGOs
5,9,19),
Cannot pay salaries (NGOs
11,15,17,18: K12)
Layoff staff or close the project (NGO
17).
Heighten the level of distrust between
NGOs and the government.
Delays In funds
Second, the funds released by NACO to the SACS rarely meet the budget that they
have approved and fund releases are regularly delayed (KI 5; APSACS). This leads to
delays in the release of funds to the NGOs (see Table 7.2). In turn this results in an
inability to plan. in drawing on reserves, the inability to pay salaries. project closures,
and an increased level of distrust between the NGOs and their funders. The cause of
these delays relates to both the expenditure ceiling of the Government of India's 10th
Expenditure Plan and capacity limitations at NACO (KI5), Funding delays are further
exacerbated by inadequate resources. financial. human and technical. at the NGO and
SACS,
Frequency of contracting
Third, NACO guidelines recommend that administrative approval should be given for 3
years. In practice the contracts are renewed on an annual basis (NGOs 6. 13. 14. 17;
KI2). This serves to increase uncertainty and. coupled with the persistent funding
delays, limits the ability to plan over the longer term.
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"The planning would be different without the bread there I cannot plan to cut if"'
(NGG 15)
Capacity
Finally. technical capacity. in the form of skilled personnel. or lack of it. at the SACS
level has been vital in shaping the programmes in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. At
CAPACS. decision-making was constrained by political influence over-riding technical
inputs in the budgeting setting process (NGGs 13. 14) and during a single year there
were tour changes of director. This has limited the ability of the SACS/MACS to reach
full capacity (CAPACS; NGOs 13. 14). evident in the decision-making processes:
"They (the CAPACS technical advisory committee) check the credibility of the proposal
then recommend. But it was not so seriously done. It didn 1give us the impression they
had applied tne« minds at slt" (NGG 14)
Similarly. TNSACS directors have remained in post for periods of up to 12 months.
weakening the ability to develop and sustain capacity. The changing capacity at this
level has also had important impact on the contracting model. The first TNSACS
director developed the "best practice" SACS by ensuring the clean up of corrupt
systems. instituting transparent financial and activity monitoring systems and so
facilitating fund absorption (NGOs 6.14; KI 1) (Ramasundaram. Allaudin et al., 2001).
The NGOs showed a great deal of respect for TNSACS during the period of this
directorship. They expressed disappointment in the subsequent leaders and their
frequent changes. stating that programme quality had declined considerably (KI 1;
NGOs 6. 14. 16):
"In 1995/6 X came to be PO (TNSACS director) - then only they set up system and
structure. he changed it" (NGG6)
"Now (2002) corruption has come back in" (Kit)
In contrast. in Andhra Pradesh. there has been continuity of the SACS directors. The
tormer director at APSACS was in post tor a period at 2 years. The time allowed for
learning and innovation: he appointed technical project officers to work with the NGO
advisor and worked with DFID to merge the NGO programmes and recruit the TRU.
The director in place throughout this study has been in post for over 2 years, also
allowing for learning and a sense of ownership (KI 5).
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Empty or inadequately filled staH posts also delay programme activities and reduce
technical capacity. TNSACS and CAPACS have suHered from empty staH posts and
mixed quality of personnel. At TNSACS. the NGOs describe mixed experiences with
the NGO advisors (NGOs 6, 14. 16), who are crucial to the smooth functioning of the
programme. In particular they expressed a complete loss in faith in the current post
hOlder:
"t don't know what his (current NGO advisor) constraints are" (NGO 16)
At CAPACS. the post of NGO advisor had yet to be filled: although an appointment was
made during the time of the study, the individual only remained in post for a few
months. Similarly, although the TRU in Andhra Pradhesh are better technically
resourced and have managed to fill critical NGO programme management posts, a
large under-spend in the first year of activity can be partially attributed to the 6 month
absence of a Team Leader (TRU).
Technical, financial and management skills are required to ensure eHective monitoring
and overcome the constraints of the institutional environment such as fund flow
problems, short term perspectives in planning and corrupt practices. In Andhra
Pradesh continuity has led to capacity development and the facilitating of NGO
partnerships, reducing the distrust between the contractual parties. The apparent lack
of capacity within the SACS has contributed to weakness in the contractual governance
and continued distrust within the Tamil Nadu programmes at the time of the study.
7.5.2.2. Asset specificity associated with targeted HIV
prevention projects
Where asset specificity is present, barriers to entry and exit in the contract are created
and so the problems of bounded rationality and opportunism are exacerbated. The
investment in partnership with the NGOs, the capacity development and the
establishing of NGO-target community links are all asset specific investments in the
HIV prevention service contract. The development of funder-NGO partnerships and
capacity are both associated with opportunity costs if the contract is terminated.
Therefore the funder has an interest in maintaining these contracts. The dependence
on the NGOs is evident in both states, although the investment in training, contact time
with the NGOs and the development of partnerships with the NGOs vary across the
programmes. In Andhra Pradesh, it has led to falling competitiveness in the NGO
sector: the second round of NGO recruitment did not involve re-advertisement but a
return to the original shortlist of NGO applicants; and, more recently, under the TRU,
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when a need for re-focusing some of the less successful projects was identified, rather
than terminate contracts and re-advertise. the existing NGO partners had their projects
re-designed. TNSACS presented a genuine concern that the NGOs might seek
funding from other sources:
"If they (NGOs) have FCRA certificate (registered to receive foreign funds) they will go
elsewhere" (TNSACS)
If the NGO loses the contract, there is a real possibility of securing funding from
elsewhere given the current momentum in HIV programme funding in India. On the
other hand, there are also opportunity costs of losing the contract, associated with:
lasing the status of implementing a government supported project; seeking funding
elsewhere; and funding gaps that may mean they lose the trust of the communities with
whom they work.
7.5.2.3. Informational problems and opportunism
With the funding agencies tied into the contractual relationship, they require
mechanisms to ensure that NGOs deliver according to plan. Informational problems
are inherent in the system: as noted above. the monitoring of the impact of HIV
prevention projects is problematic. This is compounded by the limited ability of external
evaluators to communicate with marginalised groups such as commercial sex workers,
access to whom maybe dependent on the NGOs themselves. and by limited capacity in
HIV/AIDS programming, financial management and reporting. Transaction cost theory
predicts that these will be the underlying causes of contractual difficulties. The ability
of the contracting programme to deal with these informational problems is likely to be
key to its success. yet. in spite of the central guidelines, how the systems meet this
challenge and their success in doing so differs considerably across the two states.
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Tamil Nadu
The monitoring system in Tamil Nadu is seen as particularly weak (Dalal Mott
MacDonald Pvt ltd. 2002). Document review of monitoring records at TNSACS for this
research found it impossible to track activity and financial reports: there were
inconsistent sets of data across NGOs; and complete sets of reports were not available
for the majority of NGOs. Quality of the projects is also unknown (Comptroller and
Auditor General of India. 2004). External evaluations for Tamil Nadu did not capture
quality and NGOs report that queries from TNSACS focus on the financial rather than
the technical (NGOs 6.8). Other problems in the system include: lack of feedback
from the monitoring teams to the NGOs (NGOs 6.8.19); insufficient resources for NGO
Supervision (Kls 6. 7); mis-reporting of outputs and activities (TNSACS; NGO 6); and
Potential bias in the monitoring team who are all staff from "competitor" NGOs (other
NGOs in contractual partnership with the SACS/MACS) (NGOs 6. 8). In addition. one
key informant criticised TNSACS for simplifying its financial monitoring system.
Although the former system had caused delays. it had screened out misspending of up
to £1 million over three years. Nevertheless. in spite of concerns regarding corrupt
practices. TN SACS had blacklisted only one NGO since 1996.
One NGO had strong feelings about TNSACS monitoring:
..There is no monitoring system" (NGO 6).
Andhra Pradesh
In contrast, in Andhra Pradesh. the NGOs perceive the monitoring in the APSACS
programme as a strength and a vital part of the contracting system (NGOs 2,9), placing
importance on its capacity building aspects (NGOs 8,18,19), in spite of the quantitative
emphasis (NGOs 9,10,12) and the time required (NGOs 2.15) .
.,The monitoring system is best; it allows us to make rectifications ... it may be time
conSuming but it will improve and support our work' (NGO 18)
The NGOs also place importance on their relationship with the TRU and APSACS:
..Transparency is there; .... anything we will discuss; .... Ours (relationship) is informa/-
we are friends .... " (NGO 2)
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"APSACS is a good donor .... providing to the NGOs funds and guidance and training"
(NGO 5)
In Andhra Pradesh it appears that the TRU, as a third party, is able to make NGO
recruitment and evaluation more transparent (KI 5). Facilitating this transparency are
the experience sharing workshops where incidence of NGO staff exploitation were
uncovered. It appears better able to overcome opportunistic behaviour:
"Can't give (external evaluators) bribes - the NGOs don't know them" (NGO 8)
"There is very little corruption in the TRU programme (In other government funded
programmes) those people they directly ask for money' (NGO 2)
By mid 2003, the TRU had completed investigations on 9 NGOs and 5 projects had
been terminated. In addition, the TRU has used its flexibility to remove their staff when
found to be involved in bribery (Kll).
7.5.3. Governance arrangements for scaling up
The key features influencing the transaction costs of the different models are
summarised in Table 7.3. In both contracting models, the funding agency is found to
be in a "hold up" situation where the investment in capacity development and
establishing of a contract makes them reliant on their contractual partners. However,
evidently, the methods used to manage the large numbers of NGO contracts,
informational problems and opportunistic behaviour diverge,
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T,a~le 7.3: Transaction cost characteristics of contracting for HIV prevention services In
nd.a
General contracting
model
Contracting model A
TNSACSiCAPACS
B
Asset
specificity
Associated with
investments in capacity
development, NGO links
with community, NGO-
funding agency
partnership
Bounded
rationality
Inability to measure
Impact; Emphasis on
quantitative indicators of
output process
Opportunism Traditional barrier of
distrust between NGO
and government;
Endemic corruption in
India
Dependency on core of
technically competent
NGOs; limited and varied
inputs to training for
NGOs
Monitoring system is
weak; Simplified financial
reporting procedures;
External evaluation for all
NGOs completing 3 years
of funding; Issues of
technical quality not
addressed.
Opportunism persists at
NGO & SACS level;
simplification of financial
procedures leads to
further exploitation; only 1
NGO roect sto ed.
Uniform capacity
development:
supervision,
consultative project
design and monitoring
process strengthens
NGOITAU relations
Monitoring and
supervision by team
ensures TAU
knowledge of
programme
implementation
Opportunism persists
but identified and
penalised - 5 NGOs
have had projects
terminated; removal of
im licated staff
Tamil Nadu (contract model A)
At TNSACS the high costs of funding delays and contractual frequency led to the
streamlining of financial and other monitoring requirements- Under the conditions of
dependence of the funder on the funded, the degree of NGO autonomy and the
distance between the NGOs identified in the analysis, Transaction Cost Economics
predicts that contract model A, implemented by TNSACS and CAPACS, will operate
within a relational type governance structure. However, it appears that this structure's
ability to implement the current programme size is limited with the number of NGO
Contracts falling during the current phase of the programme. Observations suggest
that TNSACS simply had too many projects to carry out the intensive monitoring
required (NGO 6; KI 2). Funding delays persist, problems with meeting monitoring
requirements are evident and capacity development has not been adequately realised
(NGO 6, 16, 14). Added to this, the contracting programme continues to be
undermined by opportunism (see Table 7.2).
Andhra Pradesh (contract model B)
By providing for greater operational independence and flexibility in recruiting technical
expertise, the management agency model is able to deliver more NGO projects and
scale up the number of contracts faster (Soni and Jani, 2001). APSACS used the
management agency mechanism to implement the scale up of its NGO programme.
218
The TAU plays a directive role in project design and budgeting. All NGOs receive
training in both technical and managerial aspects of the programme. Capacity
development inputs have led to strong ties between NGOs and with the management
agency. accountability and clarity in the project methods. with one NGO comparing the
structure to a company (NGO 15). A technical team strengthens the NGO links with
the management agency in a way that the single NGO advisor at TNSACS is not able
to achieve.
With the merging of the management structure and as the number of NGOs managed
by a single structure has increased. some NGOs have found the contractual process
declining in quality:
"With the large number of NGOs now monitoring is not really happening; loose ends
are there and misuse" (NG09)
"Now the NGOs are more the capacity development is less; slowly it has come down. It
is happemng but less than compared to before" (NG02)
In spite of these problems encountered by the NGOs and persistent opportunistic
behaviour. it is evident that the TAU and APSACS still maintain considerable control
over the design and implementation of the individual projects and are able to reduce
corrupt practices (KI 1), This greater control and closer relations between the NGOs
and the management structure in contract model A implies that the organisation of the
contracts is more integrated and tends towards a more hierarchical form of
governance.
7.6. Discussion
The analysis presented here explores the transaction cost characteristics of two
mOdels for contracting out HIV prevention services in India and how closely these
relate to transaction cost theory as described by Williamson (1987) (Williamson, 1987).
Using a deductive qualitative approach, based on a combination of document review
and semi-structured interviews and supported by the research team's observations, the
analysis shows how transaction costs for these complex contracts appear to be
reduced by more hierarchical governance of the NGOs. Paradoxically, however, due
to the inflexibility of the Government of India bureaucracy, this form of integration could
only be achieved through contracting out the management of the NGO contracts.
The Williamson framework was developed for analyses of the private sector and
assumes profit maximising behaviour. However, previous analyses in the public sector
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that build on the Williamson framework have shown that asset specificity. bounded
rationality and opportunism are still important factors to consider in the process of
contract design (Ashton. 1998; Palmer and Mills. 2000; Allen. 2002). In the context of
contracting out HIV prevention services in India. where government contracts with not-
for-profit organisations. the same factors apply. HIV prevention services are difficult to
monitor creating informational problems. There is a need for considerable asset-
Specific investment in training. monitoring and supervision associated with establishing
the programme. In addition. the HIV prevention programme in India is plagued with
uncertainty arising from fund management and opportunism. According to the theory.
the combination of these factors all point towards "serious contractual difficulties" and
the need for more hierarchical forms of governance. At the same time contracting out
of HIV prevention services by the government was a deliberate move away from the
hierarchical Government of India bureaucracy in the search for efficiency.
The hierarchical form of governance as described by Williamson (see section 2.7.2.1)
is not immediately apparent in either of the contractual models under observation in
this study. Evidence from both states demonstrates how comprehensive contracting
has not been feasible given the combination of bounded rationality and opportunism
inherent in the nature of the services combined with the features of the local context
and contract design. In Tamil Nadu the SACS reduced the demands on the monitoring
system to minimise delays, depends on a core of technically competent NGOs to help
roll out the programme and has taken a bottom up approach to planning and to
contract management (see Table 4.5, p.29). A more relational style contract has
therefore been seen to evolve. The NGOs have freedom to implement their respective
project designs and penalties against project mis-management are limited. In addition.
the level of technical resources and commitment available at the funding agency has
further constrained the ability to effectively manage the contracts. As a result,
opportunism and funding delays have persisted. there has been inadequate investment
in capacity development and the number of NGO contracts has declined. Without
major change in the contracting system and renewed commitment in the form of
resources. the success of this relational contracting is determined by the extent to
which opportunistic behaviour of both parties continues.
In Andhra Pradesh. APSACS contracted out NGO contract management to a third
party. In the context of the profit-maximising firm or well-performing bureaucracy. this
would represent an even greater step away from hierarchical forms of governance.
However. in this case of limited capacity within the SACS and distrust between
contractual partners the opooslte appears to be true. An alternative form of
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governance that combines contracting out with hierarchy has been imposed on the
contractual relationship. By creating an opportunity for flexibility in management and
through the increased availability of resources. the process of contracting out has led to
greater direction in project design. stronger capacity development. investment in NGO
partnerships and direct supervision. As a result the governance of the contracts has
become more rather than less hierarchical. This hybrid form of hierarchical
governance appears to be better able to cope with the informational problems and
opportunism identified in the contracting models as well as the scaling up of the NGO
programme.
It could be argued that the improved ability to manage the contracts associated with the
management agency is a result of absolute funding levels rather than the governance
arrangements and their ability to minimise transaction costs. Evidence from Tamil
Nadu suggests the contrary where. in spite of the budget increasing from INA 40
million to INA 64 million. TNSACS expenditure on the targeted intervention programme
feU from INA 55 million in 1999/2000 to 26.5 INA million in 2002103. This implies that
the problems do not lie in resource constraints but rather in ability to spend. Although
comparable figures are not available in Andhra Pradesh. due to the changing
management structures over the period of analysis. it can be inferred that financial
costs are necessarily higher with a management agency than without. The thesis
findings suggest that these extra costs have helped to offset the opportunity costs of
weak monitoring systems. poor technical and financial reporting capacity. NGO distrust
of government (and vice versa) and opportunism. even increasing the ability to spend
and scale up.
Several limitations to the analysis need to be noted. First. the qualitative nature of the
study does not facilitate a direct comparison of the two models and it is not possible to
identify on an absolute basis which contracting model has minimised transaction costs.
Instead. the study aims to identify the nature of those transaction costs and. through
analysis of the qualitative information gathered. ascertain which contractual model is
more successful in scaling up NGO contracting. Second. the documentation sourced
for the study was mixed in quality. There were conflicting figures on expenditures.
Coverage and number of NGO contracts given in different documents and it was often
difficult to discern the reality. Where there was doubt. figures that are reported to
NACO were used. However, this level of uncertainty in reporting only served to
underline some of the findings regarding the informational problems. With regards to
the interviews, many of the NGOs perceived that we came from their funding agencies,
in spite of explanations that we were not, and their answers could have been shaped
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by this perception. In addition. the differences between Indian English and British
English complicated the explanation of some issues. possibly leading to
misunderstandings or misinterpretation. Further. not all interviews were taped.
Although the notes of the interviewer and the research assistant present were cross-
checked against each other. it is recognised that there can be flaws in note taking and
they can be more prone to greater subjectivity than taped and transcribed interviews.
A final limitation relates to the sample. APAC has a high profile and as such is
perceived as an important model for the implementation of NGO HIV prevention
prOjects. Without an understanding of the transaction costs in this system of
governance. it is possible that the study misses an important component of HIV
prevention activities in Southern India. However. the APAC model is funded by USAID
and operates relatively independently of government. It is questionable whether this is
a model that the Government of India could replicate in other states. On the other
hand both contract models A and B are managed and funded through government
channels. The lessons learnt from the analysis of transaction costs in these two
models are therefore more likely to be relevant to government supported programmes
in other states than those learnt from a model such as APAC.
As investment in HIV prevention continues and the SACS programmes evolve. the
contracting models have important lessons for the next phase of the National AIDS
Control Programme as well as to other South Asian countries. where similar NGO
contracting programmes are being supported by the World Bank (e.g. Bangladesh and
Pakistan). Policy lessons derived from the analysis are threefold. Firstly. contracting
out the management of the NGO contracts is a method that can be used to overcome
the informational problems associated with the service itself as well as the bureaucratic
COnstraints observed in the SACS. Second. transaction costs might be reduced and
project quality improved by re-designing the financial procedures to enable longer term
planning, while retaining an incentive for NGOs to perform. Third. an important factor
in minimising transaction costs is strong positive relationships between the NGOs and
their funder or management agency indicating that where two or more projects
implemented by a single NGO are funded by the same agency. technical and
managerial skills and the investment in partnership building can be shared across the
prOjects. In other words. increasing the number of projects a single NGO implements
has potential for increasing returns to the transaction costs. However. in nearly all
cases across the 993 contracts with NGOs in the National AIDS Control Programme.
each NGO implements no more than one project for their respective SACS
programme. Scaling up by these programmes would benefit from identifying NGOs
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that could implement more than one project for the funding agency. Indeed. visits to
India atter the completion of the data collection suggest that the SACS are now
exploring the possibility of increasing the number of projects implemented by existing
contracted NGOs as well as contracting further NGOs.
As well as the important policy lessons. the analysis has shown that the transaction
cost economics framework provides a useful tool in helping to understand the nature of
contractual relations in the public as well as the private sector. It contirms that even
where profit maximisation is not the motivating behaviour of contractual parties, more
hierarchical forms of governance are better able to cope with contracting in large
numbers. However, the provision of targeted HIV prevention projects in India also
requires overcoming problems associated with public sector bureaucracies normally
associated with hierarchical governance. As a result, in order to minimise transaction
costs, it appears that these services require different approaches to governance than
those predicted under the Williamson framework.
7.7. Conclusion
The application of the transaction cost framework to the situation of contracting out
public services to not-for-protit organisations has allowed the identification of key costs
assOciated with the governance of HlV prevention services through NGO contracts in
India. The analysis shows how a more hierarchical form of governance has evolved
within the network of the contract management agency and the NGOs. This has led to
greater transparency, improved flows of information and perceived quality, and limited
corrupt practices. In turn the reduction in opportunity costs of poor quality and leakage
arising from poorly managed transactions, in spite of higher financial costs, highlights
the importance of more hierarchical governance systems where there are "serious
contractual difficulties". It is unlikely that the SACS on its own, with its broader
responsibilities and limited autonomy can achieve the same ends. The management
agency approach therefore appears to be both transaction cost reducing and better
able to cope with the scale of these contracting programmes. The results presented
here indicate that in the case of public sector financing of HIV prevention services more
hierarchical contractual governance, in a hybrid form not anticipated by Williamson,
may be required in contracting out, in particular where there are a large number of
Contracts and opportunism is evident.
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Chapter 8. Discussion and conclusions
8. 1. The costs of scaling up HIVprevention Interventions
This thesis has examined supply side issues in the expansion of HIV prevention
services for vulnerable groups in Southern India where they have been contracting out
services to non-governmental organisations. In low income countries contracting out of
health services to the private (including not-for-profit) sector has been introduced as a
means to increase coverage and improve efficiency (Nieves. La Forgia et al., 2000;
Slack and Savedoff. 2001; Vladescu and Radulescu. 2002; Harding and Preker. 2003;
liu. Hotchkiss et al., 2004; Loevinsohn and Harding. 2004; Peters. Mirchandani et at.
2004; Loevinsohn and Harding. 2005). In India the rationale for working with the NGO
sector in HIV prevention has been driven by both these objectives (Bennett and
Muraleedharan. 2000; National AIDS Control Organisation, Undated-a). As a result of
different patterns of aid at the state level and the autonomy of State AIDS Control
Societies different methods for contracting out similar services to NGOs have evolved.
The size of the contracting programmes and the variations in contracting models in
Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu presented a unique opportunity to examine how
production and transaction costs vary with levels of coverage and the nature of the
organisational arrangements. This study was therefore the first to collect and analyse
a standardised set of cost data for a single HIV prevention activity from multiple sites.
The unique set of data allowed for the first statistical exploration of the factors affecting
costs of targeted HIV prevention projects. Further, the study is also the first to explore
the impact of transaction costs in the governance of HIV prevention programmes. It
therefore provides original insights into the nature of transaction costs in large scale
programmes for HIV prevention in India.
8.2. Overview of the findings
8.2.1. Production costs
The production cost analysis found extensive variation in total and average costs as
well as the cost structures of the individual projects. Scale, defined by both coverage
and volume (which were further defined as the outputs of the HIV prevention project),
was the leading factor in influencing the level of average cost. Accounting cost studies
in the health services literature suggest that there are falling average costs in primary
care (Creese, Srlyabbaya et al.. 1982; Robertson. Davis et al .• 1984; Over. 1986;
Berman, Brotowasisto et al., 1989; Robertson, HaJl et al .• 1992; Broomberg and Rees.
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1993a: Soucat, Levy-Bruhl et al., 1997: Jian, Jing-Jin et ai., 1998: Ensor. Ali et al.,
2003: Johns and Baltussen, 2004: Routh. Thwin et al., 2004: Terris-Prestholt.
Kumaranayake et al., 2005a). However. the results of this study show that average
costs fall over a limited range of coverage. up to between 1500 and 1800 commercial
sex Workers. At greater levels coverage average costs begin to rise again.
Unlike the review of accounting cost studies in Chapter 2. meta-analyses of
econometric analyses of health services have been inconclusive about the presence or
not of economies of scale (Barnum and Kutzin. 1993b: Barton. Bloor et at., 2004;
Goldman and Grossman 1983; Kass. 1987; Mansley, Dunet et al., 2002: Smet. 2002;
Wouters, 1993). Econometric analysis of both a set of NGO case studies and a larger
financial dataset of the costs of HIV prevention that are presented here find that the
index of economies of scale varies with the level of coverage and that average costs
are falling. However. the case study sample confirms the presence of a point of
minimum efficient scale whereas the analysis of the financial dataset finds that average
costs continue to fall within the coverage range of the sample.
Although hypothesised to have an impact on average costs. other factors including
production technology. scope. input prices. technical inefficiencies. context and the
timeframe have been less well-explored using econometric techniques (Barnum and
Kutzin. 1993b; Johns, Baltussen et al., 2003; Smet. 2002). This thesis explored a
number of these factors and found that age of the project. input prices and capacity
were not causes of variation in the total cost. On the other hand the state. funding
agency and context (as measured by the literacy level) were found to contribute to
variations in total costs. For project age. state and funding agency. these findings were
confirmed by both the case study analysis and econometric estimation of cost
functions. The cost function estimation also found that regional variations in prices and
the nature of the target group were significant causes of variation in total costs.
8.2.2. Transaction costs
In exploring the transaction costs of scaling up. scale was defined by the number of
NGO projects delivering services within each contracting model. In the profit
maximising world of the private sector. the attempt to minimise transaction costs or the
perception of transaction costs leads to different organisational forms (Williamson.
1987). The nature of transaction costs is shaped by the level of bounded rationality,
oPPOrtunism and asset specificity associated with a transaction (Williamson. 1987) (see
P.62). HIV prevention services are inherently difficult to monitor, contracting out for
HIV prevention services in low income settings requires a considerable degree of
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capacity development to ensure fulfilment of contractual obligations and corruption is
widely reported in the Indian public services. According to the theory. this combination
of factors would lead to "serious contractual difficulties" and bureaucratic forms of
organisation to overcome some of these difficulties. However. bureaucratic delays and
lack of capacity in the government sector has been one of the factors leading to
contracting out HIV prevention services in India (Bennett and Muraleedharan. 2000).
By setting up semi-autonomous SACS. which act as purchasers of services. the NACP
intended to overcome some of the bureaucratic delays associated with the government
sector (Ramasundaram. Allaudin et al., 2001). The results presented here. however.
show that the limited capacity within the SACS only serves to exacerbate the
informational problems of contracting out HIV prevention services and has permitted
corrupt practices to continue among both SACS and NGO partners. The presence of
an agency to manage the NGO contracts. as implemented in contract model B (see
Figure 7.1, p.199). appears to help overcome some of these problems. In spite of
contracting out both the services and the management of the NGO contracts in Andhra
Pradesh a more hierarchical style of governance is in place.
Importantly. the hierarchical form of governance that has evolved within the network of
the contract management agency and the NGOs has led to greater transparency.
improved flows of information and perceived quality, and limited corrupt practices. By
seeming to control the opportunity costs of poor quality and leakage, the recruitment of
a management agency appears to be transaction cost reducing. However, the
Williamson framework implies that internalisation of the transactions would normally
OCcur to overcome such issues of bounded rationality. opportunism and asset
specificity (Williamson. 1987). As a result the analysis presents a paradox when
applying Williamson transaction cost framework in the public sector. Rather than a
classical hierarchical form of governance being in place to overcome contractual
difficulties, the management agency approach, i.e. contracting out the transactions.
appears better able to cope with the level of scale of these contracting programmes in
which over 50 NGOs hold individual contracts with the SACS and require capacity
development. monitoring and evaluation.
8.2.3. The full costs of scaling up
As stated in Chapter 2. an understanding of both production and transaction costs is
required to assess gains or losses in efficiency associated with changes in health
services. The analysis presented here shows that production and transaction costs
vary with scale of activity. The results filii a gap in the evidence base regarding the
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nature of the variation in total and average costs as such activities are expanded as
well as the efficiency of different approaches to contracting out used to increase
coverage. The thesis confirms the importance of the influence of scale on cost but that
this varies with the type of project. It also shows how contextual factors need to be
considered in the analysis of costs. in particular geographical location (input prices and
state). institutional arrangements (funding agency) and socioeconomic context
(literacy) .
Analytically it is difficult to consider production and transaction aspects of costs in
conjunction. The production costs. as defined in this thesis, can be measured
quantitatively. whereas transaction costs are non-quantifiable. A quantifiable
comparison between the different contractual models in the transaction cost analysis
can be made using the econometric techniques. Using the case study data it is
Possible to explore the impact of the funding agency on the production cost of the HIV
prevention project. A rejected model in Table 6.6 (p. 183) examined exactly this and
found that the total costs of the TNSACS. CAPACS and CCOOR prevention projects
were 35%, 11% and 13% lower than the APSACS projects. respectively. This result
may have arisen. in part. to differences in the quantifiable aspects of transaction costs.
for example the monitoring and supervision costs of the management agency.
However. it is important to note that this does not include the immeasurable costs of
governance such as corruption. mismanagement or weaknesses in quality. Indeed, in
the absence of final health outcome data, the qualitative analysis of transaction costs
indicates that it is questionable whether the lower production costs observed in the
TNSACS projects are a true reflection of more efficient services.
8.3. Limitations
8.3.1. Conceptual problems in measuring scale
The comparison of scale across different projects requires uniformity in the definition of
scale. Scale has been looked at from two different levels of the system reflecting the
nature of activities at these two levels and the goals of the national programme. In
exploring production costs scale is defined as the coverage of the project and the
VOlume of services provided at the NGO project level whereas in the transaction cost
analysis scale is defined as the number of contracts funded and managed at the
programme level. On the surface the definition of output measures at each level are
similar across the units of analysis. However. variations in production technology and
quality of services may imply that there is variation in how these outputs are actually
measured across the programmes and projects. Ideally. in looking at the allocative
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eHiciency of a programme, an outcome measure such as HIV infections averted
compares like with like and would provide an appropriate measure of output for both
levels of the system examined here. However, this is expensive and complicated to
measure, requiring randomised control trials and/or mathematical modelling (Merson.
Dayton et al., 2000; Grassly, Garnett et al., 2002). Furthermore, this outcome provides
a picture of the scale of the impact of a project or programme but does not measure
scale as in the size of the programme or volume of services in a manner that relates
directly to the production function of a programme.
So that the output indicators used in the thesis are similarly defined, only a limited set
of services were selected for analysis. Not only was the focus constrained to HIV
prevention projects for vulnerable groups but, within that, the case study analysis
focussed solely on projects for commercial sex workers. In addition, all these projects
operated under similar guidelines issued by the national programme which provide for
a specific staffing structure. As noted in Chapter 5. variations in the method of service
delivery persisted in particular in the method in which STI services were provided.
However, more subtle differences may also exist in the form, for example, of variations
in the quality of services provided. The cost implications for these variations and
whether these variations are systematic across the NGOs or are tied to, for example,
the funding agency, as suggested in Chapter 5, are areas for further research that
would facilitate the generalisation of these results.
8.3.2. Problems In access to data
The mapping survey provided detailed insights into the nature of HIV prevention
services and the range of funding agencies. The sampling frame was intended to
include the full range of contracting models as well as case study NGOs that fulfilled a
range of characteristics. Unfortunately without permission to access the USAID
supported Tami Nadu programme, APAC, an important component of HIV prevention
services was excluded. Without APAC included in the sample. the research
concentrated on those funding programmes that were implemented directly by the
SACS i.e. state government programmes. As a result. the research results contain
important lessons for the government response in India and other similarly structured
government-supported programmes outside India.
In addition to the exclusion of APAC. many NGOs were simply unreachable and we
were therefore unable to include them as part of the case study analysis. The reasons
behind their non-response were varied and most likely included unwillingness to
participate in the study. Willingness to participate may be associated with quality of the
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service delivery or information systems, in which case there is a possibility of some
bias in the results. In particular, the exclusion of the APAC NGOs is likely to have led
to a downward bias on costs given APAC's higher budgets (see Chapter 4). In certain
cases, as confirmed by two different key informants, some of the NGOs did not exist
and were fronts for their Executive Directors to receive funds. As such these non-
existent NGOs were relevant to the transaction cost analysis in that they revealed the
corruption and lack of accountability in the system.
8.3.3. Data availability and limitations In measuring and
analysing costs
The collection of full economic costs was more problematic than had originally been
predicted. Arising from a lack of records and the autonomous nature of the research,
access to the information on full economic costs including output measures was difficult
and time consuming to obtain. Unlike collecting cost data in a trial setting or as part of
operational research. the retrospective nature of cost data collection at operational
programmes is subject to these risks of missing information. In addition, although
permission might be granted. organisations may have been less than willing to reveal a
full picture of activities and costs particularly where they feel vulnerable to the changing
funding opportunities. This is exacerbated by the limited time of personnel, whose
priorities are project delivery. and where there are practices of corruption.
Where there are good information systems there will necessarily be better information
regarding project implementation. outputs and costs. As improved information systems
might be a reflection of better capacity, by limiting the analysis to projects where
information was accessible could have resulted in a bias in the results. Where there
were information gaps. the research team sought different strategies to fill the gaps
such as obtaining output data from centralised systems for collection of monitoring
information at the funding agency level. It was not possible. however, to prevent the
impact of corruption or mis-reporting and errors in reporting from entering into the
dataset where no other sources of data were available to facilitate cross-checking or
triangulation.
Further complicating the collection of cost data in both qualitative and quantitative form
were the dynamics of an operational programme. Activities are necessarily changing.
as the programme evolves and lessons are learned. Pinpointing a timeframe and
maintaining that timeframe consistently across NGOs and different programmes can
therefore become difficult. For example, if asked a question about how a programme
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was functioning two years ago. the respondent is likely to be influenced by the nature
of the programme today and how it has changed.
Poor quality monitoring systems and corruption have led to some weaknesses in the
accuracy of the data. To help resolve this. for the case studies. each HIV prevention
project was sent the cost analysis in draft format for their input and review of the data.
Although this could not overcome the problem of corruption, it helped to rectify
problems of mis-reporting or inaccuracies in the data. Similarly, reports on the
transaction cost analysis were sent to the funding and management agencies and key
informants for their comments. While each of the case studies returned the production
cost reports with their inputs and revisions, the funding and management agencies did
not respond to this request. presumably due to lack of time.
Each of the datasets used for the analysis of production costs had its advantages and
disadvantages. The case study data yielded a relatively small sample size which limits
the power of the statistical analysis. The financial data, collected in Andhra Pradesh,
provided a larger sample strengthening the econometric analysis. However, the
economic cost data collected from the case studies provide a more complete picture of
the costs of production, in particular in relation to the fixed costs of production. The
difference in the nature of the datasets limits the validity of the comparison of the cost
function which is illustrated by the different order of magnitude in the marginal costs.
However, consideration of the fixed costs of production have not been excluded from
the analysis of the financial dataset as many of these e.g. staff and rented office space,
are supported by the funding agency and reported in expenditure statements. The
dummy variables indicating which phase of recruitment the NGO falls also takes
account of some variations in fixed costs as these fixed costs are incurred by the
funding and management agencies and differences between these costs will be
observed only at this level. Both sets of data, however, are cross-sectional. This limits
the ability of the analysis to pick out the difference between the short term and long
term concepts of variable returns to scale and economies of scale, respectively. In
effect this implies that where differences in average cost are observed this maybe due
to differences in variable cost, for example re-training, when fixed costs remain
Constant (short term) or when production technologies change and both fixed and
variable costs are varied (long term). The rising costs beyond coverage levels of
around 1500-1800 CSWS in the case study sample maybe related to the fact that the
analysis has captured the short run cost curve and that once methods of production
have been adjusted to meet the requirements of larger scale projects, average costs
could fall again.
230
8.3.4. Non-quantifiable transaction costs
Obtaining the complete picture of transaction costs can often be undermined by the
difficulties in collecting the appropriate data. Given the impossibility of quantifying
transaction costs the thesis has used qualitative data to explore this aspect of costs. It
is therefore impossible to combine the qualitative transaction costs and quantitative
measurement of production costs to provide a single cost figure. The use of dummy
variables representing the different contracting models in non-parametric comparisons
in the case study and the cost function analyses were the only way of combining the
two forms of data to provide a comparative analysis (see section 8.2.3). However.
these are poor proxies as the variation in production costs observed in these analyses
fails to capture the actual transaction costs and therefore do not reflect the full picture.
8.4. Implications of the results
The findings of the thesis provide the first indication as to the shape of the cost function
for HIV prevention services. They therefore provide a new building block in the
evidence base tor policy and planning and. in particular, budgeting and institutional
design for large scale HIV prevention programmes. As indicated in Chapters 5 to 7.
the findings underline the importance of improved information for planning and contract
design in the areas of both production and transaction costs, and scale of activity,
whether defined by the number of contracts or projects or the level of coverage. Scale
matters when conSidering cost and efficiency. To raise coverage levels at the NGO
level requires more personnel time, more supplies and more supervision. The
observed fall in average costs as coverage rises indicates that the fixed costs are being
shared over an increasing range of outputs. The analysis of financial cost that
excludes the tixed costs incurred at the funding agency level implies that this may
Continue to high levels of coverage. However, when full economic costs are analysed
a point of minimum efficient scale is observed. Increasing coverage beyond this level
using the same production technology leads to a decline in efficiency. This may result
from the increasing difficulty in reaching the next commercial sex workers or the limits
of the eXisting investment in fixed cost. In the former case, in order to achieve full
Coverage, a project and its funding agency have to account and budget for the increase
in average costs as coverage goes beyond a certain level. In the latter case,
replication of the project with associated replications in fixed costs is likely to be a more
efficient means of achieving increased coverage levels than simply increasing
Coverage within the existing project infrastructure.
In the case of programme scale and increasing service delivery units, there is rising
complexity associated with setting up and managing increasing numbers of contracts.
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To achieve smooth-running NGO projects with minimal leakage and optimal quality
requires establishing strong, positive relations with NGOs, developing their capacity
and monitoring their activities. The hierarchical and top down approach to planning
and implementation that achieves this end in Andhra Pradesh can also be seen to
restrict the development and evolution of projects that might need to adapt to the needs
of a particular population, countering the ability of the NGOs to follow needs based
planning led by their constituencies. On the other hand, as the funding agencies
become more dependent on those NGOs whose capacity has developed with the
programme, the NGOs position in the contractual relationship becomes stronger and
they are likely to maintain greater influence over project design.
T0 sustain these hierarchical types of relationships requires an increase in total
resources with each new HIV prevention project contracted for. As the number of
contracts increases sharing the fixed costs of the funding or management agency over
increasing numbers of outputs leads to lower average costs. Potentially, in the case of
transaction costs, these can be further minimised by reducing the frequency of
contracting through longer contractual periods and getting given NGOs to implement
more prOjects to take advantage of trust and capacity already developed in existing
NGO partners.
Driven by a dearth of information regarding the costs and efficiency of HIV prevention
prOjects, this thesis set out to contribute to the evidence base on efficient ways to
expand HIV prevention services and to better understand how and why costs might
vary as activities are scaled up. Chapter 4 describes the response to the HIV epidemic
in India and highlights the importance of the NGO sector and targeted HIV prevention
services in the National Programme. Building the evidence to further develop this
programme as its coverage increases in the form of ensuring adequate and appropriate
funding levels and improving its governance is vital to prevent wastage of resources
and achieve the coverage goals. The thesis helps address the information gaps in the
National Programme by providing new and standardised data on costs of the delivery
of HIV prevention services and suggesting methods for contracting out, among the
eXisting models, that might be more efficient. The following sections summarise the,
implications for the National AIDS Control Programme, generaJisable policy
recommendations and areas for further research identified in the thesis.
B.S. Implications for the National AIDS Control Programme
Planning the delivery of HIV prevention services in India takes place among a multitude
of actors led by the National AIDS Control Organisation along with the health sector
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and a number of donors including the World Bank and DFID. This thesis has
implications for this planning process at both the sector policy and strategic
management and the service delivery levels for the contracting out of particular HIV
prevention services (see Table 2.3).
At the sector policy and strategic management level how the programme is governed is
key. As the size of the programme increases, its management is likely to become
more complex. The thesis provides evidence of funding delays, corruption and
resulting poor quality in the delivery of services when programmes operate at scale.
Adequate resources and changes in governance arrangements may be required to
cope with these increasing complexities. Recommendations to NACO and its donors
to address this issue, in the context of targeted HIV prevention projects, arising from
this research are to:
• Encourage alternative forms of contractual governance that facilitate scaling
up. Key features might include hierarchical control, while enabling flexibility,
and minimising corrupt practices associated with large bureaucracies.
Ensuring transparency and helping to minimise distrust through improving the
contractual partners' expectations of each other (see section 2.7.2.1), as
carried out by APSACS by introducing a third party contracting agency.
appears to be an eHective option for achieving this.
Identify and, if they exist, take advantage of likely economies of scale with
respect to the transaction costs through contracting with given NGOs to
implement more than one HIV prevention project.
Identify and, if they exist, take advantage of the economies of scale associated
with investment in planning and capacity development by increasing the
contractual period. Alongside an extension of the contractual period, it is likely
that the system of annual renewal of contracts could be improved with a more
transparent incentive based system dependent on third party evaluations and
alternative measures of performance.
•
•
The thesis did not explore the options of alternative forms of governance such as
delivery of services through the existing health system. However, in spite of the
weaknesses found in the contractual models, it is unlikely that the health system would
perform better. In contrast, contracting out was in fact a method used to avoid the
bureaucratic delays of the health system and to take advantage of the not-for-profit
sector's better ability to reach marginalised groups.
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At the programmatic level planning needs to take into account the scale at the level of
service delivery. in terms of service volume. as well as scale in terms of the number of
delivery units. The results from the case study analysis in Chapter 5 indicate that
relatively small scale commercial sex worker projects are more efficient than larger
scale ones with an optimal coverage of around 1500 to 1800. On the basis of this
implementation of CSW projects should be on a small scale of up to 1800 CSWs.
Chapter 6 and the financial cost data show that the optimal coverage for the HIV
prevention projects with other target groups is higher and increases with output. The
results from this analysis lead to recommendations of large scale targeted HIV
prevention projects for truckers. slum dwellers and other high-risk groups.
It is also good planning that an implementing agency takes account of these variations
in efficiency and ensures that the optimal level of efficiency is achieved given the
required coverage level. Planning to expand coverage therefore requires
understanding the cost function of services. It is recommended that NGO projects
have better access to information regarding the nature of the cost function and use this
information in the budgeting process.
The thesis found that information regarding the production and transaction costs of the
targeted HIV prevention projects was not available in India, so limiting the evidence
base with which effective planning can be carried out. NACO and its donors need to
support national level research on the costs of different HIV prevention programmes.
supported by adequate monitoring systems, to fill this information gap. Further data to
be COllected on a routine basis to feed into such research therefore might include:
• Information regarding economic costs, without which important contributions to
the programme may not be budgeted for and a full understanding of the cost
implications of different options are not obtained.
Key identifiable transaction costs of different options for governance of service
delivery.
Context specific information on the nature of the target population, its size and
accessibility, prices of inputs, in particular labour, and the level of capacity to
deliver HIV prevention services as well as manage project budgets and report
to a funding agency.
•
•
For targeted HIV prevention projects. this information could help identify the most
efficient level of coverage for a particular project and whether it is more efficient to
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increase coverage by reaching more people with the existing project or replicating the
project in a new location.
A further finding of the thesis is that corruption is a major problem in which all parties in
the contracting partnerships can be involved. It has led to wastage. seemingly poor
quality or non-functioning projects and has reduced the potential efficiency of HIV
prevention services. It is exacerbated by lack of trust between the contracting parties
and delays in funds which pressurise implementing partners to show results when
promised funds may not have been delivered. From the evidence presented in the
thesis it is apparent that transparency and accountability on both sides of the
contractual relationship between the SACS and the NGOs needs improvement and that
potentially this could be achieved by:
• Developing more positive style relationships between the contracting parties
with improved transparency and feedback to NGOs in the monitoring and
evaluation process.
Ensuring that the funding agencies are delivering on their obligations by making
funds available on time or planning for these funding gaps and assisting the
NGOs to do so.
•
These types of changes need reform at the level of the SACS and NGOs but also
support from NACO and its donors. in particular to ensure smooth and predictable
flows of funds.
8.6. Generalisability of results
The results of this thesis have the potential to provide useful lessons beyond both the
states in which the programmes operate to national and international HIV prevention
programmes, in particular where NGO contracts with government are an important
component. In spite of weaknesses in the study including the small sample size which
may not be wholly representative given the low response rate in the mapping survey.
the weakness in some of the cost data. and the exclusion of the APAC contractual
mOdel.as well as the location-specific nature of cost information and qualitative data.
there are a few important lessons that can be extrapolated beyond HIV prevention
programmes for commercial sex workers and India to other circumstances.
As supported by theories of production and transactions costs and existing empirical
evidence. scale impacts on both costs and contracting. As shown in the thesis.
production and transaction costs vary with scale. As a result budgeting and resource
requirement estimation need to take account of the planned scale of operation in terms
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of coverage level or the number of contracts or projects being implemented. as do
governance arrangements.
The variation in production costs implies that there are economies of scale to be taken
advantage of. at least over a limited range of coverage. in targeted HIV prevention
prOjects. However. the different results generated in the case study and the financial
dataset analyses (see Chapter 6) suggest that the shape of the cost function is not
generalisable across different types of targeted HIV prevention projects and highlights
the importance of service-specific cost and scale information.
The research findings indicate governance arrangements must be appropriate for the
scale of operation. In the case of HIV prevention services purchased by the public
sector. governance arrangements for contracting with large numbers may require
alternative forms of governance to those observed and noted in the transaction cost
economics literature. Where programmes involve large numbers of contracts
increased levels of resources and capacity are required to manage those contracts.
This includes investment in ensuring transparency with reliable information systems
and is likely to involve more formal and hierarchical forms of governance. In contrast
where a programme manages smaller numbers of contracts. this is more likely to be
able to operate effectively with relational contract structures that are more dependent
on trust.
8.7. Areas for further research
In exploring supply side issues in the expansion of HIV prevention services through
contracting out services to non-governmental organisations. this thesis has also
identified three major areas for further research that would deepen the understanding
of the costs of health services at different levels of operation.
Firstly. to see if these results are robust. further research on the nature of the
production and cost functions of HIV prevention services across the full range of
vulnerable groups targeted by these services as we" as for other forms of HIV
prevention is required. ideally using prospective data collection of economic cost and
production data. This needs to explore variations across different service delivery
models and their implications for quality. costs and efficiency.
Second. research on the response of different service providers and their funders to
different incentives inherent in the contracting mechanisms is required to develop low
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cost incentive systems that go further in ensuring quality and minimising corruption in
the contracting out of HIV prevention and health services to NGOs.
Finally, a deeper understanding into the state of corruption in contracting out is
required: how it works. what is the rationale behind it, what is the extent of its impact on
the HIV prevention programmes and identification of methods for minimising it.
As the HIV epidemic continues its global devastation, there is an urgent need for
scaling up of HIV prevention services. The coverage of HIV prevention programmes is
being expanded with a number of different strategies. Planning and resource
requirement estimation for these strategies relies on limited information regarding the
costs and governance arrangements. This thesis broadens the evidence base on the
costs of HIV prevention services. It presents an example from a specific context and
programme of how both production and transaction costs vary as HIV prevention
Coverage is increased and appropriate governance arrangements are important in
reducing waste resulting from poor quality services and leakage. The results underline
the importance of including production and transaction costs at different levels of scale
in the analysis of efficiency and cost function estimation. To make the best use of
resources, these informational inputs should be considered in the design of the scaling
up of HIV prevention services.
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New Deihl
Name Title Organisation
Mr Prasada Rao Project Director National AIDS Control
Mr Danikachalam
Organisation
NGO Advisor National AIDS Control
Organisation
DrSalii Joint Director. Monitoring National AIDS Control
& Evaluation Organisation
Neelam Kapur Joint Director National AIDS Control
Organisation
Navreet Kang Deputy Director Finance National AIDS Control
Organisation
Mr S. Ramasundaram Former Project Director Tamil Nadu State AIDS Control
Society
Dr Peter Heywood Population Health and World Bank. Delhi
Nutrition Advisor
Carol Squire Director Population Services International
Dr Thomas Philip Director Family Health International
Stella Manoharan Family Health International
Bethanne Moskov Head of Infectious USAID
Diseases Dept.
Mr Sanjay Kapur Project Manager. Office of USAID
Population. Health and
Nutrition
Dora Warren Consultant Centre for Disease Control
Tim Martineau Health Adviser Department for International
Development UK
Heiner Grosskurth - Population Council/LSHTM
David Miller Country Project Officer UNAIDS
Swarup Sarkar UNAIDS Inter Country Team
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Maharashtra
OrganisationName Title
Dr Alka Gogate,
Dr Minni Khetarpal
Mr Narveka
Lalita Mahajan
Mr Girase
Mr Vaiyadanathan
Rajeswari Balaji
Ravi Duggal
Binodh Mahanty
Vivek Diwan
Shilpa Merchant
Seema Shroff
Project Director
Jt Director STI
Deputy Director
NGO advisor (temp)
Financial controller
Director
Consultant
Monitoring and
Evaluation (ex NGO
advisor Maharashtra
State AIDS Control
Society)
Mumbai District AIDS Control Society
Mumbai District AIDS Control Society
Maharashtra State AIDS Control
Society
Maharashtra State AIDS Control
Society
Maharashtra State AIDS Control
Society
AVERT
CEHAT
CEHAT
Lawyer's Collective
Populational Services International,
Mumbai
Asha BMC
Tamil Nadu
Name Organisation
Dr. Bimal Charles
R. Christodas Gandhi
Sebastian Jayaraj
P. Krishnamurthy
Mr Pari
Mr Sampath
Dr Mono Rama
Mr Ramkumar
Mr Winsley Clement
Dr Chandramouli,
Dr Sucila Pandian
Mr Cletus
Mrs A. Murphy
Mrs Jaya Karupayee
Mr David Thiagarajan
Mr Hariharan
Dr. Ravi Raj Williams
Title
Director
Project Director
NGO adviser
Director (Ex-director
APAC/ ex-programme
officer at TNSACS)
Director
Director
Director
Project Coordinator
APAC
Tamil Nadu State AIDS Control
Society
Tamil Nadu State AIDS Control
Society
Dept. Public Health
Shantoshi Social Sciences Research
and Welfare Centre
VEEDO
CHES, Chennai
CSR. Nagercoil
Palmyrah Workers Association
Centre for Social Development.
Kanyakumari
CAST. Tirunelveli
SCAD Gramodyah
Teddy Trust. Madurai
Mercy Trust, Madurai
IMAGE. Madurai
ICWO. Chennai
Christian Council for Rural
Development and Research
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Andhra Pradesh
OrganisationName Title
Ms Rachel Chatterjee.
Ms Damayanthi
Brahma Prakash
PC Kasinath
Dr Shashikala
Sharavan Kumar
Roshan Kumar
G. Daniel Raju
KSL Chowdary
Venkatesa Rao
S.P. Reddy
Maheshwari
Principal Secretary Health
Project Director
Team Leader
Consultant - training
Project Coordinator
Zonal Monitoring Officer
Director
Project Coordinator
Project Director
Director
Executive Director
Project Coordinator
Andhra Pradesh State AIDS
Control Society
Technical Resource Unit
Technical Resource Unit
Technical Resource Unit
Technical Resource Unit
SEEDS - Social Educational and
Economic Development SOciety
SEEDS - Social Educational and
Economic Development Society
ARISE. Rajamundry
CHANGES. Kakinada
UMA Manovikasa Kendram
Lepra India
Karnataka
OrganisationName
Dr James Blanchard
Title
Consultant CIDA support to Karnataka State
AIDS Control Society and
Rajasthan State AIDS Control
Societ
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B E
T R Building. TIT (Madras)
hennai-600 036. Tamil adu
Tel: ()..W. 257 03.) ; Fax: OM 257 0559
x
The London 'ch( 0101' Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, in eollab ration with the oundation for
ustuinable D clopm 'nl (F ). at the Indian In iitute f Technol gy (Madra ), and under
funding fr m the Well' m ru ...t ( ). i Initiating a rear h proj et to anal ~ the re ource
rcquircm int f r venting up HN preventi n inter enti n...at the tare level in Tndia.
culing up targeted THV prevention acti itie ... ha ... been Identified a a priority by the ational
ro )1111'01 raunisuuon ( 'O) of India to halt the rising ineiden e of HTV. To en ...ure
adequate funding. planning for this requir :-.an timate of the re ources required l do so. The
study ill c amine thi .. by:
• d scribing J ll transmission patterns and current le el: of int r enti n c erage
calculating 'o~t~ of target d HIV pre ention intcrveruion-, in India
analy ..ing 11m tiles 'hang as activities are ..,.alcd up
llsing this informati )11 to stirnutc res urc requirements f r HIV prevention
•
•
•
Thi-, ...urvey form, part of the firM pha...e f the ...tudy and i... bing used to e. tnbli ...h levels of
COvcrag' and nature I' organi.,allon of UTV preventi n rviee ...in the two tate. We would lif...e
to invite you to h Ip In our cnqtllrie). and complete the questi nnaire. By answering th
qu').ti ns n th nalurl: or thc TITV pr ention servkcs provided, th organi~ation .,truclure, the
main s urcl.:s of funding anti ...ystems for monit ring and evaluation, you will help us e rablish a
omplctc picture of th current level of liN prevention activities in Tamil Nudu today.
II informMion pro ided b your or~anj ation wiJI be k pt confidential. nly our rl.:.earch
team will have aecc ...s ( th' information dunna thl: data c lIection proce~s. The rep rt from the
.ur ey will be matle avnilabll: t Oll pli r to circulati n.
In addition to compkti n of lh que).lionnair' we would be grateful if you could provide us with
[lny baekgr untl doeumcnwti n or pr ~e t rep rb that you feel w uld b useful { our survey.
sample or organi ...ali ns will be "'I.:lc ted f r the second phase of rhe tudy. in 'Which CO'l
analy'ic", or Ihl.: HI prevention Ser i e ... will bl.: earn d ut. Ple ...1.: an you indicate to us
whcthcr y( 1I will be inter'.,leu in pani lpating in lhi, ,urvey.
Wc " ould he j!raleful if OH could r turn the comptet d qu 'tionnaire al ng with any
aUa hm Ills to us af Ih Foundation for u tainabl D lopment, before. x xx.
With mnny thanf...s I' r your kinu co-operation and time for filling Oul th~ \urvey.
YOllr~ sincerely.
L rna Juinn'ss
R ' ...carch F'II w, Lond n cho)1 of Ifygicn'
& Tropical M'didn
mail: lornu.gllinllcs" (n)hhlm.a '.uk
Professor R Murakcdharan
hanthi . ankaralingam
Indian Tn...tillitc for Technology. Madra ...
LSHT 1/ It ( Indrlll,) \1 pping HI" Pr , ntion Acth iti .
- A. 'ONT,\CT OET,\llS
AI Nam 01Or 'am"atll n:
Ai At1dr~",,:
A~1 ('tty \4- Divrrict
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L H . 1/ n (\f drn~) :\1 ppinJ! HI" Pr vention A th iti
....
B.S. How many p eoptc work full-urn >. part-umc anti as volunteer for your organisation (for both l-TTV
and nOIl-llI -related a '(1\ uic ...). ( ltcmanvely please provide a \luff It ...r with ...taff de ...ignauon ...):
Towl Hlv-related activitie ....
Full tunc:
Purr lime:
Volunteer ...
Other:
tart Completion
date dale
U) the project nam
b) the projc t \It '\ or rh IH projects
C) Whet her the sHes tire urban or rural
cl) the ucti VII ie .../xcrviccv pro" Ided .u each project ...ire
C) start date for each of the ucuviuc- ut each of the "'lle"
f) whether the activit ie-, an! 011"0111" (and if nor the completion date)eo l:"
g) number or Cl member ...reached b) each acti ity
11) year to which til datil In (g) apphc ...
. i) c.:stimate or the number ...or the I'G at each or rhc project <ire ...- for a trucker int rveruion please
gIve the estimated numb 'r of the T ' Pi.IS\tn~ through the project "Itch) each day
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, umber of peer ...
from each peer
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m kind
contact
DatI.: umber or
aucndecs
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"tlppin~ HlPrc,"cntion Actlvitie
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C.13. rfyou WCf' able to c pund your acu 1Ii1:" In order to ensure increased bcllCll'i{Jllr c/Ilmg('. what
~ould You nlan to do?
t---
~.3a. Arc the I flV/AIDS related nctiviries inrearatcd with the other work of your oraanisation?
1.3b' . YES -INOI. I . . '. . ..
~ . If Yes, ple.,,,c describe how the THV nrcvcnuon services are intearatcd mto the Other acnvrue x.
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L HT 1/11 (M tint .. Mapping Hn Prcv ntlon Activities
\",hok (including
most recent
rve any donari ns in-kind? Eg condoms. cl nated
Funding period
Please '~Clr~ date funding
commenced and com kll'J
_____ R~,
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rher forms of monironng and e aluution carried ut for the HI
Internal . icmul
activitie ...
...(ha!. line or follow-up), co-r
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Mopping HI Prevent] n Activiti
F·NE T P
.Inthe second phase of our study, we will be carrying out detailed cost analyses at a sample of
Interventions in this state. In the cost analysis we will calculate average costs of delivering the HIV
prevention services and describe how resources are allocated in the implementation of these
activities. In this way, the cost analysis can help with budgeting and future planning and can help
With improving the efficiency of the organisation. In order to carry out the cost analysis, we will
~eek access to data on the activities of the organisation, the outputs achieved and financial
Information and carry out interviews with NGO staff. The study is being carried out for scientific
research purposes only. All data pertaining to your organisation will be kept confidential and the
r~porting of data relating to your organisation will be made available for comments to you prior to
circulation.
We would like « knov if ou W( uld I 111( 'r ''Itcd in partictpanng in thi ...next phase of the xtudy. Please tid
One of the 1c ) \I.!~ below lind return tlux form with the qucsuonnairc.
We would like ro paruc.pu: . in the cost stud . if sckl.'l I.
tr so w'
, C would .IPprt':Clilll.; t[ If ou could Id! u...what ou will require fr m ux in order to evtabli ...h an
aorccm' fnt or the cost ...tudy to take place:
Wc ill:!; NOT Illtt:rc.,lcd in pnrticipuring in the CtN ..tully. Please ..rare why
Name ( IP ca.,c pn nt)
Dc ..~lgnf1tion
Organisution
Date
WE WOUll r !KI~Tt TIT K Y U TOR Y R KT [) CO )PT·RA no T '0 1PL TIN I nns
QtJFST!( ,\ IRE
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Appendix 3: Andhra Pradesh mapping survey questionnaire
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Economic Analysis of Scaling Up HIV Prevention Interventions
The Foundation for Sustainable Development (FSD). at the Indian Institute of
Technology (Madras) with the assistance of the London School of Hygiene and
TroP.ical Medicine is carrying out a research project to analyse the resource
requirements for scaling up HIV prevention interventions at the state level in India.
We would be grateful if you would complete the following and return it to us by
tomorrow morning to assist us in the above research project.
Organisation name:
District of intervention:
What date was your organisation established
Does your organisation hold an FCRA certificate?
What is the total organisation expenditure for all projects?
What is the total number of staff working on all projects
(eXcluding executive committee members)?
__ I 1 _
Yesl No
~hat year did you start work on HIV-related activities (if
different from APSACS targeted intervention)?
How many intervention areas do you cover (NOT the number
of project sites or halt paints)?
What is the average distance per day travelled by an outreach
Worker at your project?
What were the targets and achievements for your APSACS targeted intervention in
the contract years 2001/02 and 2002l03?
2001/02 2002103-
Target Achieved Target Achieved
High risk group reached (number)
STDs identified
STDs treated
Condoms distributed (freel social
marketino)
Number of target areas
With many thanks for your kind assistance.
lorna GUinness, london School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine
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Appendix 4: Letters of permission for study
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Letter from National AIDS Control Organisation
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Letter from Tamil Nadu State AIDS Control Society
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Letter from Chennai Corporation AIDS Prevention and
Control Society
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Letter from UK Department of International Development
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Appendix 5: Costing questionnaire
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N For r rch purpo only
Instruction to the Int rvi \ er,
Aim of the questionnaires and records review:
To obtain inf nnari n n:
I, 'in'm iul and 'on nu costs f th intervention from the NGO'. perspective-
in order to c »nplet th Hl nng v rkshe 1.
2. To under-rand rh rgunisuti n and financing of th services
• wh i doing what. where and with what Finan ing
under ...tand th pre c ~..,or c ntracting and th impact m the organi arion and
its .. r ices:
• o..,t... f d cvel ping and c. igning rh contract. monitoring and
aluuti )n, cu ucit building! traininz, o: IS f ntract renewal and
co...t.., ass 'hued with envuring vm rh running of rhe project kg fund
11m ...)
• level or II1Vt.:...trncnr ...pccific le the projc t (i, .capital c . ts and .apacu
d vclopm nt that arc unlikely to b useful in ther acti ities)
• I \t I rae .ountuhility and wh is a' untable to who; level of
dClcnd'ncy
• rationale Ior imp! menting rhe proje r
• nature of the relationship b/w the GO and th c nrract r - i. thi-,
trusting and p( ..,ili c or i.., it difficult'?
• cffcctivcncvs c f thc conrructing mcchanixm - \I hat arc the pr ..,iti\t.:
<lsI' Csand what tU' th' disud anlaJes
4. 0 unc.kr..,tun I thl: rol of partners (C,g, p~c.:r l:dul,;ator" hc.:ahh care
provid rs c.:1')in tht.: impJ Ilpnwtion of the project
• ontribulinll t Ih pr jc 'I (timt.: .md ..IJ ut.:)
Puymt.:nl b the.: Prolc 1
Ratj( nal for and hl.:ll"lit ...gainl.:d fr m tht.:proj (,;[
•
•
Intervi wee:
,,' tion 1: Int ith pr ';ect dire tor or pro'; ct manage
JC'ls"'re~ldth inlr<du li<nloth'inh: it.: \I cl.:inundnotl.: Ih'nal1ll: oflhc.:inlc.:rvic\'"c'.
dat or inll:r j \J , your nHm and th rganis.ltl 11 ut lhc.:I )P of rhl: Sc.: 'tion. Plcasl: w.:ord
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rhc~c imcrvicw. and nil ur the answer- on the questionnaire or a separate. heet v here
nee's ur . ( ._8 ne cl .. 10 be asked l b th th PM and PO).
Section 2: Project manager and/or finance officer
The re' I'd...revi \J will bc sent in advance ( the organisation. Tfnor it : hould be shown
to the projc 't dir .tor v ho an th n direct you t the relevant interviewee and record ...,
The infr rmari n ...hould be collected ~ r the m ...t recent year for whi h inf rmati n is
a uilablc ( hich should be the tart up period or the project) as well as for the start up
acrivilic!'. i.c, pr poxal I vclopmcnr/ncg riarion: rarget group
num ration/id muficution: training; I dcvel pmcnt: sy tern development etc,
, ction 3: P r educator.
, I' the indi idual ...lisl d in the V( luntcer and peer educators li..t we need to find out rhe
alu r thi" c mrribuu 11. Inter re all thc p r educator .., If [heft: arc more than to
peer c lucar rv, aim to intcrvic _or} r the pe r educators (which ver j" rhe higher
nurnbcn bu-, d. \i here po-....ihk, on types of peer cdueat r.../"ex worker ..., geographical
urea Llnu/or ine me group.
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[ntroductor ot
To he read to the vtaf] at lilt! NGO as an introduction to lite interviews: ) and record
h F undation for ustainuble Development ( D). at the Indian In titutc of
T' .hnolr gy (Madru-, i\ carrying ut II re!'>'arch pr ~I,; I r analyse rh resour
requircrn nts r r s 'aling up HIV prevention intervention ...at [he state level in India.
Th proj cl is funded by the Welle m Trust ( K) and xupport is provided b AeO
and 111"1ixit to the G is part or the 2nd phase of the research in
which w ar currying ut a ost anal ...is of the HIV prevention w rk, \l e w uld like
t document the acu it; v iha: ar carried out as v ell (l" the resource ...required to
impl men: these 'H th J and contract munagcm m le d.
W 'Ii ould thcr for' like t ) .I!'IJ... ut about rh Iollov ing typ sol' informati n:
I. R(utincly cell ctcd m niroring data on acti itic .... outputs and finance for the
turg ted int irv 'ntion".
OCU!11e::ntat')[1 and valuation of financial and non-financial outlay. b the
er nrracting ag n y using proj cl d rumcnts and inter iews.
the pn 'e......es invol cd in contracting with a funding agenc for the
impl III nttllion of Ht prevention proj~ct"
II information pl'ovid d will bud for r earch purpo coni and information
not rei "lS d ithout prior penni. sion. nly our rc. carch team will have a 'Css to {he
informati< n during the:: (hila collection pr ·I.;SS.
nce w' have c )l11p1 I d thc anal ...is We will rl;~c.l Ihi" b~lCJ... to y< II for your comml:l1t.
Th report from rhe:: t nnly ...i...will b mud\; a <lilable to you prior lO circuhnion.
1\ colkct th information w woultlliJ...c In inter iC\J lh project manugt:r and th
financ rri<: r ahout th neli ilk.,. financing, nd contracting procc ..., s ( f the project.
Th proCl:S" is in _ "tag's 1st: an inICrvil:\ ubnullhe aClivitie" and pI' c ...scs; unu
1nd: a re::corc.l ... re ie . We w )uld al.,o liJ...e to inl 'J'\il:\v lhe peer cuuculor\ nnu hc.!rh
cur' pro idcr" w IJ...ing \I illl our rroj ct.
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We mil 11 cd ro 'P nd ~ m rime going over proje t d curnenrs and rhe records or if
you me hi.1PPYwith thi ...make s me phot copies r take Iloppi s of these. We will pay
for or make reirnbur ...emenrx for any ph r eopic we take.
Th interviews wirh the proje I manager and th ~ finance offi er may take some rime and
may includ ~ follo up interview ...f r clarifi arion. We apprc iate your patience in thi ....
Th arcus c creel by ( ur analyvis ar as f llow ...:
• ctivirics and hixtor f pr ~CCI
tart up a ti irk ...and cupacu development
Monitoring. uluatic n and le .hnicul axsi ...urn 'C
- rdinati n v ith fundcr and parent rgunisation
Per ... nn I
upplics
Building operating and mamtcnunce
Trunsp nand chicle '0"'['1
"!.. P nditurc ant! utputx l r the N x
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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tion I:Proj t escription
arne of rganisatron; _
arne of Inter icwcc: ---------------am or Inter" icv er: Dcsignati n: _Dare f Inter iew:
Background to the NGO
1. PI U~I,; can nu giv e !TIt; U brief background of the organisation:
What ar the rganisation' \ crall objc rives?
hat arc rhe other pr grammes and funding sources alongside the
targeted tnt rv .ntion (TI)?
\ hut date wu-, th rgunisation established? _
•
•
\ hut i...the IOta I annual e: pcnditurc of the organisation as u v hole - for the
m sr rcc nt financial car (please 'an yt U pr vide a Ii"r of all proje [s and all
fun ling sour' x)? _
4. ..,your rgani...ution h II an . RA ccrtif ate? Yes I 0; If \0. for how
ng yw working v ith internationul
___________ JC;,lr:o.
5. What is the 10t.11number f ...taff w rking in the organisati n (m, a whole)?
·ulllime Part lime (include paid staff only)
V ns the targ 1 xl inrerv ntion (TI) the first Hlv programme implemented by
your rganisari n? TInot. when did our organi ...ati n first start w rking on HIV-
rctat u acthi,il.!'? Plca,t.: U 'I ribc lht,;..,ca liviric'I and lhl;; funding. ources.
Targeted Intervention Activitie
7. \I hal ~r )1I r quir d tub thl,; fllnuerl cmma 'ling agcn 'y to impJcllknl the.:
Tt'? (11' multlpk '1nurc ...of funding plca ...t.:dt.:'icriht.: for each agency)
H. Wht,;n \ t1':\lw re the.: contraCI(') yt)U h )Id nm '\wardcd? _
9. flov" I mg ila'vl: l tI I '1.:11 h Idmg thblth 'SI.: wnlra 'th)'! _
10. 1\ lhl' an • tension l)f an t.:tlIlkr Ct nlme'·.
LI. If!-. when" Wo.lh fir" contract u\ .mkd? ----------------------
(
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I... leave un y u d . 'rib' [he (her <led ities that r k pia e in order t enable (he
start up r rh inter cntion under this ontra t re penditurcs, frequency, dates.
p eople in 01 cd). r r ample:
• rap )"ul devol prnent
• ecd~ ssexsment (i f avai lable please pr ide reporr)
• Training
• ontract n gotiution, proposal xubmissi n and review
• Project bits to and by funding agencies/consultants
• 0 clopmcnt of management information xystems.
• thcr - plea ...e specify
did you start implementation of the targeted intervenrionL. \J hen
(TT)'? _
14. When (\J hi h till! ,) W uld OU "<I the TT was fully operational and providing all
the ...er icc ...a ...planned? i.c. \J hUI would y u say v a (he start up period for the
j ntcr c ntion? ----------------------------------------------
15. What j, the durutic n of the conrruct (in In nths)?
16. 0 you e: pe r th c ntruct to be renewed? Yes 0
17. If "'0 how many menth" do you c peer 10 work. n rhi-, project from the . tart of
th inter cntion? ----------------
J 8. I [0\ arc the inputs (budget). outputv and activitic ... specified in the contract?
Please can you d scrib thcs c. (Pleu"Ie specif the target for the TT outputs).
1(. What i!'l(arc) Ih' target group(") {hat you work with undt:r th' Tt'. (in theory and
in praclic '). If s < work'r.., pktl\c.; uc.;" ribc (he type f se. \vorker:-. that yOU
w)rk. \: jlh (c.;g hrothel ba"'t:u, MrCCl ba..,cd. lodge b~I.;J
t:lC) __
20. What 1S the; total numb 'r of the wrgl;t population (hat you reach! ure; in contu
with ill an particul,lr pint in tim!;? _
21. Whi.lt proportion or tht: rotal St:, worke;r population in thi" area. uo you think this
is?------------------------------------------------------
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--. Plcavc .an you descnh 111 derail (he ucti itics carried ut under the proje (such
tt, Bch.ivir ur .hangc cornmunicurion,
:n;..tbling en Ironment, therj.e.g.
nd m prom [ion, TI management,
• 10 y( U work .. irh parrnerx in (he cornmunit (peer educators. physicians
I.!IC) and ar the-e partners framed by our rganixati n?
IS there C( ndorn l 'l~ I marketing? Or is condom distribution free•
• do nu prov Ilk I treatment? If not who doc,'? How L treatment
•
finun ....d cd cs th project pr vide support")
U) )OU carr out community mobilivation activities (cg family health
.\\·\;11'1,;11 'ss Ci mpuignv, fc,tl al...er )
13. Was invc-tmcnt in capital items such us equipment. c mputers, buildings etc
r quircd? If s . who funded th SI,; and which of these (and hov man ) are
required It I' mcniturinr 01 the contract ( g c mputerv)?
,_..t. id slaff aucnd training durrng th implementation? r, thi-, vufficient'i Wh
Staff
_S, H \ muny we rking d.\ x .11'1.; (heft: ill (a) the v eek < nd (b) rhe year for your
orgr n ,,;11 km'! (a) _ (b) _
_6. re th re an crucriu for 'tafT recruitment laid down by the purchaser? What are
the?
27. Wh.1I nrc (he r spon'lbtlilic, of the tickl .,Iaff? Do your field sraff operare
• ceo,- ling to i s<.:hl.:tiuld tim wbk. If,) pletl'i,; can I Sl:C a CI)PY? In practice do
t II h:cp to Ihl...,chl.!duk. II' n I. 11m mu h rime ea<.:hweek i, allocated to:
• tid v. (H'''- (I.C. direct ..,crvh.,·t:provi'lOn)
rcpm1tng (i.' \:riring llP dail ul:{ivt[;l:s. compiling m nthly r port~)
..,WI'f rH\: ,ting~
othel a 'tivitic~ (pk.l'l.: 'pcdfy)
•
•
•
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- • \J hill ur )- ur re-p nxibilitics under the targeted inrervenri n? (this . hould be
<tskl.;uof both the pr ~ .cr man uger project director) ?
PD-----------------------------------------------------PM ___
D you w rk full rime n the targeted intcrvcnti n? PM: Ye.'1 0 PD: Yes/No
If n r. what are our other rcsp nvibiliti si ucti ities?
D:------------------------ PM: --------------------------
I IQ\; many day, arc sP"'OI working n rh targeted inrervcnri n each month?
D:---------------------------- PM: ___
_9, or the vrurf (includ 'III ,wIT b th working directly on (he project and those
) and uny . ccuri board member" involved in the
proj Cl, plca-, cun vou rdl me: (a k the project director or proje r manager)
• Wh,H arc thcrr rcxpon ...ibihucs (0\ ard- the targeted intervention?
• Do they work lull tim' on th targeted intervention? If not:
• What pn portion or their rime do they spend on the TI?I What is {he
number or days they ...pend on the project?
• \J hat b their xalar or average month! income?
30, Please can ye u rdl me about rhc time ...pent b the peer cdu ators on the pr deer
ucuv.uc, :
<1) How man peer educator, \: ork on the project U( any point in time? _
b) r the pc r cuu ';,tror" paid? yc~ o
C) Tf, how much and how frl:qucnlly? _
d) \,: lld' other in' ntlvl..:~ (mnndar un I mom:t'try), if an • do you provide to the
p I.:f cdu '~Hnr '? _
c) Ihw a~ lh t m 01 in' 'ntivc" de elopeu? _
J) r' rhe payments anu in cmi\c'i ...ufficienl? v hy? _
g) Ho\! orll..:n d ea'l1 or thl: peer cducators Hill: nu mCl.:rings " ith the GO? And
how I ng arl: cach or rhe,c mectings? _
h) n i,l\l..:rag h v.. long al'l.; (he p 'er cuu ',Hor conti.lct~ with the target
group? _
i) What i...th numbcr 01 contu'l ...\N IIh the targ ~t group each of rhe pl.:er ducator"
had in thl; 1<I\t cur? _
288
N For r earch purpo e only
I what time or day do rh p er educar r... arry out their work? 1. (hi. during
worling or lcr-ure time (i.e. what would they be doing
therwise)? _
k) How long (in months) do you c: peer each peer educator 10 work with the
j)
pr~c t?VVh : ___
I) ~ hat i... ur r luti nship like with the peer educators? Would you say it was
go d an I ...rrong or diffi ult. Pleas e plain why? Would this be different if they
stayed longer v irh th proje t?
J I. Please can ou tell me ab ur the lime spent by the volunteerv working on the
proj Cl a uvit: S in the la ...t finun .ial year:
u) H w man v luntccrv t re w rking on the pr jeer? _
b) Ilov many working days do they \I ark In total f r the TI?
c Do u provide th 111 v ith an gift!'>/inct:nrive ...? If so please des ribe and what is
the alue of th Sl:? _
Payments and auditing
.L. Whu] j .., the moxr recent! complete I financial year? _
a) what was rhc budget for thi ...peri xl? _
b) f r thc mrrcm contracr? _
(PI u.., pro ide th budget and its breakdown - in electronic format if po sible)....
13. Please an you lcs cribc how th ~N i.., paid?
• IT w freqw.:nrl arc fUfH.h released? _
• n\i hat basi ....? ( .g. i.., this subject to ..,ubmirtcd rcporh) _
• What prop mioll or funds urt: released at each instalment _
J..t. \: hut is til' C P ndilllre:
<I) I'or til m )..,1 r'cc.:ntl completed contract pt:riml
b) to dal unuc.:f the.; current conlraer? _
(Please rrovi I rh l:XP nuiwrdfinun 'ial \wteml:nt and Its brcaldo\ n - in dectronic
format if [,)o""lble - pka..,c.: "'petlry thl; lime period)
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Monitoring & Evaluation
35. Please d scribe the mechanisms used for r porting to the donor/purchaser:
• HQ\: frequent! do ou submit reports to the contractual partner? In
rh .ory and in practice? _
What ar rh requrrem nrs f r each of rhes reports? _
HO\i many r gister ...do y u have to maintain to fulfil these obligations?
What arc the irnplicuti ns or these rep rt: for y ur activities - i.e. how
much rimc do ou <lnd your staff pend In prepari ng report ...: which ...taff
•
•
•
ar pr
long? _
• Has (he rcponing x stern changed since y u started with the onrractual
nt d rom .arr ina out normal dail activitie ... and for how...
partner? In what v uys? (c.g. Ilining. c ntcnt What were the implications
of these changes? _
36. Pleas ~d ....ribc an other monitorinz mcchani 111S:...
• D you recci c m nitoring vi its? If "'0, please can you tell me who
vi ...ired 0 er [he: life rime )f the project and, hen they visited for ea eh of
the ...c vi ...it ...'? _
• What v er the implicationx )1' thi. /the e visit for your organisation i.e.
did 01..1 and your ...talf ...pend limt.: in preparation and in hosting the vbit;
I,: hi 'h of your ...lUff Wt.:fI.:prt:vt:ntt.:d fr m currying out normal daily
m:tivlti ' ...<lnu for h )w long'! _
37. r rh\.:rl.:any otht.:r m a~urt.:'" tuke:n by (hI.: purcha t.:r for monitoring? Eg for
billing. 'Osl 'onln I, ljuillity a~"'llri.lncc. community con~ullatlon
JR, 0 otl1\;r parrs of your organisation pmvidc "uPP)fl 10 the momtonng and
manag m nl of th ~ contra 'I? If "'0 who is involved and 110\: much tlme is 'Pl:nt
in thc ....t: ;1 'tivittcs',
39, Huvt.: ylll been providt:u "viLh i.IOY(raining r 'tuppon to help with the rt;porting
...y ...tt.:m?Was th, ...tramlng t.:ffccti ? ~ hy?
40. 0 ou curr )lIt hdw ioural slIrve ... to ul1ucr"tand it bcha\liour hange ha.
tak n pluct.: \ ill1in tht.: (ar~'CIPO[ulatinn gn)up? IT so, pica t.:C'll1 f wJ..e a copy of
"'lIr t.:y reports. If nOI. d) YOll havc any mh"r llIt.:ch.tnism to measure beha, jour
chang '! Plca...1,; can you tlc ...cribt: rhi ....
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41. Do y u ha c inf rmarion on the HTV prevalen e am ng the targeted group or
the di ....trier within whi eh you work' If es, please an I take a copy of [he report
fr In these survcyt . Ye ... o
42. Please can J se a cop of the c ntract for the targeted intervention (i.e. the
contract you h Id with the funding agen y).
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Nam f rganisati n: _
Name f Inter icwe : -----------------Nam f lnt r 1 ewer: --------------
Designati n: _
Date of Interview: _
Picas an II
used l em r int anti
rcc rds r registers [Q' the f !lowing: (thee data will be
mplctc rh ace mpanying tab] s)
I. PI usc pro id c pi ~ I th monit ring r p rts (finan ial, pr gramme a ti ity
and utput r p rts) - in ele tr nic format if p . sible - for the mo. [ recenr
Financial year. (usually in th form or m nthly te hnical r p rts)
PI al.;~ 'an u pr ide me with the budgerts) and expenditure rep rts, br ken
d wn by lin it m. f r th intervention since its in eprion.
leas ~ an you also pr ide rh dares and am unts of all fund release: sin e the
proj cct inccptic n.
list r the pr ~ t sir" that y u w rk at and the stirnated size of the different
turg I p pulati n(s ut each site re r th m st rec nt finan ial year. (If indi idual
site data n r Cl ailable pi as pr ide total).
ite P ipulation size
(if kn wn)
breakdown by
p pulation group
Target t be reached
(current contract)
breakdown by
population group
A.
B.
D.
oral: ------------ --------
5. li....t or all the buildings that an; used fc r this proj Cl at ea h f the project it :
• lease in ludc headquarters, an ...torage fa ilities, II Id offi es. pr ject
Ific s etc)
• II w many !'o luar f cli mdn:s arl,; I.!ach f these buildings?
• H( w many ...quar I' t.!t art.! U.,cu by th TI?
• What j, the r nwl charcrt.! r r l!l1eh ()r thl.!sc buildings?
• Is Ihis rh normal mal'k t value r r.'u h a pr perry? If not. d u have
an slimat or rh (ru ~ mark. ~I valli .
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6. Il',r f the vtuff, p er educut r, and v lunreers \: orking n the project in the
In "l r cnt finun nal car (p! ase in lude ALL staff - in luding those paid
.ontributi n - e sv eeper .. drivers and rh r supp rt staff _
an I LL oluntccrs - in eluding III mb rs [the uti e committee) and their:
• sign: (ion
• ualificart n
• Pr f ......i n (I' r pc r du uror and volunt ers)
ate start id work w ith rganisari n
UIl: left { rgunixuric n (if applicable)
alar an an ben 'lirs In mo. t re cnr Finan ial year
•
•
•
• Ilowan c.../ inc ntives in m st r cent Iinan ial year
7. A li ...t f th h alrh c: re pro idcr ... (phy; ician / R tP..,) working with the proje
nt and:
'h rr quuhfl '~Hi ns
onsuluuion fcc r r projc t ref rrals
in-ulu til n re ~ r n n projc l r fcrral ...(if different)
nam • dat . dur: lion. location and related c pense: of training
prov id d to Ihem in r lation [0 [he TT sa ices provided under [he
prl~ccl
8. Ii" t f uJllhc t,;;1pir'll it<.:ms'm i cquipmcnr (i.e. th "e item. whose expected life
•
•
•
•
jl.,gn;ulcr Ihan I CM) u...cc.l hy lht.: projcct. thc.;irpurchal.,c price. year of purcha e
[lnd e, p "(cd hI' in car·... (pI a!\" al... include i(ems (hut L re part r the GO
et I1trihurion or h: c been donar d to the projCl:t. Do not in 'luclc i[cll1~ with a
vcr I \: alll' 'g It:~s than I; 00 R
9, Ii...t or all Ihl.: hide ... u-.c:c.l b tht: projc '( (including provided G
( nlriburi m ilnd pc:r-.ol1all O\! ned l. Ih ir purchase plice and year or purchase.
10. he hick It)g ht band/or rravd c. PCI1'l!s/lravcl claims/olher claims (eg
lll1ll1l1ni a(1( n 10.1\ 'erWin Ira d cost, incurred b the pr ~t:ct and field staff.
I I. ondtm slo I.. 1'1.: 'ord ...- r( r Inn'>t fcc!:nl tinan 'ial car:
• Ihe numher )r 'l nUt)m ...re:'dvl:c.l at the.:pn jeet (all I., urcc'i)
• (Ill: numh r r l:( ndoms c.li...rril utcd in Ih m )....1 rcc 'nt financial year.
• the nurnbc.;r )1' 'l ndnrn... sold in rhe m ...1rl: cnl financial ear.
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Tr fcrral r r f., - f r In st re '111 finun ial y ar:
• th T 'us s referred
• rh I as s treated
• and r r a eh I paucnt r f IT d
- the dingn xis/syrup! m; qualificari n f health care pro ider (egMBB IRMP)
- c nsulrurion re drua barge f rea .h patient (b ih GO & patient e p nse ):
n rrnul (un.sub,idis" C nsultution Icc if differ nt.
1. . list r rh lE materials and training materials are us. d f r edu ati n of the
rnrg t gr up/training in th m ..,rre cnr finan ial car.
Y ar
j material
EX Firer
--- --------- ------
-------
----------------
OM of producti n
20()O, R\' _ -00 for 20,000
o. used
__ 5,032
14. ' r thc most rcc 111 flnan 'inl year. the bills/re eiprs for:
• bui lding r nt
utilities (water, clc tri .ity, gas)
c mmunicati ns (ph 11 , fa, . internet)
building maintcnan c (cleaning, fuel. ClC)
chic! maintenance (if applicable)
stationary 'II1<J oth r )f/i c supplievc: pen-es (cg photocopying)
•
•
•
•
•
15. 11 the training a ti itics that ur swff hav attended since the start of the
contra rual pn 'l;S'" f r rh I (in lude needs ass sSll1cnt):
• Rial I ~ pcndilUrcs (Int d. \uhsi-;(cn c. f d. fees)
Numbt.:r rail ntlces from your rguni..,.llion
Ulnt.:. datt.:, durari( n 'm I 10 ari n f the c( ursc
•
•
16, II the training a'li ilics that y ur organis lion ha provided (including pcer
educator lrtlining) sin" the pI' ~ecl start including:
• R'lut u . p n liturt.:s (Ira I. subsi..,r n e. fa 'ilitator f cs. Co )d. venue)
Nllmb 'I' of . tamtl f'a 'iliwlors•
• lIll1b'r r uttende s
• Ntlmt.:. dntl;.durnt ion and 10', lion or OUl"'l;
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17. II the start up a cri ities that v er required t implement the proje r (eg project
pr posul d vel pm nt, c ntra [ n g tiation, ne ds ass ssment, enumeration of
rk rs, id ntifi ati n f pe r edu arors. d velopment of reporting, ., rem, )
• eli iry flam and dare
• Inputs t rhc a tivit (. taff rim . travel, ' upplie: .c mrnunication etc)
• R luted c penditurcs
18. II th B communication), ad cacy and other events(beha iour hang
(eg rami) h ulth awareness campaign. , mela: held by your rgani: arion in
the lat financial year
• R late e: pcndirures (rra cl, sub ist nee. facilitator fee .f d. venue)
• arne, dat .xlurati n and I cati n of th event
• Numb r fc: tcrnal facilitators
• umb er or an mdc s
19. II th monitoring and re icw visits that have taken place since the starr of [he
ontract tendering f r rh pr ~' t (in luding m nitoring visits tAD from the
funding ag ncy, review teams or consultants) including:
• Rclar d c. p n liturcs (tra cl, subsisten e. f d)
• Lo ation f th visit. dare and duration f the visit
• Nun b r r isitors
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TNSAC Record Review
"-at th re ords r reg; .ters to ee the fall ing for the time period from
I _ until pr s or:
Background Information
I. nnual bu g ( and r Ica'l s for as a \: hole targeted interventions
xinc stan of A P2
itures f r A
....und 'f ontract \I ith each y ar and their contractual
p ri I .'1) (i.e .. tun dar ant! end date plus renev al dale if appropriate)
4. nnual budget. fund r lca-, .'1 and fund release dares for GO working on CS\:
inter cnti n....during A
5. nnuul c pcnduur .., l
ncri it -tluring P_
UIPU! (Fr m It; .hni <1! rep rh) or
\: interventions - by GO and
working n W int rventions b
7. )\ 'l P l r ih .ontrn '( and an guidclin '. that you and the NGOs arc required 10
follow in Ih contra iual pro ss in luding a description f the m nitoring and
aluauon pr }Cl;"".
osf. of' monitoring. nd contra l manag mcnt
li'l or th ...talT and volunt r, working on the project in the la..,! 2 year
(plca-, ill .lu I'LL staff cg ...we per." uri er ... and ither supp rt staff) and
rh 11':
•
• uah icurk n (if appli 'ubi
•
• ilt left rgant...alion cif t1pp!kabJ )
• u11l1" and b nefih (including staff d'veJ pment) JJ1 m ..r re ent
fin.1J1 'HII 'ar
• Allnw4l11 '1.;..,1 in entl r.; in mo ..r r~ 'ent l'illun 'iar year
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f:. matcrialv distributed for u~c in cdu . tion of [he targ t gr up a"
1I" 0 by
mu! 'rial
di.,tribut d
ur c
car cost
f production o.
---------
----------------
-------
list )1' rh supplies used or distributed r the GOs v rking n W
nar t.:[ in the la: t finan ial year.
LIppi
dar
uanrir 1I. d nit pri e Purcha:
---------------------------
-------
I J. li-, or rh twining thu: has been pr \ idcd r facilitated b) our organi ation
for t 111.
• chi cl c p nditurcx (tra cl. subsi-rencc, fa ilirator fees, f d. v nue)
• urn l r the c ur-
• ure and duration r our-
• 1',[ if lacilitut r ,lOO th eir pr fessi n(s
• ixt f Uti .nd c., (including d signution and organisation)
J 2. Ij.,t I til c I sur visits laciluat 0 b your rgunisation
• 1;111.:01,;, p nditurc- (travel. subxistcncc, facilitator f es. fo d)
• Le 'ali n or the visit
• urnrion or biI
• Li. r ,. purticipunts
11. list r th ad 0 ',IC In tworking me ring» facilitated b y ur rgunisati n
• nditurcs (Ira 'I, subsistence, fa .ilitator Iccv, 1'000. enu
•
• .11 r the t.:nt
• ural I n of t.:nt
• i.,l r fa 'tllt.lfOr., 'md their prof ......it n(s)
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14. 11\1 f rh IIImitorina and c; luation isit carried ut OR
fu '!Hat db } ur
• Rclnte j e p ndirure-, (travel. subxisren .e. monitors fe s, fo d)
• ocr lion of 111 J it
• at ot th "l\it
• urution r isit
LI...t t monitor v, luahti .arlon ...and rgani-arion affiliation
15. lixt of an t n...uItJnt.'· ....,h that have; been rgani: ed by your org nisation
rdUh:d t the management or the I.
• R nee. m nit r fees, food)
• I. '(Iii n and purpos Dr the i...if
• a( r rh i it
• urauon 0(' visit
• r i...1 )1 m nit rx, quulificatic nand organisation affiliation
16. J U'i list all rh building that UTe u ...cd b ' the T
r...:
for the management of
• PI'I'I; mclude hcadquurrcrs. any srorag fa ilirics. field office .. project
olfic s ct .)
Wh, I IS the r ntul .hargc for each of these buildings? b thi ... the normal
murk I r III r r such a proper: ?
•
17. PI <I ... Iisr all rh furnishing ...u-, d for munagcrn nt of' Tlv in these buildings:
J I <Is include h '<luqllartl.:rs. an. storage facrlities. field offices, project
( IrKI.:' er .)
• hal \! .... Ih co ...! or ca 'h of rhc ...c II m:--?~ hen \l er they pllrcha ed
•
.tnu \\ 110 lllnt! U th'm?
IH. A lI't 01 ullih capil:ll iterm. equipm\':IH and furni hing It, d in the project. their
pur 'h~l'"' prkc lin J year of pur ha...c
. t\ Ii...l of ,III the hick, u...l.:d b Ihe proJc'l (including provided G
~onlrit uti m tint! p 'NH1J1cl OWIl\.:i), theIr PlJ['dl,lS' price and car of purchase.
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• buildrna rent
urilitie-, (water, I .rricit . gao )
communications (ph ne, fa • inremct)
butlding rnamtcnan (leaning. fuel, ere)
•
•
•
• vetucle maint nanc (if applicable)
• stationary and rher office supplies,' , pcnses (eg ph recopying)
_I. fa cl I n ...c .../tra cl clairnv ther claim ...(cg cornmunicarion) incurred by (he
pr ~ '( and ti Id !'IwlT anti/or th ~veluclc log b ks if applicable
--. A li ...t of rh fr' ining that ou and your staff ha c attended in the last financial
iur in relati n 10 management or the TT inrervcnrions including:
• R 'hit ,tI c penditurex (Ira cl. suhxist nee. fa ilitutor fee .. 1'0 d. venue)
• am of th ' <.:our,e
• L . II n of the c iurvc
• Dale of the 'our,
• urat ion or cour-c
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TRU Records Review
Please T Ian 0 k ut rh re rds r registers to se rh following:
I. What is the bu lg r for the managcrn nr agen y under the current contract? (Plea. e
provid th budget and ir~ brcakd v n - in cl err ni ~ rmat if po ible - plea e
spccir the lime peri d)
What is the annual cxp nditurc f r rh most recent financial year? (Plea e provide the
I p nditur /Financiul ....tarem cnr \l ith breakd v n - in electronic format if po. sible -
pi U...C ....pc if the rim p riod)
PI as provid th rn nitoring rep rt. (financial, a tivity and output r p rts for the
rn )....1 recent financir I ar for all \i. trucker and HHP intervention .
4. PI usc Ii....t all til -. buildings that urc USI..:U b the R :
PI ~IS includ h adquartcrs, an st rag facilities. Iield offices. proje t offices
l:1I.:)
What is rh r .ntul charge r r uch of rhc:-. buildings'? I: this rh normal
market rent for ...u .h a pr p rtf?
5. Please liM ullth furnishings in these building. :
6.
•
•
• Plea...c include heudquarr rs, un sI rage facililie ......field offices, pr ~ c[ office .
et ')
\i hat wu ....the '0 ....1 of each of th~s'item, ? Wh n w re the pur hased ilnd
Who funded rhe..:m?
Ij~t (f thl: ~lnrf and vnlul1tl..: r...work.inl'T on th project in the las.l financial year
•
(picas I'll Illd,' LL Ilt'f'vs..
7.
e s\: l:cpcrs.. drivl:rs and other supp rr ~tafn and their:
• Nume and d ~igJ1.11ion
ll'llilicati n (if t1pplicahlc)
rt r ~siol1 (r r peer I.!UU'at rs ,md ulul1rccr ...)
ate ....tnrl d \: (rk. ith ()rgani~. ti n
at left orgLlni .....Hion (if appli • hi )
i1lar .md bl.:ncf'it...(in III ling ...wfT tit.: dopm nr) in mO!'lt rl..:cenl finan ial year
II wancc,1 inccnliv s in mo~t recent finan iul car
•
•
•
•
•
•
li ...1 of all Ih 'apiral item ..., 'quiI'm nl and fllrl1l-.hing used in the projecr, their
pttrchus pril: lind year of purcl1as
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liM of uti rh vehicles It,id by rh proj 'Cl (including pr vided GO c ntributi 11
and per .. nn I wn d , their purchas pri c:; and year f pur hase.
h amount p'lid for:9.
building rent
utiliti ... (v . t r. etc .tri 'it . ea ....)
Cl mmuni 'uti n....phone. fa . intern '0
building muinrenun c ( leaning, fuel,
hi .lc muinrcnanc (if appli iablc
• I'IIUli nary und th r office xupplie....I' pcnse.....(eg ph tocopying)
10. o Yl U think rh pric l r th ab \II,; items reflect-, the true alue? If not pi a e can you
•
•
•
• )
•
c: plain wh rh re is ~Idufer n 'C and what rh differcn e might be.
II. ra I p n... :./(rt v I .luirnvorhcr claim (cg C mmunication) in curred b the
projc 't and field ....1·11'1' and/or (he v .hiclc log b h if applicable
'_. lii.ot r rh materials di rributcd r r u-, in xlucation or the target group in the
rno ....r r c n( Iinan 'ial y M.
mal'rial ( lIr 'c
car o"r
f POUtl tion No. di ..tributed--- - ------- ------- -------- --------- --------- -----
Ii. I or th ~upplies u... cl or tli ...lribulcd to th'
in Ih' lu...1fin'ln'inl car.
...cg condom ....drug~. ~tat ionar
UPply
oir pril:~ Pur hase dale
...... _-_ ----- ------------ ------ ------------ -------_ --------- -----
l4. Ibl or the lruining lb'll (til' ~Itlr,.ha I.! attended ...int.:l.:the R in 'cption including;
• R I'll dc, p ndilurc ...(tnt 'I. ....lIh....i ..t 'Ol.:c, facilitator I l.:". f() )d, \lcnut;)
Naill\.: ( f th e( ur ...
Lo 'alion of lht.: c ttr ...
•
•
• .He or (h our:.
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• uruti n r l ur-, ..
li~t f the training thar ha~ be n pr vided or fa ilirured b your rganisati n for the
• lure I c penditurcx (rra I. subsisienc . Iacilirat r fee. ,f, d, venue)
• urn
• at f rh . urse
• ururi n f c ursc
bl f la rlrtut( r, and their profc ...viontv)
• i'l t f auc ndc ,
Ii~lof the posure i~it fa iliiar I by our organisation
•
• R lat d -. p .nditur ...(travel, ...ubsrsren re. facilitator fees. 1'0 d)
• 'atit nor th i,il
• at ( r the i...it
• urur] n of' vtvt:
• i-.( if parti ipunt-,
Ii~lof rh uti 0 'U' /ncrw irking events fa .ilitutcd by your organisation
• d. subsixtcncc, facilitat r fees, fad. enue)
• Num r th cv nt
• Date r th event
• uratioo or e cnt
• i~t t Iacilitat r, and their pr fcssiont«)
hy Y ur I'gan-.hli)n
list r th ,up r i... r • n nit ring and evaluuli n isilS carried our OR facilitated
• R Imetl ' I entlilllres (1m cl, sllbsisfcn 'C, monit rs fee~. fa d)
I 't1liol1 r Ihe j,ir•
• at of tlli"t
Dunlliol1 ,. bit
List of mOl1it)r~. qualification ...anti rgani~atiol1affiliation
•
•
19. PleHs 'iH) I 'it.:: a c py or Ihe onlra t and' ny guid lin .-.that you and the
r luir d to folio\: in th' 'ontra 'tLtal pro q.,~.
0...are
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Infer \l ith p r du ator
For the il1t1il'itlll"/~' livtcd in the \'O/UlIh'c>I' and peer educators /i 1l1'e need tofind our
rhe valuo ofthi, contrilnnion 10 the project a, well (1.~ an undervandine of their
re/ali() I' . I
11.\ ITpwith th ' pmJl'('t ..
We would 1;/..(1It> interview all the peer educators. Ifthere lin' more Thall to peer
edl~C{fI()r'\1aim to interview _Oc" ofthe peer educators. ~ e will use 111;.\sample 10
e 'fllll(lfe the I' tlue-; [or fll ' lid! eroup.
POI' '~ .
peer 't!lIc'lIfon: \(>11 will need to sample ha {'eI 011the type. of ('X worker.
({IIcl'()!· ' .
II 11/( Ollie I!,I'OIlf>
For lion '~Pt't't educators: select at [cast J peer educator from each profession-
eg trucker.\ hl,/pt'I'.\. loaders (humalis), shop-owners. tran port association
repr('\'C'I1IUlh'('\· etc.
J~/,()\lid('(I(lch lndividu " \I jl/l lin introduction to tlu: project lind (H/.. the questions asof/ow".
WC ..II' 'HIT ing alii U • ~I unul "i, of' til targeted j ntcrvenri n. s you ar a re
pann '1' t ) the inr rvcntl n, 1 v auld lik 10 uxk Cl few qucsti ns ab ut your work with
lhe projl:ct. 111'0.will hdp 1111..: lInu'r,(and rh ulul: of ()ur contribution t the project.
I. What i... our:
•
•
I fa Illall cars)1' "h oling have ou compler u? \i but i'i your euucation
a hie crnent?
Wh n did au 'turt wod, <1\ a PI; rl:ullcal r'1
4, Whul \i tb your 'Tl( Ii alion ror slartlng wor"- [1'\ a peer cuucal r?
5. WI1'tt arc ollr rl:~p()n\lbiliti ....ih 'I P 'r \:ducator'.' What arc the activitjc~ that
ou arr out'.
6. PI tt, 'an ( tI WC" 'rib
I.:du .uo!''?
7. Ho\! muny h()ur~ t1
day/\: C 'K '?
to en\: the pro' ,~or hl)V .. you Wt.:n.; re 'ruirl:d as a pe r
)U 'pl,.:nu provitling peer education activities l:<l h
8. r fov nHiny dtt " in u m nth do XI w r"- U ) you work. a...a peer educator?
9. Whul (imt.: t f d'l d) ou n )1111<111(.;u!'r our thl.:sc actj itics'?
304
NG For r e rch purpo only
10. What w uld you be doing U[ rh !'>L' lime!'> if you were not w rking in pe r
cducati n? !g. h (hj~....
• L ixure time
• When u ~ auld be carrying h u ehold chores
• In w rlJ ng hour ..
ihcr - please d ...cribe•
I J. What thor a '(i itics arc you! have ou been involved in with the project (eg
training. . posur visits, s If h clp group de clopmcnt etc)
12. How mu h time in cc h week. do ou ...pend in these other activities related to
the inter 'nti n ( g training, me ting with project "Ita1'1'. travel)
13, What w .nrld you be demg at rh se lime" if you were not working in peer
cd ucut ion?
14. Hov man people diu U ontact and pro ide education/referrals to in the
lust m nth?
15. or each of th s conta '(I., hov long did y u spend on average with the
indi iduals/ groups?
16. Do c mpcnsution fr m the project eg payment, travel
l.IlJOWUI1 .es, gifrs, s .iul support. If s . plea: ..c can y u describe these (type.
amount! aluc, Ir qucncy f payment etc)
17. D you rec i c tips puym nts in a timely mann r? Arc they sufficient to
cov r the services nu pro ide?
18. What costs do you incur <1' a result of the project (eg transport,
COl11l1lunjc,tti 11'i. iI1Cl1tive,., for pc""", to lislcn! ...eek treatment)'? Plea:e can y u
th,er]h rips .
19. What is our a cmgl.: t:. p ndilLlrl,; n Ih", project relared i(cm~ each III nIh?
_0. What hen !'ils do you gain from h ing a p 't:r cdll ator?
_I. nn you d s rih your rcluti nship with rh projc;cr Have you r your pt:ers
hud an uifl'iculti'Os in currying out thl.: projt:ct acti ities? What was the
pmblcm'! lTe \: \: crt: (heSt: res Ivl.,;u?
2_. 0 all rltl.: pt:cr t:ducutor ...r ·cI VI.: t h ' ...am Ie d or compel1"uti n and benefits?
Tf not. what are thl,;different I 'vels'? And \I h d Y tJ think thi ...is, o?
305
N
For r arch purpo es only
If the pc r cducnro. '\ a ., worker please ask the following:
- . Do you get paid b a. (he h ur b. b [he night, . per encounter or d. other
(please -pecl f
•.4. How mu 'h d you charge f rca h houri night/enc unter or ether?
25. H \' many pard en '( unicrvworking hour" do you have in a working day on
a crag?
26. How many da /nigh: do ou work. in a month?
_7. Plea"c an ou tell me all the income-earning acti ities that you are involved
in?
-8. What j!-. y( ur average monthly earning from all' urcex?
29. What i~}' iur normal" orking pattern for these - i.e. number of days per month
an I number or hours per da ; and the period, during the day and week (hat
you '-re \ orkim; on these...
30. ou have v orked hurd and nrc nov" resting and ha ing coffee with your
Iri nd,. HmI" much" ould I have 1O pay you (0 do <orne work for me for one
hour?
V "e}',. I' (1I/1t'\I'or,.. ()l '(I rlca] to c! ici! )'("/1('.
31. You ar .urrying out your housch Id chores. How much would I have to pay
y u to do som work for me for one hour?
Use ./hml('wor/.... overleaf to elicit m/Ut'.
J_. ou art; .u work. How much would T have (0 pay y u to do some alternative
work. for In lor one hour?
Use ./i'lIlI1t.!H'Or!.. ovcrtoajro elicit value.
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la~'( b\ mking ifttic IIouhl give lip t!tCII' lim '.for an 0111011111of rupee equivalent to
the,r l '/ '
( llt Y IIIU}JIlt' lI\ identified earlier ill \//I"I'C'V. Go througli the tep he/ow until vou
('()1I1'l'rl1" (11 .' , I ' .
... v ) (1111111111111111 vtttttc'.
lf yos, tl1('11 hal/I/I(' value
• If, "I again, then half rh amount again; if n , then ask q. with value
midway between prev It U"I aluc and' 2 the previou alue
If yes uguin, rh in hall' the amount gain: if n • then ask q. with value•
midway b crwc n prcvi us alue and "2 the pre ious alue
If no, 111,>1/ t/ouhlt, ,ht' value
• II' n ug.un, then Ut uble the amount aguin. if ye.. then ask q. 'With
value rnidwu b tween prcviouv alue antl'2 the pr viou alue
• fI no again. then tk ublc the amount again; if yes, then ask q. with
alu midv ay bctwe n pre i U"l value and 1'2 the previous value
33,Do Ih intervention outweigh th costs'? an you
e: plain our r 'as ns',
Thallk 111" " tervi /. I' ., II £'n'/(,II·"t'. OJ , It!11' (11m!,
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Append/x 7: Assumed length of /lfe of cap/ta/Items
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Capital inputs Life
Training and start-up
Medical equipment
Computers and other electrical equipments
Vehicle
Furniture and Typewriter
Project life (5 years)
Project lite
5 years
10 years
10 years
309
Appendix 8: Transaction cost survey interview guide
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Tar~ t d Inter mtion
Background to th cont ract
nd r. landing the ontracts v ith unding Agenci
I. Please can ou describe rh' c ntracus) that y u are working under for the TT:
• v he ivurc the Iundcrts)
• Wha: arc the c ntrucr peri <1(,)
What arc DU I' quircd In do by rhc fundal contracting agency (0 implement
the TT?
•
')-. n v hal gr und-, \ :l:-. th contra 'l awarded - competitive tender. dir et negotiation or
s 111 c thcr wa ? H v V u, rh award de ision made?
3. r r rh c )nlm r ht, been I" n cd please can you describe the proces of renewal. What
was your reason for I" ncv ing rh c nrra t?
4. V hat wus the 1"1,;,I..,on/l11 Ii alit n I' r entering into this contract'?
5. How was the price ,. (he contract d .idcd? an you describe f
negotiation with th purchaser for the setting of [he budget? L th money re eived
ade [uutc in terms r the vervi cs G pro ides, if not why? E.g. d e ...not c ver
COstset ".
6. Wruu is the re uirc I contriburic n to the budget? What are the funding sources
for this? 0 e... [he rganisation/orher ...ources contribute anything beyond it
budgerary comrrunn nts. if's why an I how much do you think this is'?
7. Is then: any 11 ibility in the budget'. (c.g. do you have to stick to the budget
CUlcg rie~ or )U 1110e mont.: ar und) Tn rh ory and in practice?
What \! (uld b lh implic. tion or u. an ovt:l' ...p~nd and b. an under-.pcnd in the
hudg'l? '.g. do u ha c to give the money buck.
re you paid on lime i(h the..:amount thal ou arc.;",uPP ~ed to rc.;ccive? If not plea~e9.
can you . pluin the reasoll~ r r no dela s r differl,;nccs'? Hm: often are there
delays'. 0 s thi" affect thl: way" rvicc" arc pro'vidl.!d?
J O.Whal is Ihe fund rl Ol1lru 'ri ng agency required to do under the c nTract? Have they
m t with their ohligation,,'? If tht;y didn't, W( ull you b' able to rc.;ctify thi~. How
Would you d lhis'?
II. Which sttilT carry out neti iti s r lilt d to Iht: managl:ll1cnt or the contract and the
COlltnlcling pr<ce~~? Do Dli 'it.:' nn of Ihc~c ,rafT .h key in ICl111 or your rcluti ns
with th purchn, r'?
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J -. Who 'It ur rguni: ati n v a ke (0 rh development f the contract (i .e. identifying
fund r, prop sal de ! pment, n g tiari n tc) ? What r le (if an ) did the e ecutive
C mmitl, Ib ard f tru: t 1.:' pla ? H w much lime was pent by each of these
indi Iduat-, in [he d vclc pment f the pr ~e r proposal and negotiating [he contract
ue;on.:crn nt.
PER N
(days) le/Act! itics Time
c mputers, building ere
r quir d'. If' vo, \' h fundc i th se and whi h of these (and how man ) are required for
m{ nit mng t r th Cl ntra t (cg computers)?
14. i I st~\ff' tt nd training lurmg th irnplemcruati n? Tsthis suffi ient? Why
J 5. (you think (U v ould increase the in cstrn nt in capital. item" and [raining or any
other areas, if the .onrractx 1,;1' It ngcr term? Why?
16, D )e, rh purchus r, t any criteria for thl,; acquisition of ...upplies (cg condoms. drugs.
r:. n uteriuls etc) r capirul items I' an rh r inputs'. What are the ?
Monitoring and Ianag m n1 of th ontra t
17. r you required It audit your accounts? If '0. how frequent! ? Ho often doe thi
happen in prnct ic '. Who pays Cor rhi-, and hat is (he CO~l?
. l la l: you b n pro kled ilh nny tr.linil1l" or ,upport help with the reporting
s ~t 'm'. Was this Ir'lining elTet:li ''1 Wh ?
19 Wh l( I' ,. . ., . . . h !
. ~ til'l.; ll(.; Imp lI.;atfl)ns 1 moniloring rl.:pm, lor your acllvf(lc,", - I.e. ow muc 1
lime Ut t 1I and (ur ....wcr "of' nd in preparing n;porr. : which ,raff ar pre enl d from
carrying (ut n nml! dady a 'Ii itie, und rl r hm long?
_0. Please dl,;~'rib any (h«.:rmonitoring mcchanisms. What were rhe impli ations of
this/thes isit ....for your organi."o:llion - i.l,;. did you .1I1d our !'!latT . pend time.: in
preparation und in h )sting the isit; whi h or our staf.,.\' erc prevented from arrying
Out normal dnily neti iri !'t and for hl)\' long'?
- J. Has (h rep rl"'g s stem chang d sin 'C DU ,Wrlc I .. irh rhc c nrracrual parrner? In
whill ways? (c.g. timing, Ct nlenl) Whut \. I,;)'e{he implic'lIions ofrhe"e hange",?
22. Whut prohlems 10 )U fa c. if an ,wirh lhi, monitoring ,y,rcm?
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2 •. If Y 1I v ant cd I ,uo Y u think it v uld be cas t pr ide Ial e figures? If '0 how?
(i.. where arc rh weaknesses in Ih ~m nitoring system)
_4. D s th contract .pe 'iCy th ~ penalties imposed in the as of a breach of c ntract?
• How would u I pe .r bre ..ichcs f nrra t t be re: Ived in pra ti e?
• D you/ ould oo ref r to and use th ontract do urn nt (e.g. stated
obligations and sancri nv) t r solve disputes?
Would y u exp 'I probl ms such a: th se to b res lved in a fri ndly v ay or
w uld Ihis 0"' difficult and usso iatcd with mistrust"
• Pleas an y u des .ribc your e pcricn of this. if any. Were there any costs
•
in I cd - what w r these costs?
y LI kn v of other orgunisati ns wher this has occurred. what happened?•
Performanc of contra t
25. What arc the tid antagcx and dixad anrugcs f working under thi. onrract? Doe: the
Contract ha ~an affect n ~ rice provisi n? g d s it effect efficiency or quality?
26. Is this y ur only I; p ericn c of v rking und r Cl c ntract like this'? Yes 0
• If not, Ple tiS ~ d "crib' your expert nccs and h w they ar different to working
on the targeted impit:mentalic n (eg what other ontra IS have you worked on/
for hut reas()n~/ with whal funding agencies/ how was relationship with
funder)?
• If so, what a Ijll~tm "nls hav Oll hall to make to do so (training. capacity
cl' elopm ~nt. in es(mCnl" elc)?
Which r th 's ~ dill YOll re I was rh bl.:st system'? What are your reasons for
this?
27. Do Y LI think. working on this il1r~r cntiol1 improved Ihl.: capacity of your
rganistllion? Tn what way?
2 . Do y u think y 1I ar tlble [0 manage 111 I,;ontra t and r p rt effectively with the
current mi r skill" and p rienc '? Tf' nor what further skills d you think you
•
r 'Illir '.
29. Please Cun I se a c py or th contn.H..:t1'01' the targeted inter enlion (i.e. the c ntract
YOll hold with thl.: funding agency).
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caling up
30. Has rh ':tIL r the tarzet \'Ir up au co er cbanzed0' 0' er time? If 0, plea e can you
d scrib
•
how has this changed.
What is the change in co erage? (p pulation size, number of areas ... tc)
Did (his lead t) chang s in inputs hIatT. travel etc) and activities - please can
you d scribe the change in detail?
WU':t thi-, reflect d in the contract? In what way?
•
•
• Has increasing co cragc affected the quality of services? How'?
31. 0 you think the cUITI.:nt coverage is ....urn .ient for prevention of HIV in thl ....area? If
not what and wh re arc 111"gap ....?
3_. What action would b required to in ruse c cragc of th W ... fr m the current
co rage I cl? What ould be required in term" t f further inputs (building ......staff,
cquiprn nt, supplies etc) if y ur rgunisution were l increase overage in this way?
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LONDON SCHOOL OF HYGIENE & TROPICAL MEDICINE
Keppel Street, London WC1 E 7HT
8Qplication Number .
(To be added by the Secretary) FORMA
ETHICS COMMITTEE
APPLICATION TO CONDUCT A STUDY INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS
bhiS form should be completed, signed by the Principal Investigator and Head of
L
epartment, and returned to Phoebe Roome, Personal Assistant to the Dean,
SHTM, Keppel Street, London WC1E 7HT.
Name of Principal Investigator: Lorna Guinness
APPointment held Research Fellow Date July 16, 2001
Other Personnel involved Dr Lllanl Kumaranayake (Supervisor)
Professor Charles Normand (Sponsor)
Title of project Economic Analysis of the Resource Requirements for
Scaling Up HIV/AIDS Interventions at the State Level In India
I approve this project scientifically.
(Signature of Head of Department)
Date .
Re~eived by Secretary to the
Ethics Committee
.............................................
.............................................
1. Give an outline of the proposed project. Sufficient detail of the protocol must
be given to allow the Committee to make an informed decision. (Attach a
summary of the project if this is more convenient).
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USingeconometriC methods, this research will investigate the key influences on the
costs of scaling up HIV prevention interventions in two high prevalence States in
India and identify the key policy implications of ensuring efficiency and adequate
funding of this scaled up response to HIV. The multi-site study will collect cost data
from a stratified sample of HIV prevention interventions using standard costing
teChniques including document analysis and interviews with project staff. To identify
the factors affecting the costs of scaling up, the degree to which they do so, and the
nature of organisational structures, qualitative data will be collected in semi-
structured interviews with project staff. Using the quantitative and qualitative data,
an econometric model will be developed to establish how costs change with
C~verage. Total resource requirements for 2 states (Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra)
Will be estimated for different levels of coverage and compared with the results
obtained from more traditional methods of estimating scaling up costs.
MethOdOlogiesfor estimating marginal costs of HIVprevention interventions in a data
cOnstrained environment will be developed and resource requirements for a scaled
up response in two States in India measured. Findings will be written up and
reported to decision-makers in the two States and at the national level as well as to
the organisations participating in the study.
2. State the intended value of the project. (If this project or a similar one has
been done before what is the value of repeating it?).
To assist in the planning for the response to the HIV epidemic at the state level in
India by measuring resource requirements for HIV prevention and predicting how
these might change as activities are scaled up. By providing this in-depth
understanding of the costs of Interventions, the research will help to ensure value for
money and adequate funding for HIV prevention in India. This type of empirical
analYSisand modelling of costs in India has not, to my knowledge, been undertaken
before.
3. Specify the number, age, sex, source and method of recruiting subjects for
the study. Attach a copy of any advertisement to be used.
SUbjects for the study are organisations providing HIV prevention services. The
sampling frame will be Identified In year 1 of the study in a mapping analysis of
organisations and projects working In HIVprevention In Tamil Naduand Maharashtra.
This will be complied through a postal survey and interviews with experts.
Information will be gathered on the type of activities being Implemented and their
COveragelevels, for all projects identified In the mapping exercise. In the case of
non-response, the postal survey will be followed up by personal contact. A sample of
30 prOjects from each state will be then be selected representative of the Intervention
types and coverage levels. This Is an appropriate sample size for econometric
estimation. Two randomly selected projects, from the sample, will be selected for
Pilot testing the data collection tools.
j. State the likely duration of the project, and where it will be undertaken.
his Is a two part project.
- Part 1: the mapping analysis and pilot testing of research Instruments will take 1
year: October 2002- October 2003.
Part 2: the cost analysis (data collection, analysis and write up) will take 2 years:
October 2003- October 2005.
s. Specify the procedures (including interviews) involving human subjects.
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~art 1: Postal questionnaire to be completed by a project staff member obtaining
Information on HIV prevention activities, location of project, target group, length
project has been running and approximate coverage.
Part 2: Semi-structured interviews with project staff and key stakeholders (for
example: donors, community leaders, project clients) will be carried out by the
research team. The content of the Interviews will be developed In the first year of the
project
6. State the potential hazards, if any, and the precautions being taken to meet
them (include information on hazardous substances that will be used or
Th' produced, and the steps being taken to reduce risks).
ISstUdy poses no physical hazards to participants.
7. State the procedures or activities, which may cause discomfort or distress
T ~nd the degree of discomfort or distress likely to be entailed by the subjects.
here IS no risk of physical pain or discomfort to any of the subjects. Interview
q~estions related to problems in project implementation could potentially cause
minor distress to the Interviewees, in particular If there is some form of corruption
Within the organisation. Care will be taken to be sensitive to these issues during the
Interviews and interviewees will be made fully aware that all information they provide
Will be treated as confidential.
8. Specify the degree of confidentiality to be maintained with respect to the data
collected and the method of achieving this.
~" study team members will be trained to respect strict conditions of confidentiality.
ata will be securely stored. During the period of data collection, results will be
recorded with personal Identifiers and will be kept In a locked cupboard. Data and
results will be aggregated so that they cannot be tied to Individuals or organisations.
9. State the personal experience of the applicant and of senior collaborators in
the study in the field concerned.
~orna Guinness (applicant) has worked for 5 years as a health economist. In this
t me, she has worked at the Ministry of Health, Bangladesh, and UNAIDS,Geneva,
and has been Involved In data collection In several countries in South Asia and
Africa. Lllanl Kumaranayake (supervisor) has supervised cost studies in several
cOUntries In Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe and leads a group of researchers
~Orklng on the costs of scaling-up for a variety of priority Interventions at the global
eVel. Professor Muraleedharan (overseas supervisor) has more than 15 years of
~esearchexperience In the field of health care economics and policy analysis In India.
hnparticular, he has worked on several studies on the private-public partnerships In
Health care provision In Tamil Nadu Including a study on the role of government In
AIV prevention. Dr Ramasundaram Is the previous director of the Tamil Nadu State
IDSSOCietyand Is currently a consultant to WHOCommission on Macroeconomics
and Health, advising on HIV/AIDSprogrammes.
10. State the manner in which consent will be obtained (eg verbal, written,
witnessed) and supply copies of the information sheet and consent form.
Healthy volunteers and patients will require different information sheets and
consent forms. (See notes attached at end of this form).
~rltten consent will be obtained from each of the organisations selected for part 2 of
e research. Please see attached (annexes A to C) for a sample letter requesting
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~~~sent, research protocol and a consent form. Verbal consent will be sought from
individual interviewees (see annex D).
11. State what medical supervision is available and its location in relation to the
subjects.
Not applicable
12. Is the study initiated/sponsored by a pharmaceutical or other industrial
company?
NO
If YES, name the company
13. (a) Does the project involve pre-marketing use of a drug/appliance or a
new use for a marketed product?
NO
(b) If YES, does the company agree to abide by the guidelines on
compensation of the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry
(ABPI) (Clinical Trials -compensation for medicine-induced injury) in
respect of patients?
YES / NO
If YES, a written statement from the company to this effect should be
attached.
(c) In a study on healthy volunteers does the company agree to abide by
the current guidelines of the ABPI for healthy volunteers?
YES / NO
If YES a copy of the proposed volunteer contract should be
attached.
14.
(d) What is the regulatory status of the drug under the Medicines Act
1968: Product Licence / Clinical Trial Certificate (CTC) / Clinical Trial
Exemption (CTX) / Doctor or Dentist Exemption (DDX)? If CTC, CTX
or DDX a copy of the certificate should be attached.
Will payments be made to subjects?
NO
If YES give details
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15.
Will the level of service or support available to study subjects be lower after
the study than during the study?
NO
It yes, give details and describe the steps being taken to minimize the loss in
welfare experienced by subjects at the termination of the study.
16. Describe the measures to be taken to communicate the results of the study to
study subjects, their representatives, local government, national government
and other relevant bodies who could use the results of the study to improve
0' the lives of the study subjects.
i Issemlnatlon workshops In each state and consultations with key agencies involved
n HIV prevention will Inform policy makers on the intervention specific and
organisational factors that affect the costs and on appropriate methods for
estimating resource requirements,
!o reach a wider audience, the study results will be submitted for publication to
International peer reviewed Journals and are likely to be presented a relevant health
economics or AIDS conference(s),
17.
Include any other relevant information.
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18.
Where the research is to take place overseas, the Principal Investigator must
seek ethical approval, through his/her overseas collaborators, in the
Country(s) concerned. Approval will not be granted by the LSHTM Ethics
Committee until this written approval is submitted.
Please list the countries where research is being undertaken
Other countries: India
Please submit formal ethical approval statement given by local committee within
~hachcountry. If ethical approval has not yet been obtained from a local committee in
e country, indicate to whom the proposal has been submitted and when a
response is expected.
~~hical approval has been waived as It Is not required for social sciences research. A
e ter from the Indian Institute of Technology Madras to this effect, is aUached.
Signature of applicant
Medically qualified NO
Other qualifications (please state)
MA Economics and Economic History, University of Edinburgh 1991
MA Development Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, 1993
MSc Health Policy Planning and Financing, London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine, 1996
Are you a member of a medical protection organisation? NO
Are you a member of any other protection organisation? NO
321
Annex A: Sample letter requesting consent from organisation
Date
Address Block
-------------,_---
Dear
The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the Indian Institute of
Technology (Madras) are undertaking a study to estimate the resource requirements
of scaling up HIV prevention interventions at the state level in India. Your
organisation has been identified as one of those that plays an important role in HIV
prevention in this State. We would like to request the participation of your
organisation in this study by providing organisation cost data and information
regarding the structure of the organisation.
Attached is a copy of the protocol. which gives details of the data to be collected.
The results of the study and the cost analyses specifically related to your
organisation will be provided to you.
We hope that you will respond favorably to this request and will sign and return to us
the accompanying consent form. Thank you.
Respectfully yours.
Fi;incipal Investigator
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Annex B: Research Protocol
Annex B: Research Protocol (to attach to letter seeking consent)
Title: Economic Analysis of the Resource Requirements for Scaling Up HIV/AIDS
Interventions at the State Level in India
Background: To halt rising incidence of HIV in India, scaling up HIV prevention activities in
or~e~ to achieve higher levels of coverage in target populations has been identified as a
pnonty. Further, it has been shown that greater effectiveness and efficiency of HIV
prevention can be achieved by targeting interventions to high risk populations such as sex
W?rk.~rsand injecting drug users. The National AIDS Control Organisation (NACO) of India
pnontlses these targeted interventions but, although, programme coverage, is
undocumented it is reported to be low and scaling up the response is now underway.
To ensure adequate funding, planning for the efficient scaling up requires an estimate of the
res.ourcesrequired to do so. Information needed to make these estimates include the costs
of .,mplementation and how these costs change as activities are replicated or expanded.
~hls study therefore aims to assist in the planning for the response to the HIV epidemic at
e state level in India by:
- calculating costs of targeted HIV prevention interventions in India
an~lysing how these change as activities are scaled up
uSing this information to estimate resource requirements for HIV prevention
Methodology:
Data will be collected from a sample of organisations working on HIV prevention in
Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu.
~alculation of. costs: cost data will be collected from eac~ ~rganisation. in the sample.
tandard costing techniques will be used. Data sources Will Include project reports and
dOcumentation interviews with project staff, expenditure records, staff salary sheets, stock
records and vehicle log books. To calculate unit costs indicators of coverage will be
required and collected from project reports, documentation and interviews with project staff.
Factors affecting the costs of scaling up: Interviews will be carried out with organisation staff
and organisation partners involved in the service delivery to provide an understanding of
W~atfactors may affect costs as activities are expanded and what barriers to expansion mayeXIst.
All data will be treated as confidential and be stored in a secure place during the data
~ollection and analysis. Data and results from each organisation will be aggregated in the
Inal analYSisso that they cannot be tied to specific individuals or organisations.
II1lPI.'C8tlons of the findings: The cost analysis of each participating organisation will
provide an understanding of the efficiency of their work, identify areas where cost savings
~an be made and assist in ensuring financial sustainability of the programme through .a
ette~ understanding of resource requirements. The findings of the overall research Will
~~~tnbute t~ developing methodologies in the under-explored area of the costs of scaling up
prevention programmes and inform local and national policy-makers and planners.
Dlsse.I1lI~8tlon of the findings: Study findings will be disseminated to the participating
~r~~nlS~tlo~S,policy-makers at the state and national level. They will also be submitted for
u hcatlon In peer-reviewed journals and at international conferences.
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Annex C: Sample Consent Form
Consent to Participation In the Study:
Economic Analysis of the Resource Requirements for Scaling Up HIV/AIDS
Interventions at the State Level In India
Principle Investigator:
Lorna Guinness, Research Fellow,
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
I ha~e read the research protocol for the study and I understand what will be
required of our organisation if we take part in the study.
I understand that the cost analysis at this organisation forms part of a broader study
~nd that the presentation of the overall study results will be in the form of aggregated
thataso that it is not possible to link these data to specific organisations. However,
e .results of the cost analysis of our own organisation's activities will be made
abvall.ableto us on request and will remain confidential unless written permission is
? talned from us. Further, I understand that all information provided in individual
Interviews with the research team will remain anonymous and confidential and will
not ~e released, including to any other member of the organisation, without the
permission of the interviewee.
~y questions concerning this study have been answered by the research team led
t:' Ms GUinness. I understand that at any time the organisation may withdraw from
IS study without giving a reason.
----_~Q{!.fi5J.qS:an!.!J/~·saS:t[!!iou.nLNC!Si!am!!1!ie:.._ agrees to participate in this study.
Signed . Date .
Name
Title
On behalf of the Organisation Name
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Annex 0: Individual Consent Form
Hello, may name is . I work for . We are conducting a
~~~dy~t your orqanisarfon--i.Q-fearn more about the costs of HIV prevention and how
ISmIght change as activities are increased in this state. We are interviewing all
~ey staff members in this organisation to help us collect cost data and understand
ow YOurorganisation works.
I am .enquiring today whether you would like to be interviewed about how the
organisation works.
I.Want to assure you that all of your answers will be kept confidential. You have the
right to stop the interview at any time or to skip any questions that you don't want to
answer.
YOur~articipation is completely voluntary but, by participating in the study, your
ehxpenencescould be very helpful in ensuring effectiveness and value for money in
teState response to HIV prevention.
NOTE WHETHER RESPONDENT AGREES TO INTERVIEW OR NOT
[ 1 DOES NOT AGREE TO BE INTERVIEWED • THANK PARTICIPANT FOR THEIR
TIME AND END
[ 1 AGREES TO BE INTERVIEWED
1
:s n~w a good time to talk? .
s thIs a good place to hold the interview, or is there somewhere else you would like
to go?
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~oes scale matter? The costs of HIV-prevention interventions
or commercial sex workers in India
Lorna Guinn I L'I 'G ss, I m Kum r n yake Bhuvan swari Rajaraman.: Girija Sankaranarayanan,3
angadhar Vannel ,I P. Ra hupathi. 'AI Geor e~
Ob' .M~~ct~eTo expl~re how th c I of proj affec both the total costs nd average costs of HIV prevention in India.
transm~.S E~onol~lICcost d I nd m sures of c le (cover 9 nd service volume indicators for number of cases of sexually
CollectI~efd Infectl?ns (S1Is) referred, number of Tis treated, condoms distributed and contacts made with target groups) were
parame ,rom 17 Interventions run by non overnmenr I or anizatlons aimed at commercial sex workers in southern India. Non-
Findin tnc m thod nd r gr sion n lysesw r used to look t the relationship between total costs, unit costs and scale.
sexW ~S Coverag v n d from 250 to 2008 sexworkers, Annual costs ranged from US$ 11 274 to US$ 52 793. Themedian cost per
costs fr e~re hed ~s US$ 19.21 (r n ;::;US 10.00-51.00). The scale variab~esexplain more t~an 50% o.rthe ~ariation in unit
Conclor. I of ths unit co t m sur sec pt cost per cont t. Total costs nd unit costs have non-linear relationships to scale.
could uslen A~erage costs v ry with the scale of the project. Estimates of resource requirements based on a constant average cost
for pi un?ere tim te or overestim te tot I costs. The re ults hi hlight the importance of improving scale-specific cost information
nnmg,
~~O~d~ HIV infections/prevention nd control/economics; Prostitution; Sexually transmitted diseases/therapy; Contact tracingl
M oml S, Condoms!economl s; COS! nd co t naly is; Indi (source: MeSH, NLlv1).
Re~~ c~es I~fection VIH/preventton et contr6Ie!economie; Prostirution; Maladies sexuellement !ransmissiblesltherapeutique;
Pal ere e suiet conta eeonomi; Condom! conomi ; Coat et nalyse coOt; Inde (source: MeSH, INSERM),
Traz~~radsclave Inr cion s por VIH/pr v n ion y control' onomia; Prostitucion Enfermedades sexualmente transmisibles/terapia;
o e eontactoleeonomi ; Condones/economia; CostOSy analisis de coste. India (fuente: DeCS, 8IREME).
~UI '."J"'~ . .)~ 1 ..r.J~ IS ..wI ~\..... ~~.J cJr-)1 1/1.:.1.1j_,.J1v ~ \S_,..wl.y ~\i I cJr-)11/1.:.I.1 j_,.J1v.J~ \S_,..wl :.,b.i11 .;.,ws::JI
~;: J3~) "~') •.cll ..;.,JIS::IIJ.ll ._i"IIS::II ~f.lll J.il_,.JI .;..1t~1..a:i1~f.lll jI_,.JI ~WI ,\.i.:il .;..1t~l..a:il,~WI ,\.cil cJr-)1
BUlletinofh ~'_~\.j~ ~1\""&\ ,0.,1.\\
t eWorld Health Organization 2005;83'7 7·755.
Voir page 75 I .4 e rcsume cn ran(,alS En la pagtna 75-4 '9ura un resumen en espanol
. ()nomi [heory h p )[IK,i1.es thar a:. s ale increa-,e.~,
mral ns[, increase .H.l hangi ng rare, giving rise ro rhe l.u sic
-~h,lped a er.lge ,r urve. Thi. curve result! from endin
inpllrs ;H ing irh rhe le cl of Ollrpu[ (such ,IS rhe o'r of
condul11~ or drug~) .lI1d. in rhe "hurr run, orher co~rs ren13in-
ing 11.cd (-,u 'h ,1., () erhead., and building co,rs). . (he s ~e
in rc.ll>e!'.fixed osrs are -lured vcr n in rea. ing number of
ourpllrs lImil rhe rC:lch the limir f rheir ;lpa iry. Thi haring
of n. cd UM~ lead., (() n )n-linc3ririe.\ in rhe rcl Irion.,hip be·
rv ccn r r.11'0 'rs .md S':;,IIe. idence from rher hC-Jlrh servi es
,u pon, rhe theory of non-lineariri' .lnd .'uggc.,r.\ (h:)[ coS[,
vnry \ irh ale ,IS ell ,IS \ irh ;\ number of orher conrcxruJI.
organizarional and inrer cmion·.,pc in fa [()rs ( -12).
In Indi:!. where ,111 rinured -.1 milli n p<.:opk arc Ii -
ing \ ith H I or AJ (I). [he! a[ional ID onrrol Pro·
gramme. lInder rh" dire rion of rhe arional ID onrrol
Pra sh,lndl
I!mb r 2004 - Pled: 10 lilnuilry 2005)
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rg.lnil Ition h· I I', . ..l\ l.onrr.l('[n wirh nllngm crnmcnr.i urg.lnl/.l-
[Ion~ ( . v) LII" ' I I' I ' k
) 1 [() [,Irger I' V prcvcnrion rov .Ir~, Ilg rer-nv '
groups (I I"" I ' I r [ , I "
I
- .. 1I1t , .urun.i ,\ 'i onrro rL:'.IIlI/.trIOIl,
lInpu )Ii~h . I 1 'I I " "" ,ct glllL c incx. 2( (0), D.I(.1 on [he ..(h[, ot [hew uu-
n a n vc 'Ire (u I '
1-1' h . I: scarce 10 ••lllt [ ~ 'il,on, I cvic« of rhc I lealrhyIlg I a 1'\ '
I' . "noJeer. Ilnpubl"hl'J report. 19"; V onz.ilc: er
a, Nlld[erm I ' t'" . , I'c .1 u.ruon n wcvr Beng.d exu.d He.llr 1 Prole'r,
lInpubli~hedr'o 1111)1 'l'l't' , :!
f' q n. ; r lere I' 1[[ e III Ilrll1.trIOIl ro l r.1Ion mm 'I ' I 'h c ,el lere ( I. I' .20); ,llld rhere 1\ 11I111[etlCl IJeIKI' on
OW rOfll co I 'I ' , ' J)
, , " C l,mgt' .1' .1<.11HIe' e p.ln I (_I ,
, In an.ll 'ing rhe C(hr, of I HI -prl'l.:nrilln imeJ'l.:n-
I'I0n., r1rPere] , I k' I I I'I' . e- t.1I L( mmerCI.1 wX \ Ilr 'er, 111 ,Ollr l<'rn 1l11-1,
I' It' paper' I I I' . I jc P ore, WI '''1 e.d e(l, ,i[e-'pe 'int' ro[.l co,r, .Inl
aVtragcC() f'L11 'o ,r, 0 I preVClllllll1, Ir i, rhe nr,r p.tper [(J pre' 'Ill
c' .\1' .'-H.I oliecreJ from mulriple ,ire' li)!".1 ,illgl<' III -prevcll-
1011Illcer .' 1'1 I' , '
I I:IHltll I. I': .111.1) 'I' .Itldre ,e, ~ re\;IOlh probklll\ otnler 10 lol()!;, I I I (" I I't' J'", e-I(;.I .lllt t (' lnlrU)n.1 I erell'e' .llltl .HI.trIOn'ln
IIlPUI valu' I ' I " ,, f' ,1(1011,\V lie I n:,e.lreh ..'r, ofrcil f.lce \I hell It'lllg co,r
Inornl,1(i t', I" ,d d' on 10m t If erem ,III :lIe, ('I. lO. __ ), b u II1g.1 ,r.ln-
a r I?ed n I :! .' I
I ler In .1'n)" rhe ,ill", Ir i, rherctore ,Ible rn exp orelOW co' ,sr, ary I nh , ..de,
Methods
Sample selection
: J. ~- 'Ill I apprtl.l 'h ~ .1' '"lod to en,lhlc in-deprh iIl\igllr'
" We I ,I., cOlietl iOIl of full I.:tOIl0ll11 cmr, '.: enreell ,
Were scle red f' I - I ' '" I 'fi' j'a ' 101ll r le ')1 r.lrgere( InrenelHlOIlS It cml et III
N, t;:~~11\MlrVe of illrervt;:llri( Il\ ill f\ndhr. Pr.11e,h ,IIlJ T.lm il
i ,,/eh
u (T.lole I. a .tiLlhle onl Oil [hI.: lVt.:b,I[ hlrp://\ ,who,
ne 1111,' ) B I
S I ,~nll, or 1 \r.H~' h.1d comr,leled I"ilh G ,on.1 1,lr~e'p;) c (I,e" til(' more rh.!n -0 inrel enriolb), Inrer enriom v e're
urpo~ively I I d' I' I'd''I ,.Imp et .Iecm Illg I\) [lelr C,lp,lClr , r le hln Ing
'gen y, rhei r <>, I' II' ,,' Iin H ' t>l.:ogr,lp 11(..1 OC;I[lOII, expertellce In Illlp elll<;I1(-
ing" IV Inrervenrinll\ .1n I I illingne,~ [() p.micip.lre, nly
eCIvcnrl( 'I 'ill )11\ .IIITlet .H 'ommert'I.11 ", work.:r, \~ere ,de reJ
rder ro c le:!," ' " , , , ,epid' Ilrro lor II erelll;C, III IIHer ell[lon .1'rlVlllC"
enllolopv In:! I'" 'I ., , ,ti I' N' ( urgel IOpll ,HlllO~, Iml ;1rlrle~ In Inrervell-()n c e~lg ..:. n Wcre lurrher cn"un.:d b rhe Mion.tI \.1 ' ()Il[rol
rganil'lrio " '" ,',and "d' ,Il ~ pres'rtpnoll of "t.: 'olllpOllelll\; Inf rlll.Hlon
Pc lIC, nOll ( 11 hch,1 iOllr.11 'Iullge. eon:!)Ill di,rrihllrion.c~~u ' , ,
(TT ,anon, m:,n.lg.:m 'nr of t.: lI,tlly rr.llhmirrc I ink '[itln,
Ve ,)' 'Ind rearlllg .111ell.lbling ell ir Illllenr fi)r rhc inrer-
I1rton ( d' I I' I '.LIn II' ' , "n .trIOIl.! nllrm rg.11l11.Hlon,
PU) I~hcd gllid ,line". 10 )(}),
Data collection
na~n,()~i dar,1 on pro Ider,' 0\1', IV 'I''': ,ulle rcd for rhl.: Ii-
in CIa year 001-_00 ; LILI indlldt.::! illform.Hioll 011 ' sr,
IIrred a I' rh ' 'I Id' d' I' 1Il[ rvenrlOIl- e e .111 fun Ing-agell le e,
onomic s ' I J II' 'I I' , ,and 'I . I' III II(IC ,I 1111'111\ In 0 c, III rhe IIHerWllnOIl
V,l II ' ch 'm h' '(' I d" hare d .H I' 'Ir OPPOf[UIlI 1,,[ Ill' U IIlg IIlpur, l ,H
F donared or ~lIosidi?ed), Thi~ pro ide,.l 'LlIld.lrdi7ed l1lerh! d
r aCa C lie 1" II' I'd ' Iin I n, CIl,I) Illg ,I I (;!)~r comp,lrIs!)n .Iero , rIc
rcrvcnrio I' d'a F:, n~,) . Ingre lenr, ,Jp rn'lch [() o,ring .1\ u,e I
.tr ,\ P , hi (t' II e 'c. r t.: .1I11p ,( )).
MeaSuring scale
.Ieisddlndf' "I' ,.th. , rom an e OIlOITlI per,p nVe - I' ur I~, I[ 1\
l:XCcnt Or I 'v I f' " h' I' '.Cl", ' ' () .1 (IVlry .lr WI' 1 ,In IIl['r ..:nWln I., op-
of: nng ( • ), ()1If'mgf!, which is mCil~lIrc j b rhe Illlmbt.:r
An~ ~~I ,re~ch, d. r !le 1', .lle~, Jelined h n.uion.ll pnli y,
t r />Lxmdl ;]rUr., r ,H· r di acne .I\PC r, uf rh· 1I()!tlll1r' of
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vcr i n delivered: number of commercial vex workers referred
t;)r 'TI rrcarrncnr, number of Tls treated. number of ondorn,
disrribure 1. number of lir r onr.icrs made wirh members of
rhc r.lrger group. roral number of conra r, rn.ide wirh mem-
ber, of rhc r,lrger grOllp and roral nurnbcr of COnrdC[S wirh the
member, of the cornrnuniry. All -calc mcavures were obtained
from j CO\ routine monitoring 'Y"reIR,
Input identification
Inpur\ \ ..:re idc:nrilietl by re ie ing proj..:crdocumenrJrion, by
inrcrviewillg proje r per,! nne! ,111 j by ,l~ err.1illing IOedl mJrker
price, ( ppendix I, ,l\.lil.lbk only on rhe web ,I[ Imp://ww\\,
\Vho,inr/bulkrin), Thc:y wer..: d.b.,ihed .b fixed or variJble. clC-
'ording ro ,r,lntiilrd eeo'nomi ddlnirions (5), Where qllanrirics
were nor .Iv.tibble. expc:ndi[url'.' l'vere u,ed co repre,ene inpue
leve'" Bec.lll\e merhod" of TI m.ln,lge:Ille:nr v,Hied, rhi, wa,
c Ibidercd .111inpllr caregory in ir~df Funding Jgen y-kvcl
inpur, werc ,ll1n .lIed [() rhe inr.:r'v..:nriom u,ing dir..: c .lllo a-
rion merho j, (T),
Cost valuation
All ml, \~l'fe alued ,If 10 ',11Durker pri "Peer ..:du .lcor,' rime
,Ind CO,b \ ere ,1,cerr,lined chrough ,I impk biddillg g,Hlle rhJc
generared "Iu.:, which were rhen valid.l[ed in imefl iew, ieh
omre.1 -h ,r.lf: olldollh di"rribllrcd free: of harge: were valued
.H rite pri'e of rhe lowes! COSI',"remarive in rhe Illarker - rh,lr
i" ,I \ub,itiil.:d "oci.111 m.lrkercd ondom, Be ame ehere \ t:r..:
T ble J Characteristics of 17 HIV-prevention interventions
run by selected nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and
targeted at sex workers, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh.
India, Values are numbers (%), unless otherwise indicated
Characteristics of the interventions' Distribution
Intervention design
STI treatmen
Referral
NGO's own cliniC
Context
TamIlNadu
Andhr Pr desh
Median % (range) literacy
Median (range) length of time project
under way (years)
Capacity
Cern ied to r celve foreign funds
No certificate
Certified
Median No, (range) of staff working
on HIV(n - 16)
M dl n (r nge) nnual expenditure
(USS '000) (n - 14)
15 (88)
2 (12)
8 (47)
9 (53)
73 (59-85)
6 (3-13)
3 (17,6)
14(8204)
39.3 (4,9-95.3)
51,6 (5.3-1 088,3)
9 (529)
2 (118)
2 (118)
4 (23.5)
15.5 (4,8-27.2)
Bull lin of rh World Haith Organ,zal1onI0 0 005. 3 (10)
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no d.ll.1 on re . I 'J I' I. c Ulll~'. I le ncr l(h! of con om '.1 l'\ (I.c .. me
C()~rof con I . . I
uom pn)(lI!'elllenr nunu-, revenue [rom '.1 C\) \\I.b
J"~lIll1ecl ro be O. nnll.dl/et! ccouomi; 1.I1,r, \ ere c.ilcul.ired
IISIIh>.I,rllll· i J' ',' _
C'! .' u.i« utscuu nr r.uc of )flU (vee, for cx.uuplc. (_ )).
I l
apl!." rrcrn-, \ ere .1.,.,ullll:d ro h.I\1: .1 life ur between ' and
( Yl'lf\ d J'. .. cpcn Illg Oil rhl ircm. All Uhr, \\II:re eon erred
Dt()con"Llnr -()02 0.' In [i.in rupccv, lI\ing rhe ;or (Cm~.,OlnC~rt . P i I I
( !; !'o lIcr) l d .HOr, .11lt! rlll'U COllvl'rtcd ro L doll.lf'
$ 1.00" _ flip,;,;,) (_8).
Analysis
'C.llc. tor II ' :l' I
I· . . t:O'I'. C{hr ,rrllcrllfe, .Inl lInlr co,r, (ror.1 cn,r,e IVlded hi' .. .1, ';] e .lrl.lhle) \ ('re omp.He I .IO(h' [he lI1[erven-
[lOllS O· I. IIc ro r 11.' 'Ill,dl "lI11pk ,ill:. Ilt)J)-p.lr.lml'rfic Illl'[ho h
Wlrc I" 'c1 I I I' d I. ~ [() ll)".1[ [Ic rd.lflolhhlp I I:[\VCln 'l.dl: .111 [lc
!\\In (hI v;tri.11 it:,: roLlIC(h[, .lIld lIllir Cll,r,. Thl: '0.'[ ari.lbl.:\
Wert rcg cl I. , re\.\c 011,.1 e. Lomp.lnng line.lr .1I1d qu.](ir.ui· eqll.1-
[1011form,.
I OU-p.lr.lllll'rric Illcrllnd, were: .d,1) l"ed ro look .HW k[her . I I ' :l I .'It:;] l. LOu CO,[, .tnd IIlli[ CO,[, .Irc .If letcl Llc-
tOr~ inc! d' I
I L' II Ing r le '['He where rhe inler enrinn rook pl.1 e.rIc luncling I I j " I J' .I' .Igent: . r It' m('[ In I nf m.ln,lgemeill. 1II,[rJ r
It~racy icv'l I ·1 '. I . I l jh' c '. ~ngl 1 of rl[ll~ I Ie projeCt I.IS )l'C1l lIIltl'r \ .Iy.
r l IIlrl:f en' . I I d I . .I Ion, )1I gI:l .111 r It: (_, ,·.lp.1 [[. wo te\[\
W re.'1I\e.'c1.rh J' f' . I I . II
(. '. c 1lle'IIl.ln re',r (r c.He'gone.l eXF .1Il.Uor .11'1.1)e'\Ilported 1 p. , . k d I. .' l'.lr'Olh Xl} .111I pt:.1I'I11.1n, LIIl' )1' Cl' COffe .1-
t IOn od'n,·. () '. . I' I. lenr r, Inr for 11l1cpendence or ,.Imp e' fOf I le
nlllfttlnu()I1' c. pI.I1l.1[)I· .1J'i.lbb ('Icc. for c. ,1I11plc. (29}). Th~
11u Iyporl·· f' I I' I'
I lc\l~ or e.l '1 rnl \ ,h rh.H (here \ .1.' no re .1[(Oil'olip)~!\\Ilcn • I . I I. .'C.1l val'l.1 C\ 01' e(h[ v.1fi.lhlc, an 1 rhe c.:xpl.lI1.1ror
V:ln.lhle'.
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Sensitivity analysis
DuI.' ro rhc rcrr spccrivc nature ofthe study, several con rrainr
\ ere (leed in c1.HJ collection: -orne dar.i were mi",ing; [here
were inaccuracies in the d.HJ; and sornerirnes prices h.;d ro he
used in place ofcosr. ne-way vensiriviry analysis was used ro
account for rhe-.e lirnir.uions hy manually hanging values in
rhe mring <preadsheerv (Table 2. available .ir hnp:llwww.who.
inr/bullerin) and generaring range~ offotJI OSL and unit 'osr,
fill' ~·.lChinrervenrion. Thl non'parJme[ri [e.,r, Jnd regre.",iort,
\Vt:re [hen run .1g.lin ro explore wht:rher rclarion~hip\ \rill held
\ hcn c. trlml' values Wlre usc.:d.
Findings
NGO characteristics
1l.lf.lcrerisric ofrllc ,ciected NCOs .Ire described in Tlble 3.
)f rhe ~.lmple. R were in Tamil Nadu Jnd 9 were in ndhrJ
Pradesh. Four diHerenr funding .lgen ies were repre enred in
rhc ,.1II1PI.:. Di.,rricr lirl:racy farC' rangcd from 60°0 to ( 5%.
The G s' ror.t! dnnll.d l'xpcnditllrc ranged from U -32
to U 1.1 million. ~ irll rhl' proporrion of 'rdf' working on
HIV repre,enring hetween -°'0 and 95<lo nf all sraW Three
I , were nor eerrined ro fe cive forcign nmd ....Thc Icngrh
of rimc rhe inrefvenrion h.1d hecn under way aried from 3
ro 13. l',w. Two of rhl' inr~nel1[i IlS provided TT sen iel' .Ir
rheir own clinics; 1_ 1 GO referred people for rfeJrmell( hur
,uhsidi7ed [heir rrearmenr; Jnd .3 mJde referral. only.
Total costs and cost profiles
Tor.11 co~r., .1I1d [heir hre.lkdown .He de. crihed in Table'!. The
Illt:Lii.1!lcorJicmr.1.'I '19958(fange= 1127 -52 ""93).
T ble 4. Total costs and cost profiles of 17 HIV.prevention interventions run by selected nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and targeted at sex workers. Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, fndia·
Cost category Costs (USS 'OOO)b-- Median Minimum MaximumFixed personnel 3.63 (15.7), 1.08 (6.5) 8.27 (22.6)Training
0.12 (0.6) 0 1.70 (3.2)
Monitoring 055 ( 1.9) 0.03 (0.2) 0.92 (3.6)
BUifdingand office COSts 257 (12.7) o 6 (3.6) 5.29 (26.1)Vehicf s
007 (04) 0 (0) 2.37 (10. )
Tot I fixed
6.80 (34.1) 1.71 (13.5) 16.10 (40.6)
V ri ble p rsonn I 4.62 (197) 1.28 (10. ) 6.49 (28.9)
Peer educators 2.16 (9.9) 0.34 (1.2) 12.83 (34.9)
Information, educ tion nd communic lion materials 0.38 (1.3) 0.01 (0.1) 2.21 (12.8)STItrealm nt~
0.71 (3.3) 0 (0) 2.33 (10.7)Condoms
085 (3.8) 0,01 (0.1) 7.37 (18.8)Meetings on (3.5) 0.08 (0.4) 2.32 (8.8)TranspOrt
136 (46) 015 (1.2) 2 5 (93)Other
0.40 (1.3) 0 (0) 1.62 (5.3)
Tot I variable
10.88 (53.2) 4. 8 (39.7) 34.19 (70.7)Total NGO
17,04 (88.5) 6.78 (60,1) 50.28 (95.3)Agency
2.51 ( 11.5) 1.53 (4.7) 4.50 (39.9)Total
1996 (100.0) 1127 (100.0) 52.79 (100.0)
: ~heminimumnumb r of comm rClals X wor ers r cheelby n In! IV nllonwas 50: Ih m dian was I 7: he maximumwas 008.OS!Sre In 2002-03 prices.
I V lu Sin par nth s s r Ih m di n. minimum nd m xlmumv lu s for Ih p re mag 5of (alai COStS In ch COSIca! gal)'.STI- 5 xually!r nsm," ,"I liOn.
Bull !inof th W I Ior d Haith OrganiZiI!ion Oe!ob r 2005. 83 (10) 749
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J~~lt 5. Coverage, vOlur_n per comm rcial sex worker reached and non-parametri.c te.sts for factors influencing scale varia~les
sex he 17 HIV-pr~ventlon Interventions run by selected nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)and targeted at commercial
Workers, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pr desh, India
Intervention characteristic
State
Funding geney
Cenifl d to r celv for I o und
STIserviceprovision
10 1.10d (11.41-100 1)
O.71d (0.20-1.49)
3.434 (1.68-9.22)
3.83d (2 30-10.19)
Sample Relationship with
size coverage (Spearman's r,)b
17 1.000
17 0.3235
14 0.6205'
17 0.2304
15 0.4500'
11 0.2091
11 0.3455
17 0.7527'
17 0.2034
1 0.0549
16 0.1321
17 -0.5817
Pearson'sX2
17 1.8862
17 4.9554'
17 0.1365
17 0.0048
en he two
750
n th connnoces and he categorical variables.
irh running an off ~.) arc rhe rnosr imporranr Ii. ed osrs,
v irh median alues of'I()()'h and I 'Yo. re pc rively, Irhough
rf';llfllng srs ,lppear ro be I \ . rhc majoriry of rhc c 0'[ arc
incurred .H rh agcn le cl. ornprising between ()% and 2 %
f.lgen·
Scale of the interventions
ln rerm~ of 0 eragc, inter enrions rea hed from -0 ro _008
omrncr i.11 se: \ orkcrs (Table ).. ind non-pararncrri re rs
vhov rhar there .ire ,ignin am relationships between 0 er: ge
, nd funding :tgen • budger (p sirive) and litera rare (nega-
ri d. B ,IU~'co cragc level" ur ,I r • rhc inrcrvcnrions,
ornparisons ofservi e olurne v ere made b fir r dividing rhe
lume de' ripror b crage, rhus re caling large ariation
in -er i c olurne. AJrh High a relationship hcn e.:n olum.:
.md over.lge il,\ e pc red. no ~ignifi am relarion~hip \! a
b erVe I. cx cpr in rhc ,I.' f numocr f TIs rreined.
Average costs of the interventions
rhe inrer enrion MC de ribcd in Table 6. Thc
O. O.
up i
8ull tin of th World Haith OrgaOlzatlOO10 ober 2005,83 (10)
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Tabl RelationShip b tw n total costs. unit costs and scale for 17 HIV-prevention interventions run by selected
nongovernm ntal org nil tions (NGOs) and targ ted at commercial sex workers. Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. India
Measure of scale Total costs' Unit costs (USS 'OOO)b
___::::~~:- ~M~e~d=ia~n~(r~an~g~e~)~S~p~e:ar~m:a:n~·s~m::o~(r.~,)~
Coverag (n - 17) 0 7990' 19.21 (9.86-50.70) -0.5221
~::ually tr nsml ed infecllonsr f rred (n _ 17) 04 28' 49.82 (16. 7-167.48) ·0.8750'
C u lIyrr nsmin In Ion tr led(n .Iol) OS017~ 62.9(13.91-1 1.19) ·0.7987'
Fi~S~dc~msiSlnbu (n.17) O. 80' 0.22 (0.05-1.28) ·0.9216
nt CISWllh I rg group (n 15) 04500.1 26.29 (13.88-59.81) ·0.7964
:::cont ctswithl rg rgroup(n_lI) 04273 497(174-11.27) .0.7182'
M ~?nt s (n '" 11) 0.5 5' 4.68 (1.57-8.46) ·0.5000
~alcos!(r n (11. 7-52.79)
AnalYSis f . .
" 0 cost venation
r.llo'rhl:! '. II' .\Vi lb' 'r'W'fll..l "glll!i\..lIH .ind povirive rel.wolhhlp'
rn orh Co • 1 III . I . I' t' I(111 cr.rgc .llll.1 )1Ir OIlC of rnc III icarorv o WI umc
'onrl- iih rltOI I .1;[.' I II I ll' r.lrg!;! gltlllp) ( .Ihk 6). Fig. I ,htl\\' hOI
.1 cow, I Ido . n rC.l\c "'"I[ 1 Ul\I!;r.lge .lI1d ,u).tgl',r, rh.1[ IIlLII C(hr,
nor III r I' I •(Ill " ~:l\e 1Ilt'.lr . rh~ \jll.ldr.lllc model h.I\ .1 higher R'
q~lIrel)t'n I f'Ii'''' I . I I I'fa e-' I) f1,C"0' r of I Ie regr~"lt)f\) r 1.lIl r Ie lIIe;lrrnl ~1I1) .b, ' rPUrrJllg [he h porhe,i" The qll.1 ir.tri . rd.l[iomhip
Cl; een 10( tl . 1 I I I h Id' . l:0\1' .Int , .1 I; .1 '0 .Ipp '" [() r I; vo Untl.: 111-
I .HOr Cl( I .grou Cepr cnll om\ d"lrthllre; I, .dl nnLlU, ~ Ifh urger
Po . p.\ ,1nt! .111conr.1 [\. The r~gre ,it m ImplY rh.u rhere i, ,ISirl e lilll .,. I' b1 I ' r rl,;,trlom lip em cell c;ofldolll\ .lIld ro[.d crhr .
()Wev· , h
'I g I c;~. Iklf !;I' [hl' "lkM mudd ntH rhl' oll.ldr.Hic model 1.\
, 00 Ii fl
(F' I Or rh~· rcI.Hioll"hip, IcrwI;c;n Ih!; I,.onucr .Hi.1bk,
I, !lor' 'Ii. "gill C.lll[ .In I R> (), 1).
rw" Th~ 111111h porhc:,i, (rh.11 rhc:re i, 110 rel.Hiomhip bc-
Cell llllll 'I) j •1'1 C '[ .111J mC.hllrc, of \ ·.dc) UII .11, le rejened .
. Ie I'C\Lilr\ )1' I ., .
ag , (I' l' lIon-p.lr.lIll 'me r~"I' of co,r per lInlr of, '.Ik
allhr rh '~ re'\pC fI ~'''lle unir .Ire .111lleg.Hi e.1I1 f. \ irh rhe
cv .cprion of ,dl conr.i rs, sr.iri 'ri ally signincallr (Table 6),
The scale 1.lri.lblcs explain more [h,1I1 0°0 of rhc ariarion
In unir CO\[, for .d' measures of unit (hr~ excepr cost per vex
v orker rc.rched .1I1d ovr per onra r. The intiuen e of the fa -
rorv, :fe' ribed ill T.lhle J. on unir 0 r was .11,0 resred lI,ing
11 ll-p,lr.lIllerric merhods (sec Appendix 2 ,Ind Appendix 3.
.Iv.lil.lbk only on rhe \ cb ,H hrrp://\ .\ ho.inr/bulkrin). e
I,.mild nor fI.:jl.:[ rhl.: null hyporhe,'i, of no rdarion,hip c. ep[
fi1r .1 neg.Hi e rd.uiomhip berween hudger and the OS[ per
condom t!iMribured •. 1po,irivl; rd,l[ion,hip berween (he lengrh
nf rime rh~ proje r h.ld b~en IInder ~.I .lIld rhe o,r per ,ex
work" rd'crrl.:d for TI [re;lrml'f1[ or [hc co"r per 'Tl rrc::ncd.
.1 plhiriY~ rel.uion,hip belween rhe pri e of field workers and
rill.: (hr p!;r Oll(.lcr. and ,I p(hiri e rel.Hion,hip berween [he
price of peer e lllcaror, and rhe (.\r per TI referred.
Thc regre ,ion., )funir CO,[, Jgain,[, ale .,uggc,red non-
line.lf rel.uiomhip, ex epr in rhe C.be of all onr.l r. (Fig. 2).
In 10 lking ,H rh!; firr~'d n:gn.:,...,ion line of OM per 'c. worker
re'.l 'hed .lg.linsr Oyer.lge. e ob,erved .1 nned line re. embling
Fig. I, Regression: 0) lin or nd b) qu<dratic forms of total costs goinst scale of HIV-prevention interventions targeted at
~~~merci I s x work rs (CSWs).(V Iu I or 2002-03 pri( s; ddiljonal s a ISj( lin orm Ion IS vall ble ar e allowing
L hnp:llwww who 1nl/bull In)
b)
<> SO
:;:;
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~
§ 30
~
i20
'!
:?
10
2000 0
<> f, ........ c , ~s
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Fig, ,Fitted regression: a) linear and b) quadratic forms of costs per unit of scale for the HIV-prevention interventions targeted
at commercial sex workers (CSWs), (V lues r 2002-03 rices; ddirional s a IS Ical In orma ion ISavailable a he ollowinq
URL hnpJlwww who In bulle !OJ
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a cL!.\.\ic I J . I I h ''. -\ up.: .1 cr.lg.: l.(hr .ur c 111 I III I I ere 1\ .1U)\[-
tnlnll11il.in' I· I I' . . ) "0)g I: I: () W .:r.lgc In Ihe r.lngc of I ( ( 0-1 (\.:.
workel'~ rca hc:d.
b, Thl.' ~clI~iri ir .uul '\i, gl.'lIl.'r.trl.'dr.lngl.'\ fl)r rhc rOLlIcostscrwecll 1011 . I - , "I I'
" 7() .lllt OliO of Ihe .111I1.' III rhc (rtglll.1 .111.1y~IS,
II11lhrly I ' ,I ',.' r 11.' r.lllgt' tllunir co~r~ I .I~bl.'fI 1.'1.'11 louo.lIlt! 'uilOf
r le Ortgln.ll v.llue\. The I e".fir regre ...\i In model, for co,r per
p~r on rea hed (Fig, • ) .Int! 1.'(1\1 per I11c.l.'ure of" volul11e hel I
w len rhl:y ~v. " I h I
1:1" rlln .1g.lIn I I[ 1 r I:~C c. rn:1ll1: .1 1IC:~.
Discussion
The O;,r I' .. .In.1 "oll.1rgereti HI -prevcnrion inrervenrion;, pre-
Scn,[(;d h T(; 1:. plorc, h II CO\[\ .11' .1 1'0 ..., \imil.lr inrcr t·nrion~.
WIll a p . I -f < . .lrrt U.l[ In II.' on hm -o.\r, .lr .1' 'ording to rhl: \ -.tI.:
rhe IlIr··/,v'· D'I' 'J' I I I~ I:IHI II, I erell-I,;, I crt' Imlnu III r Ie ~ca e, ror.1
osr~, OSf '[rll J B I I J!lire' .lIlt! .Wer,lge co,r" or 1 m[.l (hr, .lnu
.1 cr.igc (br, ere found ro h.l c 'ignificanr reiarion.,hip" wirh
rhc \ .ilc variables These rcl.irionxhips were nor linear, Dcspire
rhc large onrriburion of ari.rblc o"c;, ro the osr -rru cure.
.Ivcr.lge cosrs VM I irh calc: a poinr where average cosrs begin
ro rise is reached .H relatively low levels of ovel"<lge.
This analy is is limircd by being rctrospccrivc and by ir
lise of"rollrine moniroring sy relll nor specifically designed for
co,r .lI1.1Iy,e~. In . ome aSe~, inpllL 'lnd values ro [he projecr
were <.:~rinured b.};'ed on inrervi<.:w~ racher chan re ord~, uc-
pur I <.'reraken from rourine moniroring sysrems, .1I1d rhese
can be .'lIbje r ro errors. FinJn ial da[a were u.ed <LSa proxy
f)( [he e onomic OMS of [rJn~porr and moniwri ng owing [Q J
I.lCk of I'l.'cords. The s III ,II I '.-1I1lplc.compounded b rhe diversiry
in rhe org3ni7~Hion,' lur.l (eris[i ~, limir. our Jhiliry [0 allO\~
confidenr infcren I.' from rhe non-par<lm<.:cri c1l1drl:gre ....\ion
.1I1.llyses, Therefore, ilHerprerariolls of rhe re ulrs hould be
made \ irh .1u(ion, In.1ddi(i n, ir i. nor pos.,ihle ro decermine
Fig 3 Se '"
" nSltlVlty analysis plots of quadratic relationship between coverage of commercial sex workers (CSWs) and a) total costs
and b) cost per person reached. (AddlHon 15r HSHClin ormarion ISavailable ar he following URl' hnp:llwww,who,," bulle in)
a)
b)
SO 80
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[h<:,lrt'lwlh f I I
. "lJ I 1<. It .1l10Ihhll" III ,v.11c..vuh rh ...other duucu-
\IOlh b<:ll . I' .
L' I .11\<:mu nv.m.uc .11I.d\'1\ ....llldd lx' required. III \Pll':
OJ [1nl' ur I I I· r 0) cmv, I Ic unc-w.rv vcnvinvrrv .m.ilv-,« ,hll\\cd rhe
1<:\Ld[\In I . I .
, I' . c c1111r<:ro )Ih[ J\ldwugh rher, nu\ .d,o It' 11.1\
r~'t!IIIl!'lr) I .. ' . .."
.. " I III [ 1<:ll<:lX".If\ '.1IIII'll Ilg c rrtcrr.t ot .lgrC':I1ICIlIto
p.lrll 'Ip IIc" I I
.' , [1(' l ircc nou of rlu-, hl.I\ I' .Imhlguou,. r.c. rhovc
.lgl'l'<:llIg I
I
. 0 p.lnll_lp.Hl' .11'l'Ilkdl [t) he hcrrcr .11 rt'p{)rrtllg .ind
fll\ Illly I' .
h '. l I 1ll,1}110111111'1)[h.1I rhc· ,.1I11pk h,h .III.'Llgt' costsC .H Ir<:'- 1 I. oll",rl'll[ v ()\\er Ilr higher
.In.1I10Ih III \ .dl' m.l\ .HI\<:Irum rhc 1<:11I'[hof IIJ1II' rhc
Illr~I'V" I "
f
: I ellrl{lll I.h 1<:<:11under .....11, rhc "r.:.lt:h.tbili!\" .ind ,it.:
() Ikllr '. gc:r group.h wc!l.l\ Ihl' [.lrVc[' ,cl 111'[h ...lOll [r,lI_[1IW
,lg<:lIr. C . " "I t -OIn.lgc: 1.ll'Inl.ILUlrdlllg [() [hI.' fUlldll1g .lg<:11I .1I1d
[ Ie )lIti1'<:I Ii· II I I . '
I
". <:l.III,..· .IIIIIU.I )(Il gl'[\ tlq llld on .Il 11t:\CI1II.'II[\
Ill.lll· dllr' I I .[h.. IlIg I 1<:prc'\ IOlh l'c.1f .1I1<!.11 Ihe [ll11e Ilf [hc ,[udy.
· ele .1\ IlnureJ Inlorm.llllln Illllh ..' ,"<:oflhl' urgl'l pllpUl.l-
flOIl\ i[ i\ 1'1 I I' 1M;) r 1.111,.tl\l'r.lgl· r<:Hn:[\ rhl.' .Ibiliry [l) IlCg0rt.Hl·
[.JrgCC\ I' III I I .
I
. In [un r 1<:.lLfll.ll ,,'e ot rhc Pllf ul.HItHl. fhi\ 111.1)
.1 \o.lPI)1 I', ) 10 ( It l'J'ell l'\ In \IlIUIIIl' ..,,([h fl"Pl'U m l{)\....r.I~..·: lor
OIlCfUlldi " '[I ng .Igell(~, ....11 l.lIg<:h .Inc! hudg<:1\ \,cre ,<:r.I<.'l'orcllllg
()I le WI" I ' ., I"" lCl '-{)\l'Llgc' 01 Llrgch. Ilo\\c\'cr, rhe e llle.l,urn .11,1l
COlllrmd . I. '. . k l <:grl'e 01 ".In.UlIln In rn:hIlIL.d l' hUl'nL\ ( ()\r pl'1'
IIIII[ 01 t) IIIpIli) .IUIl" .Ipp.lrelllf\ '111111.11'1I11CI'\ClHllllh.
I
;\, wnh, .11e.{(lui "hi' .He likely [() he dmen hy hlldger,
<llll [,II" . I ' ,of I ~~I' ,t:I ) [hl: 1l,!.~.lnll.III111". 'IIJ'1hl'l' .11I.dY'I' find, rh.1{
" I' ~fi:f.Il{(Jr, ,hllwn ill T.lbl<: . Oil!., "Iulldillg .lgl.'lllY" Iud ,I
Igill 1..lnr 1'·1 I I I' .,',
l
e .HIIlI" lip \ If I filL! !,.(hr (Pe.ll'\C)n, x' 13 ..u21;
pro ),Ihilll I I () () I . I I hfo I . )(J·t . ,\ Wit e r.lIIg<:ol!.1 mr, 1.1\.1 ,0 et:n
II n( 1'0 i1111 . . I I' I' .
I . II~nl.' .I\,.:r.lgl' \.(hr, 111 lit Ill!!' "1 t: IIHI.'f\·t:lHllllIt ~'Ign, to .. . .. '. .( -8 nrc'Cr, ,.lp.l!"If),. f l'Il)e..1 ,Ige. Indfil-ICnLI"" .In 1prl e'
h' ,I (J-I_, I').)() ).3). In mlk rlll:lldlLHl' rh<:Ltlrnp.IINllb
~twC(!1l ' I ', :lhr, .1111, .de 01 opcr.ltinll. rht: ,.II11plillft pmcl.'durc
conl'rnl, 1 . 1 . "f or eplL clllllllogl'. Inrt'rVt'n[lon lk,ign .1I1dllnrcXf .h
ar·"po,,·II· I I' ,.
P
.1) c. Ill' ILI)I .. 1' Ihl' \.Imr!c 1\ ukl'n lrom.ln .ILfI\l'
rogralllll' I" .,, 11.'.r l~'~ LII.rm\ \.11') ,I'm" [hc IlHcrWlHlom. For
C)(,jnlplc I I' I ..,· I' . Wo () r le 1 Il1{crv<:nrlon, prm ide I ~n ,([yiLt"~
Wl(lln rh,' I .F . elr tlIvn t Inll.'. Ih'l IIHel'\l'IHIIlI" fl'it:rrl'd people
01 lrCal'lllell[ III I f' I' . . j I"lIh . I . l. I.' I.·Cpl or r HCC II1[Cr\l.'nIIOIl\. prO\ IUl.'t .1
I' I "Ilt y II~ Ih<: pro ltin. ;\Irhllllgh thi, nu. limir rhe ll)l11p.l-
.1)1 If} 01 I .' .ill . [le IIl[<:rlellllon,. II fdl<: r, rhl' rl'.lltr 'of, .dlng-lip
which rh"r' '11 I I ... I I' 'Ii ~ ~ .. I .1W.IV' ). 1.11'I.I{IOIlIII r lC t C'lg" ot r lt:
IlterVel1[ion. •
h, I' IV" lonr<: r t) [l, IIHervenllllll\ .11'1l\ .Iril'tl. he Imer-
1.'11[(01,,· . IFt I ' 1.'. 11111111.'(rollk pl.KC ill IWOJin~rcllr ,1,1It:' .llld wcr~
In(cd h r I' l'
o. Our t If er 'nt Ilrv.lni7.1riol", e,oire [he' ... dil er-
~nCC h " ti ~. r <: .11l.t! ,1\ Illund rh.\{ [hl"l' L{IIHC [1I,t! 1:1 [m, .Inti
IHCr cllrio I . . .A 111.1,lr.ll.rel'l,rll.' Il.lI 11Illllliucn '1; on ullir ·o,r.. (\cc
PPendi,< Ind f\ I" I' 1 I .'III - . ppenl I .l nor It r Ie nnn-p.lr.lmel rt rnr,
• ow L •b, 1\ [ll r<:)ecr rhl' hyporhl"I' rh.lr rhl'fl' 1\ nil rd.HI In,hip
I;rWcen 1"" I .~'hl .p 11:1;,.Int .1\cr.lgc Cth" (ppcndl ). If W.b 110rpw.-
1 e [() Idcnrif' f't.'·· . 1 . I I'" I Iof . f Inc II leIICI(', .1\\0 'I.Hc'l \ Ir 1 l Ifkrenr cl"
per HIll.lnlc in t]lI.ltHin.t! It: fill·m.
n :h\. •. 11l.t! ,i, connrnh Ih.1I , .t!1.' i, .1 kc t:lI;wr in in-
IIcnclnp I .
t" r le lInlr ml, re\lt!flng in.l -,Iupe 1.1 ...r.lge cO\r
urVe. lie I I' ,'I" I() r le Inlll.Hltln, 01 rhe J.lt.1 rhl.' -chr fun(.rilln
, 1I0t d" I' .II . t:rI I;t Irom .1 I f( illcrioll I'lin '!iOIl bllr i, de .. 'ripri\c.
11\ ll1.lk.:, " I'f' I . .in I more l I 11.11 I [0 Itlenflty rhe 1.'.111"" 01 'Iungc'
.lVcrng<: () 1 I I1 I " .Int [() e p .lIn r le rel.lfllln,llIp hl'l~ cen CO\l,\
. Ilt ~c.llc 1\ I' ,
W . ppen I I (.1 .1I1.1hk·onion Ihe \ cl .H hltp'llw\ I . '
r' ,'W 1 1.lIlr/bulll'un) loob .H rhe rel.uiol1\hip I 'fWeen I.{hl
IliCCurc ,llId '0' '\ ,.l:r.lg . I PPCII I ,hoI, dur rh, pcrc<:nuge
BullNlnof Ih WaridH Ith 0(9"nI1,1IIon I 0 lob r 005. 83 (10)
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fig -I Relationship between cost structure and coverage of
the interventions
pelsonnel educators personnel
costs
Input category
of Uhl, 'penl ,If rh ... rilllding .lgl.'nc. -kwl [111\ J\ CO\ l'r.lgl'
inl'r<:.he,. hur no llrht:r [rl'nd~ .Hl' di,cl'I'IlJhk. emph.l\iLi~" c-
rhe LOml'Xr-'peClnL n.([llrl' of '(hr, .lIld (he n<:l'd t~H furrher
rnl'.Ir ..h Inro rhe <:ulnomic, of' rhe dl',ign ,lIld impicmenurion
ot'lli prl'\<:nl Ion ,erVICe,.
Thc dunging nMurc of rh<: ~lIcr.lge co r h.b illlpOrrJIH
illlplil..lfiolb for pl.lIlning rhc rc~oLlrcc nccdcd for ~cJlillg-up
inrerwnrion~. onrr.lry [0 CXpcc[.lfion~ rh.1f rhc high propor-
rion o(v.lri.lb!c co~r, \...ould !c,ld ro COil [.IIl[ .1Icr.lge eOMS,Ind
rhl.' rl.'~Ollrec C~[illl.Hioll [ccilniqllcs rh.l[ .1$>lIllle [his, ,l\cr,lge
co\r~ f:III.lIld rhcn ri,e .lg.lin.l co\cr.lgc incrc'bc~. E",rilll.lr' of
re,OUrt.t' rl.'quiremell{' rh.H .HC h.bed on J nn,rall{ Jverage CO\[
wOlild rherd!)!'e ,igninc.lI1riy undere,[inlJre Of oVere,(inu[e [he
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Appendix 13: Scatter plots and fitted linear and quadratic
regressions of costs against volume
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a) TOTAL COSTS AGAINST VOLUME VARIABLES.
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Appendix 14: Sensitivity analysis of the costs of the case
study HIV prevention projects
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Appendix 15: Correlation matrices of the variables used in
the econometric cost function estimation
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Appendix 16: Themes used in the analysis of the transaction
cost data
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Themes used in the analysis of the transaction cost data:
SERVICE CHARACTERISTICS
ORGANISATION CHARACTERISTICS
• NGO motivation
• NGO capacity
• NGO behaviour
• NGO staff motivation
• Agency motivation
• Agency capacity
• Agency behaviour
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
• Competition
TRANSACTION CHARACTERISTICS
• Contract development
• Contract renewal
• Length of contract
• Contract
• Fund flows
• Contract breach
• Relationships with agency
SCALING UP
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Appendix 17: Example of an NGO recruitment advertisement
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Appendix 18: Monitoring indicator requirements
357
INSPECTION REPORT, JART TEAM
{BEFORE RELEASING 40% BEING fI INSTALMENT)
I. 'arne of tbe r\GO
2. ddre of the.
J. Priori£! roup
~. I r et rca (BI ck I Taluk I District)
5. COl.JME 'TS
1) 13ff(A_ P r Attendance Register)
(2) Activit] Performed
Activities
a) Contacted
b) o. of Interpersonal ommunication made
c) No. of oodom Distributed
d) o. of ondom Demonstrations Conducted
c) o. of ondom Outlet E tablished
f) No. of STD a es Identified
g) o. of TD Ca Referred
b) o. of STD ases Treated
i) o. of Counselling Sessions Conducted
Qualification Training (Details)
Cumulative as on Date
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.-\l'ti\itin-- ----
k) No. of ultural Progr:llllmt"~ I rrect PIa) .ondu t cl
I) o. of Audio VI~U31, J>nlgrammc- C nduct d
m) '0. of Group Di~ us ion Condu ted
I n) ;\'0. of Peers Id ntificd and frain.c.1
0) ~o. of Peer Rcrruttvd
i p) No. of R"-;,,, """: (Qod"",d
6. DES .RJPTII/£ REPORT
(a) apaciry of the .-':lff
(b) ornm nt. about th Programme lProc
Outcomes
E
~lulalin~:I on Date
Purti ular w-u
hould be~Iainiaincd
_____ ----=..~~:c.:::.=-=----+-.::-.;--;.:;-'---'-'-----"-~--.----'----,
I. Auendanc Rcgi tcr
2. Condom tuck Rcgi ter
(a) Identified (Row many
Per on )
(b) Follow p
(c) Treatrneut 'Ole
(d) rock Register (Medicine)
(e)
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Particular. \\ ell Maintained
... .-~-- ---.-------,.---- _- -
• hould be
Imrml'~
(c How often?
~~ ~ L ~ ._l
6.
TER:
(a) Type of COUll clling
(b) 0110\\ 'r
I c) R f rral if any
I (a :'\0. of Meeting~ conducted(b Place conducted
9.
(d) Purpo e of the lectin
(c) Person attended
(a) Number
(b) Per 01.1
8. Project Period
9. Date ofVi.~it
From: / I To: I
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10. FINlfl\'lIAL APPRAI. Al.
Period of \ i~i!
1\1 Qrr (From
hnd Qtr (From
, Il l rd Qtr (From
h rh If (Fro_!!!
/
I
'1 !)
I (I
10
'Iel
II, Bu-vlin c ."'un e-~ ( Olndu(ll'd ,,' ,,' ;end
Rl'IWr'( vent or III,
11. Anuua] Rcpurt Suhrnitred
13, Bunk Account (Dute 0 amount \\ ithdr:I" :.II)
l~, PI:1CC of Visit
Office
Field
1-. Over :III Remark
16, . ugg('stion
I"AME ,ADORES A 0 TELEPHOI'E ~liMBER
OF THE TWO J, RT i\fEMBERS
IGNATUR OF' THE T\ 0 JART MD1BER,'
\'{H! hers.
Auditor.
tatemcnt
Submirted or
'\0:
Quarterlv
Progress
Report
• ubmitted or
1\01
Di~i.r ~;jnril''''
Cornr ~nrt'::fI..
I d.& ~ ,<,Idied
f,"'- n!
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Appendix 19: Contract between APSACS and HLL for the
Formation of the TRU
362
Contract between APSACS and HLL for the Formation of the TRU (Extract
from TRU Briefing Note)
The important terms of the contract are mentioned below:
Duration of the Contract
The Contract wi" be deemed to have commenced on (1st June 2001) and unless
terminated earlier in accordance with the provisions, will continue in force until (31 st
March 2004).
APSACS (kev) Duties and Responsibilities
APSACS wi" have overall responsibility for the management of the Grant Funds and
implementation of the HIV/AIDS Control Programme in accordance with the terms of
the approval from NACO
Work with the Project Steering Committee to develop overall policies and objectives for
technical assistance for HIV/AIDS Control Programme
Approval of the Quarterly Programme Plan submitted by TRU and transfer of the funds
needed for implementing the approved plan on time
Monitor and audit the performance of the Technical Resource Unit, and in particular, its
role in the progress of the NGO/CBO sector programme and its financial management
and the accounts relating to;
Subject to the provisions, ensure that each installment of the Grant Funds is released
as advance to the Partner organisations for every six months activities.
Carry out an assessment of the Technical Resource Unit's performance against the
Performance Indicators each Project Year on behalf of the Project steering Committee
HLL's (key) Duties and Responsibilities
Facilitate and support the TRU which wi" provide technical assistance in implementing
HIV/AIDS Control programme, perform and observe HLL's obligations under the
Contract and operate the Technical Resource Unit as an independent entity within HLL,
as far as is possible;
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Engage other suitably qualified staff and consultants as are necessary for the
Technical Resource Unit to achieve its objectives, obtaining the approval of the
APSACS prior to any appointments;
Complete a draft programme plan and a budget for the TRU in conjunction with the
APSACS for the Project Year and present it to the Project Steering Committee by a
date, which is mutually agreed. The administrative budget for the contract period of
three years wi" be as already agreed upon.
Provide the secretariat for the Project Steering Committee and ensure that meetings
are held on a regular basis in accordance with the procedures agreed by the Project
Steering Committee. The last meeting of each Project Year should be held at least 8
weeks before the Project Year end unless agreed otherwise;
Provide the Project Steering Committee with copies of the following for the TRU:
• Quarterly progress reports
• Quarterly financial reports
• The annual programme plan
• The annual progress report
• The annual financial report
• The annual budget
• The annual audited accounts
so that they are available for consideration at the respective Project Steering
Committee meetings and can be used to monitor the performance of the Technical
Resource Unit;
Provide APSACS with the following by the tenth day of the following month:
• A monthly expenditure statement together with supporting documentation for the
Technical Resource Unit's activities; and
• A brief monthly progress report for the Technical Resource Unit's activities
Prepare the quarterly and the annual progress reports for the TRU. The annual
progress report should describe the progress which the HIV/ AIDS Programme has
made towards meeting the respective programme plan objectives, contain information
on the activities carried out, the problems encountered and the results of the monitoring
and evaluation which the Technical Resource Unit has carried out;
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Appendix 20: Training programmes implemented by the
TRU
365
Training programme Batches
Components of Targeted Intervention (SW Project)
MIS & FM
STD Counselling
Condom social marketing
Book Keeping & Accountancy
Communication material development workshop
Orientation Meeting for local facilitators
Female condom
STD/H IVICounselling
Syndromic Case Management
Program support for Project Managers
Counsellors Training
Outreach Workers Training
3
6
9
9
11
5
3
1
5
2
1
57
Source: TRU quarterly reports
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Appendix 21: Funding delays experienced by APSACS
NGOs
367
Years of Delay 1 'Delay 2 Delay 3 IDelay 4 IDelay 5 ,Delay6 Delay?
NGO mtervennon (months)
19 2 61 3' 2 11 21 6
9 4 none reported
4 4 3 3 3
15 4 6 3 0.2 0.8 2 2 5
2 4 4 6 4 5 t 4 4
3 4 8 3 5 8 5 5 4
10 2 5
5 3 4 4 4 r ?
12 5 none reported
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